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I NT R ODUC T I ON

This thesis is concerned primarily with an examination and
assessment of the proposals that are currently employed to promote the
inclusion of philosophy in precollege education .

It is the central

contention of t he thesis that t he dominant arguments in favour of
precollege phil osophy are not yet adequatel y formulated .

In support of

the inclusion of philosophy in the school syllabus, therefore, I shall in
this thesis seek to identify areas of apparent and real weakness e s within
the framework of the dominant arguments , with an aim to showing how these
weaknesses mi ght either be ex~irpated or overcome.
Requisite to the achievement of this comprehensive task is an
understanding of the term 'philosophy' as iv is used in the context of
precollege education.

To thi s end, Chapter I focuses upon alternative

conceptions of phi l osophy and the teaching practices to which they give
rise .

Current methods of teaching precollege phil osophy are described,

and they are t hen examined in terms of this broader conceptual framework.
Having completed this initial part of the thes i s , I will concentrate
more determinately upon the arguments surrounding the introduction of
philosophy in the schools.

Chapter II exam:i.nes the main argument which

presently serves as the primary source of motivation for implementing
philosophy i n the s chools, na.mely t hat the study of philosophy deve l ops
and improves t hink ing skills.

Together with the anatomization of t his

claim , Chapt er II also explores the viability of the claim in terms of
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the teachability and transferability of thinking skills.

Finally, I

shall evaluate the role played by philosophy i ~ the development of
thinking skills.

Two argwnents will be cons idered in this connection:

( i ) that philosophy i s the excl usive vehicle for the development of

thinking skills - this I deny;

and (ii) i f philosophy does not have a

monopoly on thinking skill development, then does it contribute anything
unique to cognitive abil i ty?
In Chapter III three claims made i n favour of philosophy f or
children whose benefits are putatively a function of studying philosophy
are considered.

Whereas the development of thinking skill s is an

argument that has been adduced in t he justification of other educational
innovations, the arguments presented in this chapter which espouse the
virtues of precollege philosophy are believed to be concerned with
by-products peculiar only to the study of that discipline.
examined here are

The proposals

(i) that philosophy can act as a buffer t o indoctrination ;

(ii) that philosophy affords a framework in terms of which the curriculum
can be integrated;

and (iii) that philosophy can bring more meaning

into the lives of those who pursue it.
Chapter IV then turns to consider the overall viability of
philosophy as a pursuit suitable for precollege students .
of viability are examined.

Two aspects

The fi rst relates to the capability of

c hildren for the kind of thinking that philos ophy requires and, gi ven
the requis ite ability, the second concerns the degree to which they are
rea~y to confront the issues engendered by ph i losophic inquiry .

The

most .pe:::-s i stent challenge to philosophy for children is fostered on the
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grounds of Jean Pi2.€et's theory of cognitive development.

Hi s theory

can be interpreted s~ as to sustain the object ion that children
younger than 12-14 :.-ears have neither a facility with nor the ability
for abstract thinki ~;. the mode of thought which is predominantly
demanded by the st~:.:: of philosophy .

Accordingly, Chapter IV is devoted

to an analysis of t~:s objection, ascertaining the strength of the
contention in ligh-c :;-;: both the contemporary work in cognitive development
theory and the emer€e~ce of conceptual frameworks promoting alternative
explanations for tte jynamics of cognitive growth.

The chapter then

moves on to consider the viability of precollege philosophy in terms of
~he student's readi~ess to confront issues in philosophy.
researc h has been d:;~e in this area.

Very little

However, there is a line of

investigation, the ~:~dings of which strongly suggest that most children
are ready for philo2~?hy.

The argument gives rise to two problems namely,

the assessment of re~iiness, and individual di f ferences in readiness;
recommendations for ~ieir resolution are provided;

It is to be ~:;ped that the analysis of precollege philosophy
presented here will ~~ford the reader a better understanding of the
nature of the disci;:ine and the concomitant theoretical and practical
problems in need of resolution.

The admission of th~se problems should

not be taken as an argument for the futility of precollege philosophy
programs.

On the c c:·.-trary, the discussion in this thesis attempts to

show that the diffic:·..:.:.ties are not insuperable.

In respect of more

recalcitrant proble~ 2, it is to be hoped that the thesis at least
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sugges ts avenue s which might in the future be profita bly followe d to
achieve their resolu tion.

C HA P T E R I
1'HE NATURE OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY

What is precolle ge philosop hy?

What, in other words , is taught in

the schools under the rubric of precolle ge philosop hy or philosop hy for
children ?
The answer to this question depends primari ly upon the concept ion
of philosop hy within which the philosop hy program is embedde d.

I shall

begin this thesi s , ther efore , by bri nging togethe r three interpre tations
of the nature of philosop hy which engende r slightly differen ~ orienta tions
towards its teachin g.

In the most general sense , the term philosop hy

refers to the love of wisdom, and its etymolog y clearly bears this out .
There is also the sense of the term where philosop hy refers to a specific
body of problem s and/or the hi story of the i deas of the famous phi los ophers .
In either case, the philosop her is one who exhibit s a special competen ce
wi th the tradit i onal philoso phical theories and problem s .

In more recer.t

times , the term philosop hy has been used to indicate a particu lar mental
methodo logy or analyti c habi t of mind .
has no subject matter of its own;

On this latter account philosop hy

it is rather a meta- discipli ne which

affords the elucida tion of virtual ly any problem .
My aim in this chapter is twofold :

first , it 1s to argue that

the ideal practice of teaching philosop hy in the schools requires that
the philosop hy program incorpo rate compone nts based upon each of these
three concept i~ns of phi l osophy ;

and second , it is to examine the
5

6

relationship that exists between the current approaches to teaching
precollege phi.losophy and these three interpretations of philosophy .·
Accordingl y, this chapter is divided into three sections :

(l) a description of three conceptions of philosophy and the
implications for teac hing philosophy to which they give rise.

From this

discussion, a proposal for what mi ght constitute a successful , if not
ideal, phil osop:1y program is developed;
( 2) a n outline of the methods currently employed in teaching

precollege philosophy .

To better understand these met hods , some of their

advantages and disadvantages are discussed ;

(3) an

and

examination of t he relationship between the conceptions

of phil osophy d iscussed in (1) and the teaching methods discussed in (2) .

Three Conceptions of Philosophy and the Concomitant
Imulications for Teaching

Let us beg in with the concept of philosophy as the love of wisdom.
To determine what , on this view constitutes philosophy it is neces sary
to examine more closely the nature of wisdom.

Thi s involves an

appreciation of the dist inction between wisdom and knowledge.

As

problematic as . any account of knowledge may be, wisdom implies the ability
to deal sagac iously with what one knows.

This is perhaps more easily

expressed ~s part of the distinction between knowledge and understandin; .
For exa1:1ple, one mi~ht kno,, how high Mt. Everest i s , but if in the
r.iorn i nt; one goes to climb it dressed in a swimsuit and without a pac ked
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Junch, then l.t is clear that one has not understoo d what one claims to
know.

Indeed, one would not be described as having behaved wisely .

Wisdom, to some extent then, may be described as a combinati on of
knowledge , an understan ding of the knowledge , and an ability to make
decisions and act in accordanc e with that understan ding .

On this view

then, an education al program which hoped to teach philosoph y would need
to develop in i ts students an appreciat ion for what wisdom is , and an
actual love of what that involves .

In order to appreciat e more fully the

nature of this requireme nt, let us examine more closely what the love of
wisdom involves.

First , an appreciat ion of what wisdom is, requires that

the indi vidual be able to detect
understan ding.

the differenc e between learning and

'Ihis conceptio n of philosoph y requires that the students

learn to seek not so much knowledge and facts as an understan ding of what
knowledge is , what facts mean , the way i n which facts feature as knowledge ,
and the use that can b e made of them .

On this view of philosoph y it is

clear that the teaching of philosoph y employs little , if any philosoph y ,
at least if philosoph y is thought of an sone content or subject- matter ,
say the history of philosoph y or the particula r problems which it treats .
This is not to say that an acquainta nce with this subj ect-matte r might
not contribut e to the understan ding being sought , but rather the point is
that it might not .

In other words, there is no logical reason why one

should expect philosoph y, in the sense of the knowledge of tradition al
problems , and philosoph y alone to make a person wise .
Seconc, the actual love of wisdom requires a love of l earning .
Indeed, it seer:1s uncontro versial that the l ove of wisdom, no matter what
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eJ se it might invol ·:e, entails a love of learning.

This involves the

developme nt o: a se:-:se of the excitemen t of intellect ual curiosity and
discovery and an a:i;;;:::-eciat ior; for the uses to which knowledge can be put.
The generatio n of t~ese feelings and attitudes is, by and large, a
result of the way i:: ·.•hich lessons are presented .

It is not so much the

content of what is ~aid as in what is shown by what is said .

On this

view of philosoph y ~::en, the teaching of philosoph y also requires that
the teacher have ar.i oe able to share a love of the enterpris e in which
he/she is engaged .

:tis through that love that they transmit to their

students the love o: :earning .
It should noh oe easier to appreciat e the scope and limits of the
second concept of ~~: losophy , that is , philosoph y as a body of cont ent or
subj ect matter .

Al~~ough there is an interacti on between the two, the

subj ect matter refe~:::-ed to here covers two broad areas - the history of
philosoph y or philc:~ph ical thought and the classical problems of
philosoph y.

It ·,,o,...:.:. ::>e misguided to think that a comprehe nsive

understan ding of p~::.osoph y could be reduced merely to t he historica l
account of p~ilosc;~ y.

The view of philosoph y as content admits of a

less myopic construa: . than the rendering of what this or that philosoph er
has espoused .

The ~~~tent of philosoph y can be substanti ve in the sense

of an appreciat ion c: the tradition al problems of philosoph y.
Certain prob:.~~s have come to be identifie d as peculiarl y
philosoph ical proble::-.s, for exa..'!lple, free will and determinis !".l , the
mind- body relation a::~ personal identity .

If one construes philosoph y

a.s a di$ciplin e cc:.5::i t.uted of such proble!ns and the worl d- views to which
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they give rises

jt

would follow that a course in philosoph y would need

to treat these issues.

Moreover, one would expect that the better the

~ature of these problems was presented , then the better would be the
philosoph ic education .

On this account, it would be expected of a

philosoph y program to present the classical problems of philosoph y in
such a way that the students become familiar with the nature of the
intellect ual de::iands placed upon those who consider them.

It is not

required that t~e program have a high level of sophistic ation in all
areas of philosoph y, nor even in one.

Indeed, such an expectati on is

seldom, if ever, satisfied even in the case of professio nal philosoph ers
whose specialis t area accumula tes literatur e so quickly that their
absorptio n reQuires more attention than could be given .

Expertise might

actually serve as an impedimen t to the teaching of philosoph y, in the
sense that the feeling that all problems have been solved can be
intellect ually debilitat ing .

Neverthe less, there is a strongly based

presumpti on in ~avour of the philosoph y course containing enough substanti al
informati on aoout tr.e tradition al problems of philosoph y to transmit an
understan ding o~ them.

The good teacher of philosoph y would , on this

account, educate for philosoph ical capability in creating an intellect ual
climate in which the student feels capable of making a personal
contribut ion.

The teacher of philosoph y is not so much required to

cultivate pro~essio nal philosoph ers as to nurt ure an appreciat ion of
what it is abot:t philosoph y that makes philosoph y worth professio nal
pursuit .

In respect of the concept of p~ilosoph y as content, students

need an acq_clai:::.ance with the tradi tiona:i. problems of philosoph y to the
~.xt-ent that 7.~~ey are inspired to pursue the problem ' s res0lutio n .
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Now l et us turn to the third concept of philosophy, philosophy
as a technique of i ntellectual reflection, and determine t he extent to
which i t demands a curriculum consistent or otherwise with the foregoing.
Phi losophy is often regarded as a reflective habit of mind .

Most

particularly, _ it is rendered as a predisposition to analysis where the
subj ec t of t he analysis is, by and large , the conceptual f ramework i n
which t he problen or issue in question l ay.

For example, to think

phi losophically about the problem of abortion entails, on t his view ,
reflection upon and analysis of more global concepts l ike ' the right to
l ife', 'the ownership of choice', ' the morality of murder' , etc.

Whereas

a scientific discussion focuses upon issues like the probability of an
outcome (e . g.

adoption rate after bir th-of unwanted child) based on

statistical COTiputation.
On this view of philosophy, phi losophy is deemed to have no
subject matter of its own, the sphere of influence of the tec hnique
extending far beyond the traditional problems .

Vi rtuall y any problen ca~

be treated philosophically, and viewing problems philosophic ally , incluci~g
the t raditional problems, in many cases signifies an analysis of t he
language i n terms of which the problems are themselves formulat ed .

On

this view, phi losophy is concerned with maki ng explicit the assumptions
and impli cations i mplicit in the questions and answers that philosophers
and others have been disposed to raise and provide.

i~1i le this concept i on

of phil osophy repr esents a dis tinct way of looki ng a t things , it is not
easy to say or t each what it is that makes it distinc t .

There are t,..;o

t.:1in1:;s , howeve r, "that it seems necessary for the students to be able t o
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do,

First, jnsofar as philosoph y rests heavily upon the distincti on

between empirical

~~i

conceptua l matt ers, part of what the student needs

t o know is how to r:-.a:~e t his distincti on .

Secondly, philosoph y here is

concerned to circ ur..sc~ibe the domain of possible states of affairs and
events and, therefc~e , the s tudent must develop the skills a ppropriat e
to this task.

In o:::er words, t he philosoph y student needs to know how

to determine when a~ account of a matter reflects a coherent descript ion
of events.
to do this .

However , it is not enough for the students merely to be able
They ~~st also be able to articulat e for others ~hat t hey have

done, that is, to be able to delineate the features of the matter which
constitut e its coherency .

On ·the one hand, the tradition al problems of

philosoph y are in t~e~selve s of little use in acquiring the skills of
analysis fam i2iar to contempo rary philosoph y.

On the other hand however,

the so- called tradi~ ~onal problems do admit of the contempo rary approach
and much recent li te~ature is in this vein.

Although a study of the

tradition al problet::s c.oes not i n itself a dvance the teaching of
phi losophy as a met:-.oc. of analysis and reflecti.o n, the applicati on of t he
contempo rary approec~ to the tradition al problems does .

Hence , it is

easy to see that the student of philosoph y could benefit from exposure
to the contempo rary iialogue .

It would afford a familiari ty wi th the

tools of conceptual a~alysis, as well as an opportun ity to experienc e
the intellect ual ir.~e~itan ce of the past .

In -thi s way , the second and

third conc epts of p:-.i:osoph y can be integrate d .
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fl Proposed Model for Teaching Philosoph y

In this section I am concerned to show that the successfu l , if not
ideal, practice of teaching philosoph y requires componen ts drawn from
each of these three conceptio ns of philosoph y.

In what follows I set out

to justify this model for teaching philosoph y by consideri ng sone of the
consequen ces of excluding from a philosoph y course those teaching
practices peculiar

to each of the three conceptio ns of the disciplin e .

First, let us c onsider the effec ts of a philosoph y program that
fails to generate an appreciat ion for, and a love of , wisdom .
outcomes are likely .

On the one hand , the proc esses of critical thinking

and reflectio n may easily become ends in t hemselves .
example here.

Two

Sophism is a good

When students are not taught to use these skills in the

context of the search for understan ding and meaning , they are open to
acquiring the mindless habit of applying the ski lls in the manner of a
ritual to all probl ems they confront.

While the thinking processes might

be developed in this way to a high level of excellenc e , the unthinkin g
applicati on of the respectiv e corporate skills defies the ' true' nature
of the philosoph ic spiri t .

Moreover , t he practice of r itualized

applicati on closes minds on issues that are fundamen tally open .

For

exampl e , it does not allow for the re- a s sessment of thi nking strategie s
in light of the intricaci es and nuances of each situation .

In other words ,

in the absence of the search for r.ieaning , students may have as their goal
' skill proficien cy ' .

This would be unfcrtuna te as it serves to curtail

the actual use _to which thinking processes can be put .
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On the other ~and, students are unlikely to display much incentiv e
to search for the r.-.ean ing containe d within the experien ces of everyday
life unless the phi:csop hy program s are dedicate d to impartin g a love of
knowledg e and unders~ anding.

Within the context of the classroo m, any lack

of incenti ve will nc: be so apparen t .

However , outside the classroo m

where the motives o~ ?leasing the teacher and passing examina tions are no
longer cogent , stude'-ts are less likely to be concern ed with reflecti on
and deeper interpre :ations of everyday experien ce.

Imagine , for example ,

Johnny a boy who in t:ie context of the classroo m applies his critica l
thinking skills to a passage in his textbook , yet who outside the classroom
~oes not ' think' to apply the same thinking skills to the discours e of a
fr iend.

While he ca'- ascerta in the validity , worth and meaning of his

textbook , he i~ not a~forded the same opportu nity in respect of his friend ' s
dialogue .

It is not that the friend 's discour se does not admit of such

analysis .

The point ~s rather that without the motivat ion to perform

reflecti ve analysi s, ~ie range of possible meaning s that Johnny could
extract from the inte~ac tion with his fr iend is reduced .
Program s , the~efo re, which do not attempt to generate a love of
wisdom, by and large, reduce to either thinking skills developm ent or a
history of intell ect~al thought.

In both cases, the scope of the study

is restrict ed by vir:~e of undevelo ped incentiv e to the materia l presente d
in the classroo m .

:'-sofar as all aspects of our l ives need understa nding,

it seems unreaso~ a~:e :o construe the pursuit of wisdom as mer ely a
function of inschoo l e~ucation.

Every aspect of our daily 1 i ve s

1.4

admits of a philosophic interpretation and accordingly, I woul d choose
to a r gue that any program which fai led to encourage the motivation to
~ursue this type of analysis across a broad spectrum of situations could
not rightly clai:n to teach philosophy.
Let us now turn our att ention to those philosophy programs which
exclude the tradit ional subject matter of philosophy, whether it be the
hi storical study or classical problems of the discipline.

Programs which

generate a n understanding of philosophy as certain proc esses of thinking
and/or the love of wisdom alone, deny students an appreciation of the
gr eat tradition of intellectual thought that has come to be known as
philosophy.

Perhaps t he most pernicious feature of this orientation to

philosophr is the lack of r espect it Dnput es to the interests of key
concern to prof essional philosophers.

This is unfortunate because i t is

a familiarity with these intractable problems of philosophy that affords
children an opportunity to reinforce their enthus iasm for confronting the
perplexities and apparent irresolvable difficulties they fac e in thei r
everyday lives.

In other words, an awareness of the respect that the

seemingly recalcitrant problems of philosophy engender in professional
philosophers and others can help students recognize t hat the problems
worth attempting are net only the ones whose solutions are guaranteed. 1
Of course anyone fam iliar with the class i cal philosophic problems
is aware that the amount of rel evant data that can be a cc umulated in
respect of any one problem is almost unending.
1

Therefore , one needs to

See Chapter III of this thesis for a mo1·e detailed ac count of the

:issue.
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conside r what a:::ou:-:-: ::)f subject-matter is necessa ry for a program to
be success ful.
In most cases the answer to this question depends upon two things :
the intricac y and i~~~act ibility of the philoso phic issue under
conside ration;

ar.i, ~he prior experi ence with and compete ncy for dealing

with the philoso p~i: :.ssues that the prospec tive student s enjoy .

Granted

that these ~ore spe::.:'ic needs have been met, a requisi te conditio n to be
met across all sit~a-: ions is the provisio n of at leas~ that amount of
subject- matter whic~ ~ould serve to prevent 'philoso phic indoctr ination '
or indoctri nation i:-:~o a part i cular philosop hic vi ewpoint .

Instruc tion

which fails to cor:-.::·.::.icate accurat ely the range of opinion s concern ing a
particu lar philoso:; :~:.~ issue or which involves the assertio n of
controv ersial philcs~ ?nic views without reasoned conside ration of the broadly
held contend ing vi:~s , can be indicted for inculca ting biased views.

Of

course, there are t~:s e persons who conscio usly seek to teach in this way
primari ly :'or the :;:·.:r:;:ose of instilli ng in the young a specific ideology .
Notwith standing the seriousn ess of this malprac tice, I wish to draw
attentio n here to ~:-::cnsc ious indoctr ination , that is, the inculca tion of
beliefs which occU!·s ~s a result of the teacher ' s ignoranc e about the
dynamic s of the phi:..:·s:) phic issue at hand .

Conside r , for exampl e , the

teacher who comest ~ a place in the lesson where the mind- body problem
ar is es .

1-iithout a ;-r:.or exposure to the cen·. .·ies old debate about this

problem , a ":-eac~1er ·.;:-.::-:i we will assume for t i'1e purpose s of the present
discussi on r.clds a. ::-.~-:eri alistic position , may react so adversly to any
account cf dualisr:-. ~=--~t intellec tual inferio rity is auto~at ically
t1·ansfe rred to t:,e .::.:a:..ist ' s view-poi nt .
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What all this shows is how insuffici ent attention to the subjectmatter of philosoph y may transmute
unintenti onal indoctrin ation.

jn

the context of the classroom to

Without an understan ding of the range and

subtlety of arguments that accrue in respect of the different philosoph ic
viewpoin ts, a teacher is both closed to and discourag es the philosoph ic
vitality of his /her students.

Teachers and their students, therefore ,

need to be educated in philosoph ic subject matter to the extent that the
opportuni ty for philosoph ic indoctrin ation is minimal .
Finally, what would be the outcome of a philosoph y program which
was not concerned with developin g the reflectiv e habit of mind?
unfortuna te consequen ces .present themselve s.

First, without

~wo

the developme nt

of the mental skills which afford reasoned criticism , ·a student's role in
learning is relegated to that of the passive receiver or the receptacl e of
the informati on that the education al system chooses to communic ate.

In

other words, the students are ill-equip ped to assess and make meaningfu l
the diverse informati on with which they are bombarded daily both within
and without the school context.

Second , pupils are denied the joy and

satisfact ion that comes about by thinking through issues , philosoph ical
and otherwise , when the capacity for reflectiv e and analytic thinkins is
left underdeve loped .

They become more easily frustrate d in their love of

learning and pursuit of truth since the skills which would allow them to
achieve these ends remain dormant .

Without a component designed to

encourage the reflectiv e habit of mind , a philosoph y proGram may amount
to little more than a descripti on of the different philosc•p hical vicwpoint .s .
Such .a procra:n in itself does not provide the opportu:1i ty to p~1.rtic ipate
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ju the practice of ; ::ilosoph y and the kinds of thinking that, in the first
place) generate d

t :~: .:: e viewpoi nts.

Again, the questj on of bal ance arises;

that is, how ~uch e::;~asis should a philosop hy program place upon
philosop hic subject ::atters and how much upon the developm ent of the
reflecti ve habit o: ::ind.
At the 0:..1:se:, it seems uncontr oversial that the reflecti ve habit
of mind shoul d be ::.e-:elop ed in students to its fullest potenti al. The
g_u estion, therefo r e , is probably best addresse d by conside ring the upper
limits of the practi:e .

It would seem desirab le to educate f or reflect ive

thi nking up to that :;:;oint at which f urther instruc tion would l i kely r e sult
in motivat ing tte ~se of thinking ski lls as ends in themsel ves .

In other

words, to disco~a ge students from becomir. g ' avid little analyze rs ' who
analyze ' every"th ing :o death' seems desirab le.
compone nt of p~i:os: ;~y comes into play here.

The love of wisdom
The love of wisdom can serve

to temper the pred i 2;~sitio n t o chronic analyci ty .

It orients the capacity

for reflecti ve cri~i : is~ so that i t can ~unction as a tool in pursu it of
meaning , rather tha~ as a single isolated perspec tive upon reality .
Socrates reminds us~: the importan ce of this franewo rk in the fol lowing
passage :
Even if we kno~,- :;ow to turn stones into gold , such ~nowledg e
would be wort:-::es s . For i f we did not know how to use gold ,
it would do us ~o good . . . . Even if there were some knowledg e
that would r.:a~e ·.;.s deathle ss , if we did not know how to use
our deathles sr.ass , even t hat woul d do us no good . 2
One aspect

c: :eacher performa nce is very inportan t f or develop i ne

reflect ive th i nkir.[ .

2socr~tes

~he teacher must be a dept in t he skills he / she i s

i~ t ~e : ~:~ydeMus of Flato , 2e5e-289b .
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attemp ting to instru ct .

Let me give an example pertain ing to the

develop ment of critica l thinkin g .

Consid er a teache r who is not

profic ient in the skills requis ite for assessi ng coheren cy .

Not only

would he/she be unable to assist studen ts in recogn izing incong ruities
,
but he/she could not assist in the studen ts ' develop ment of their own
analyt ic ski lls.

This is unfortu nate.

The most pernici ous feature of

this lack of. knowle dge, howeve r, manifests itself when the teache r is
unable to correc t speciou s reason ing, particu larly sad when the studen
t
is dedic ated to the pursui t of trut h.
In conclu sion then, I wvuld choose to a rgue that any propose d
model for teachin g philoso phy which did not include practic es befitti
ng
each of the three interp retatio ns of philos~ phy actual ly fai ls to make
use of the wealth of knowle dge that has c om~ to be known as philoso phy
.
The most unfortu nate conseq uence

of the other models is that studen ts

are denied ac cess to many vital sources of learnin g and knowle dge.

I do

not wish to s~gges t that the exclus ion of any one of these compon ents
from a course ~ill serve necess arily to vitiate any contrib ution it
might otherw ise make to existin g educat ional practic e.

The point is

rather that , in their abs ence, a course entitle d ' philoso phy ' cannot
afford a con~ri bution suffici ently compre hensive to do justice to the
philoso phic mode .

:,!oreov er , a course lacking any one of these three

dimens ions could , conseq uently , be indicte d for misrep resenti ng the
nature of the discip line in all its comple xity .

10.,

Methods Current ly Employed in Teachin g
Precolle ge Philosop hy
I should now like, within the framewo rk of the foregoin g discuss ion,
to examine t he current methods employed in teac hing precolle ge philosop hy .
Three differen t methods of precolle ge philosop hy present themselv es for
conside ration:

(i) the philosop hy program for element ary and middles chool

children institut ed by Profess or Matthew Lipman and his associa tes;
(ii) program s attendin g to the philoso phical content of various literary
works and/or to the philoso phical issues already embedded in the existing
curricul um .

These program s on the whole tend to be· the protiuct s of

indi vidual teachers or groups of teachers with special i nterests in
philosop hy;

and (i ii ) high school philosop hy program s which consist

primari ly of logic and the traditio nal philoso phic issues presente d in
an historic al context .
In what f ollows , I shall first describ e each of these methods , and
second, I shall conside r their major educat ional advantag es and
disadva ntages .

This discussi on should provide the necessa ry backgro und

for the then subsequ ent determin ation of the extent to whic h the program s
actually exploit the diversi ty and richness of philosop hy by incorpo rating
elements from the three dimensio ns of the discipli ne presente d above .
I shall begin by cons ideri ng the th ird type of program , (iii)
mentione d above .

~hi s method of teaching precolle ge phi lo sophy is basea

en a very narrow conc eption of philosop hy and it is tr.us a r.:uch less
i nterest ind proGra~ than the other t~o me~hods .

~Y nnul ysi s of it here
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wiJJ_, therefo re, be brief.

Togeth er with its descrip tion , I will include

a brief discu~ sion of the method 's limitat ions .
By and large ,

didact ic

the

high school philoso phy program s consis t of the

presen tation of the followi ng :

the tradit ional problem s of philoso phy;

the history of philoso phy and/or
and , logic.

This method of

teachin g philoso phy treats philoso phy as a body of knowle dge both
comple te in and of itself wherein studen ts are viewed as the passive
recipie nts of tha t inforr:i ation .
major diffic ulties .

Educat ionally , the method fac es two

First, there are many econom ic and a dminis trative

problem s brough t about by the introd uction of a new and separa te unit
of
study into the curric ulwn .

Fur exampl e, there is the problem of suitab le

course instruc tors, and the problem of acc ommodating a new subj ect in
an
already overcro wded curricul U!l'l .

Second , th~ method does not offer a

context suitab le for introdu cing phil osophy into ear lier educat ion. For
example , it makes no provis ion for bringin g the classic problem s of
philoso phy to younge r childr en in a languag e that they could unders tand
.
This method of teachin g is neithe r orienta ted to the genera tion of a
love
of wisdom nor to the develop ment of the analyt ic , reflec tive habit of
mind.

Accord ingly, its student s are deprive d of a large amount of knowle dge

that is actuall y the pot ential outcom e of a philoso phy course .
Now let us turn to Profes sor Lipman 's program in precol lege
philoso phy, or as it is now widely known , 'the philoso phy for childre r:.
approac h '.
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'I'he program is character ized by the following two basic f eatures .
(1)

Philosoph y is pres ented to children in a language appropria te

to their age through the medium of the ' philosoph ical novel ' .

These

novels, written by Professor Lipman and his associate s for each age
group from K- 12th grade, are designed for the specific purpose of
teaching philosoph y to children.

Each story centers upon a group of

children of comparab le a ge to the readers for whom it was written.

The

tradition al pro'o:.ens and contempo rary issues in philosoph y , the rules of
f ormal and informal logic, and the practices of establish ing good reasons
for b elief are introduce d at an early age and continue to be developed
throughou t the series.3

By way of the philosoph ical novel , philosoph y is

presented within the context of events which supposedl y typify the real
events in the lives of the chi ld readers.

As a result , everyday life is

made to serve both as the stimulus to philosoph ic reasoning and
speculati on , and as the framework in terms of which philosoph y itself is
understoo d .

~~is serves to develop an appreciat ion of the extent to whici

daily life adr.li ts of d·e eper and broader meaning s .

Indeed, it is likely

that this feat t:re of Lipman ' s program serves as the single most important
motivatio n for its continued implemen tation .
Little , if any , attention is given within the novels to i nforminb
children that they are actually engaged in philosoph y .

Rather , the

novels portray tte children as persons who are sensitive to problems anc
phi l osophic issues ;

as persons who seek enthusia stically the increase d

3:-'\n outline c:' t:--.e
Phi losophy fer Ch ildren curr iculun i s .:;iven in
appendix 1 .
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depth of unde rstan d:~; that the refle ctive habi t
of mind can affor d .

It

s inten ded that t:.-.e :::1il dren in the nove ls shou ld
serve as mode ls for
the reade rs; mode ls of perso ns who are keen to parta
ke in philo soph ic
inqu iry and prob le~-s :)lvin g.
j

(2)

The ph::: soph y for child ren appro ach emph asize s
the impor tance

of class discu ssio~ ~or teach ing philo sophy .

Acco rding to Lipm an, the

philo soph ic nove l, :~ and of itsel f, has littl e to
offer by way of
educ ating for phi~ cs:;~ y . For the latte r , Lipman
conte nds that the nove l
needs to be acco~ pa~:e d by ongo ing class discu ssion
s wher ein the issue s
and think ing prac tices outli ned in the nove ls can
be broug ht to life . In
other word s, the nc·:e : is desig ned to func tion as
the conte xt in terms of
which philo soph ical :ssue s are intro duce d and the
techn iques appr opria te
to their resol ~tion a~e mode lled. The ensui ng class
discu ssion , on the
other hand, is the ;:ace where philo soph y and the
skill s requ isite for
its prac tice are a~:,~ ally acqu ired and unde rstoo d
. The devel opme nt of
the class discu ss:c~ , ~her efore , is an integ ral comp
onent. in the philo soph y
for child ren prog:cc.:-.: . Each nove l is accom panie d
by an Instr ucti on Manual
for teach ers . The =c.~u als prov ide an exten sive cove
rage of techn iques
usefu l for facil i~a:: ~g class discu ssion s, espe ciall
y as they relat e to
the topic s treat ed ~:~:1 in the nove l . Class discu
ssion is seen as the
means by which philc s:)ph ic inqu iry proce eds , and
for Lipm an, it is
tanta moun t to the Q"..~:st for mean ing . His metho d
of philo soph ic inqu iry
is chara cteri zed by E. set of princ iples which are
form ulate d as intel lectu al
and moral co!~~ it~eL :2 . Both the class as a whole
and its indiv idual
r1em1·ers ::::.~st a-:::r::i:::-8::.:: :::..:. e t he se colll!:1i tmeo ts ,,hen
parto .ki nt:; i:1 their cl~:3S

discu ssion s .
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The conunitme nts are as follows :
inquiry itself;

(i) a commitme nt to the process of

(ii) a commitmen t to the principle s of formal logic,

when attemptin g to deternu,ne the validity of an argument , reason or
explanati on ;

( iii) a commitme nt to the principle s of informal logic when

searching for good reasons for belief .

These include, for example, a

commitment to respect the views of others and to search for further
reasons;

and ( iv ) a commitmen t to the reevaluat ion of one ' s reasons .

11lis includes, for example, a reevaluat 1on of one ' s belief in light of

the accumula tion of new factual evidence.

The desired method of philosoph ic

inquiry portrayed here is modelled and discussed by the children in the
novels , and the Teachers' Manuals provide further recommen dations for
initiating the practice in the classroom .
Finally, let us consider the second major way, (ii) above, in
which philosoph y is brought into precolleg e education .
not one character istic method.

Actually , there ~s

Rather, the uniting feature of t hese

nethods is that they are designed by individua l teachers .
are available :

"::wo

approache s

either, the teacher can design a philosoph y program around

the philosoph ical issues already embedded in the existing curriculW :l, or ,
he/she can supplemen t the curriculum with a variety of literary works and
concentra te on the philosoph ical issues contained therein .
choose to combine thes e two met hods .
approache s .

Some may even

Let us examine the first of these

The tradition al curriculu m systeMat ically admits of

philosoph ical analysis .

The philosoph ic issues to which tradition al

curriculum most often gives rise , however , are epistemo locical ar!d loGical
in kind .

For exa.rnple , t he questicn ' !Iow do you know th:1t ? ' is applicabl e

to all bodies of knowledge and it provides a e;ood startin[ point for

introd ucing studen ts t o issues in the found ations of knowle dge
.
Simi lar ily , ques tio::2 like ' Why do you believ e that? ' , and '
How do you
know t hat that ' s ri~:-.t? 1 a re pervas ive within the curr ic ulum
and provid e a
basis for discus sir.g l ogic and the use of its tools in the establ
ishme nt
of reason s for belie: .
While the su:iec ts of the tradit ional curric ulum do occas ionall
y
engender questi ons e~i issues more metaph ysica l and ethica l
in nature ,
the contexts best s·..:.:. -:ed for analys es of these kinds do not
oc c ur
system atical ly .

These issues , moreo ver, are not so readil y appare nt when

they do occur , partic ularly to the nonpr ofessi onal philos opher
untrai ned
in the ways of thei~ ietect ion.

In the genera l absenc e then of contex ts

suitab le for studyi ::g metap hysics and ethics , it becom es necess
ary to
supple ment the curric :aum with the appro priate mater ials .

It is not only

necess ary to enrich -:::e curric ulum with mater ials, metaph ysical
and ethica l
in nature , but it is also necess ary to do so when any of the
phi losoph i cal
issues which the tea~:: er wishes to treat do not occur appro priate
ly , if at
all, in t).'le c ontex t ::; : the existi ng subjec ts . Profes sor Gareth
~:at thews
has identi fied chi lc~en ' s litera ture which treats philos ophica
l i ssue s .
He provid es a source l ist of books us e ful for eleme ntary and
middle school
philos ophy , togeth er Nith a discus sion of the philos ophic al
consid erat ions
contai ned t herein . 4 ':be major ity of books select ed by Matthew
s deal with

4:-.iatthew

s has a re ,:-·..:.lar column in the Journa l of Phi losoph y fo r Chi ldren
which he dedica tes ~::; a discus sion of excerp ts from childr en
' s books
which he has found ~ ::; be pertin ent to the t eaching of philos
ophy to
childr en . ,.\ descr i;:-:i:m of some of t hi s 1!1ate rial is presen ted
in append ix
2 under the headir .::; ' ~ooks and Other :.:ater ials Us e ful
f or Tea chiniS
:"'reco lle~:e f ni los o_1;:·.::' .
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metaphy sical, ethical and epistem ological issues , and his work is a good
starting point for teachers who wish to develop curricul um in those areas .
Sundry other materia ls more suited to high school student s have now
been identifi ed.

In general the selectio n of l iterary works has been

carried out on the basis of the extent to which a book either models a
particu lar philosop hic viewpoi nt, or contain s expositi ons of and debates
between conflic ting philoso phic views.

High school teachers , unl ike

element ary and middl eschool teacher s, have the advantag e of being able
also to include within their program traditio nal writing s and texts drawn
_.~T::,r:i t:1e tlisc ipline o:::· philosop hy i tsel:',

T.ntroduc 1:~ry textcooks to

phi losophy , includin g logic, are in most cases accessi ble to the older
pupil.

Two sources provide an excelle nt selectio n of resource materia ls

suitable for teaching philosop hy in the high school.

They are the

publica tions from the Centre for High School Philosop hy, 1968-19 74;

a nd

the High School Philosop hy Program develope d by Ms Anna Merring ton . 5

5The Centre for High
School Philosop hy was establis hed in 1968 in

Chicago . It was respons ible for the developm ent of curricu la in
philosop hy for high school and their impleme ntation in a cross section
of high schools in the Chicago area . Monthly news letters were printed
during this time , and three manuscr ipts are now availab le outlinin g the
history , developm ent, structur e and success of the progran . Both sources
provide a wealth of suggesti ons and recomme ndations for high school
phi losophy cu~ri culum developm ent and impleme ntati on .
Ms A. Merringt on is a high school teacher in the Boston area who has
for the last three years been teaching philosop hy to her student s in
a course entitled ' Philosop hy through Literatu re ' . Her program i s well
coordin ated and the curricu la sufficie ntly detailed so as to afford an
excellen t sample of literary works suitable for present i ng a number of
philosop hic problem s to high school pupils .
A brief desc ription of these materials is presente d in appendix 2 .
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F'or those teacher s who wish to concent rate more specific ally npon
the introdu ction of logic into precolle ge educatio n, there is no shortage
of materia ls in the current literatu re de signed to introduc e element ary,
middle and high school children to and develop their facility with the
tools of logic and critica l thinking .

Numerous program s designed to

teach critica l thinking are availab le and the t eacher can select courses
appropr iate to his/her own students needs;

for example , the Edward de

Bono Lat eral Thinking Program , the :nstrumental Enrichme nt Program, and
the Strateg ic Reasonin g Program . 6

Some Advanta ges and Disadva ntages
of the Current Methods

Let us f i rst conside r some of the more importa nt educatio nal
advantag es and disadva ntages of the philosop hy for children approach to
precolle ge philosop hy .
advantag es .

The use of the phil osophic novel has two notable

First , the author can select ively piece togethe r within a

context of continu ity and in a relative ly small space many philoso phical
ideas and problem s.

Without this, the teacher must either present the

materia l by way of lecture , or he/she confron ts t he formidab le task of
amassing selecti ons of work which contain selectio ns of the philosop hic
point in question .

Second , the philosop hic novel is a very conveni ent

tool for modellin g the behavio urs and thinking skills deemed necessa ry
for success ful philosop hic inquiry .

The readers are brought face to face

6T}:lese
pros;rams are desc ribed more full y in appendi x 2 .
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wi.th individua ls wr. ::: like themselve s are learning to appreciat e the
purpos e of philosop~ :c investiga tion and the techni.que s of the process.
Although a verbal e:,:positio n of the philosoph ic process Illight be possible,
it would be less li~~ly to engage the attention and understan ding of as
many students .

A variety of personal ities and thinking styles interacti ng

in philosoph ical discussio ns are represent ed in the novels.

This not only

demonstra tes the c~~:.ribu tion that many individua ls can make to the
phj losophic inquir:: ·:·.:.t it also outlines courses of action rr.ost appropria te
to their participa t:~~ .
:'he second :::a~.:r advantage of the philosoph y for children approach

1

is the support that :.he Instructo rs Manuals lend to the teachers .

They

provide a diverse se~ection of exercises and activitie s designed to enrich
the children' s exper:enc e together with backgroun d material sufficien t to
familiari ze the teac~ers with the philosoph ical issues treated in the
novel.

Of course, :~ is expected that the teachers have on some previous

occasion explored -::-.~se topics in greater depth .

The Manuals are designei

to serve more as a sc~rce of readily accessibl e materials covering in
brief the variety c: arguments and points of view pertainin g to the issue
at hand .
Perhap~ the ~ost worrying disadvant age of the philosoph y for
children program is :.te demand it places upon the school curriculu m.

As

a separat e unit of 5:.~dy, its inclusion into the school curriculw n, nay
necessita te the dis:;:::.acer.1ent of an already existing course of study .
i~ itself cenerates ~-~erous problems which are at present in ~eed of

This
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resolut ion and to which this thesis is in part concern ed . 7
predom inate:

Two questio ns

f irst) can philoso phy add someth ing uni que and desirab le

~o the already existin g curricu lum such that its impleme ntation is
justifi ed?;

and second ly) given that it is worthy of inclusi on into the

curricu lum, by what criter ia should the arbitra tion betwee n program s
compet ing for inc lusion be made ?

These types of problem s are

notorio usly diffic ult to resolv e, yet their intrac tibilit y should not
be
used t o provide suffic ient reason for their being evaded .
Precol lege philoso phy program s of the type constru cted by
j_riclivi dual teache rs have a number of advanta ges over t:1e philos ophy f02.·
childre n approa ch .

For exampl e, philoso phy is no longer restric ted to

being taught as a separa te unit of study in the school curricu lum, though
the opport unity to teach philoso phy in this way is not pr ohibite d by
t his
approac h .

Individ ualized program s make possib le the assimi lation of

philoso phy into the subjec ts and discip lines of the already existin g
curr iculum .

The probl em of squeez ing philoso phy into the curric ulum ar.d

of removin g anothe r subjec t from it fo r its inclus ion is circ unvente d,
and the opportunity to experie nce the extent to which philoso phy relates
to and assists in the i ntegrat ion of all discip lines is readily
availab le .

A second advanta ge of these precol lege philos ophy programs

is the range of teaching styles of which they admit .

Precol lege philoso phy

is no longer delimi ted by the prescr iption for teachin g set out by the
philoso phy for childre n approac h .

The teachin g proc ess is more flexibl e

7The proble:: i is tr eated ?r.ore fully
in Chapte r III .
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and the teacher s can judge for themselv es the styl e most befittin g the
philosophic materia l and the individu al abilitie s of the children .

For

example , some new and more difficu lt philoso phical i ssue might be bett er
served by a series of expositor y lecture s followed by a class discuss ion,
whereas an issue, more familia r to the students , might be effectiv ely
presente d in terms of class di scussion alone.

It is this flex i bility

in teaching strategy which individ ually designe d programs afford .
The :ne <ior disadva ntage of phiJ.osop hy progra:-:1s of this ~ype is
that they rely for their inc eption and success ful impleme ntation upon
teachers who have a somewhat unusual , maybe even rare, blend cf teachi~g
and philoso phical skills.

On the one hand , the teacher must be compete nt

in his/her own special ity,' whether it be element ary schoolin g or high
school mathem atics.

On the other hand, he/she must possess a knowled ge

of philosop hy ~hich is both suffici ent to employ the literary works
e.rnenabl e to teaching philosop hy and suffic ient to recogniz e the elements
of the curricul u.~ which admit of epistem ic , metaphy sical or some other
form of philoso phical analysi s.

Part of what the knowled ge of philosop hy

comes to i s an underst anding of the process of phi losophic inqui ry .

To

develop in the student s a fac i lity with this process such that they could
explore issues on their own, philosop hy teacher s would a lso need to have
an expertis e in this area and a capacity to descri be , demonst rate or ,
i n some other way , familia rize student s with the requisi te techniqu es
which advance philoso phical understa nding.

This is a di fficult and

demandin g task, so ::mch so that mo..ny teacher s may not atte!:::pt. to ter:.ch
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the procedu re without the assistan ce of a profess ional philosop her or
without a detailed , compreh ensive manual providin g a step by step
guidelin e of techniqu es.

It is here that the philosop hy for children

approach holds an advanta ge.

Not only do the novels contain a model of

the process for the student s, but the Manuals provide the teachers with
detailed suggesti ons fo r undertak ing philosop hic inquiry in the classroo m .
Unfortunate ly however , Lipman 's materia ls are not particu larly suitable
for being used select ively as a teaching device in this area .

Being a

central feature of the program , the model of philosop hic inquiry is so
embedded througho ut the entire program that the success ful use of the
program for teaching the process of philosop hic inquiry would be
tantamo unt to doing the whole program .

In other words, it is difficu lt

to imagine how the philosop hy for children program could be used
selectiv ely as a model of philosop hic inquiry without an injustic e being
done to the complex and delicate ly balance d nature of the process of
inquiry itself.
In conclus ion then, it seems that there is a need for the
developm ent of yet another approach to precolle ge philosop hy.

A

curricul um which could at one and the same time supply both the type of
teacher assistan ce which the philosop hy for children approach provide s,
and the l i terary richnes s and flexibi lity of teaching styles which the
individu ally sponsore d program s offer would make a signific ant contrib ution
to the current practice s of teaching precolle ge philosop hy .

The fol lowinG

f ramework p!·o·-rid.es an outline of one of the ways in which this new
curricult ~'.:1 :::i.:Lt be or::;ani zed.

It could , for cx:1mple , be constru cted
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to include :
(i) an exter.s ive list of literar y works specify ing the philoso phic
topics to whic~ they pertain and thP. lines of relatio nship between
them.

Ideally , works suitab le for differe nt age groups would be

~art of this ce:i neation ,
(ii) backgroi.::-.i reading , discuss ions and lists for furt~e r reading
on the differe r.~ philoso phic problem s, togethe r with some genera l
guidel ines fer

~~e

amount of reading useful for the tea~he rs of the

differe nt age groups ,
(iii) a detai: ei accoun t of philoso phic inquiry and the proced ures
for establi shi"-g a classro om envircr unent capabl e of sustain ing the
practic e,
and

(iv) a variet: : of materi als - film strips , lecture s, plays or novels
- designe d to :"-creas e the childr en's unders tanding of the nature of
philoso phi~ in~~iry and the importa nce of the princip les by which it
abides .
It is beyond

~~e

scope of this thesis to consid er the perplex ing

issues related to teache r educat ion and precol lege philoso phy.
to set my

In order

propose d orienta tion to curricu lum develop ment in contex t,

howeve r, it is necess ary that at least the key feature of the posture
it
assume s to the educa~ ion of precol lege philoso phy teache rs be adumbr
ated .
I believ e t ha~ the precoll ege philoso phy teache r needs both a
substan tial backgr o-..~:::i in the subjec t- matter of philoso phy and a pr ior
and on~oinb experie!'".:::e with expl oring thP. variou s phi losoph ic proble::
-ts

32

throug h the contex t of a community of inquir y.

The adequ ate teachi ng of

philos ophy and the exemp lificat ion of its richne ss seem to de~and
these
~wo qualit ies as educa tional prereq uisite s.

Irr espec tive of how

elabo rate a teache rs manua l might be it cannot serve as a subst
itute for
strugg ling fi rst hand with philos ophic issues , nor can it functi
on as the
t eacher s sole introd uction to philos ophic al litera ture .

Rather , the

manua ls are best concei ved of as refres her course s provid ing
inform ation
releva nt to variou s philos ophic views and sugge stions for instit
uting
classro om di scus sion on relate d activ ities .

The means by which preco llege

philos ophy t e achers are to be educat ed is a proble matic issue
an:i beyo:1:i
the scope of this thesis .

The extent of the proble m is compr ehende d,

however~ by recogn izing that its resolu tion demands an arbitr
ation betwe en
variou s claims includ ing those based on econ~m ics , the intere
st level
and releva nt educa tion level of the prosp ective teache rs , the

availa bility

of profes sional assist ance , and the intere sts of the studen t
popul ation .

The Relat ionshi p Betwee n Curren t Progr ams in
Preco llege Philos ophy and the Three
Concep t ions of Philos ophy
Finall y , let us now turn to consid er the relati onshi p that exists
betwee n these curren t method s of teachi ng preco llege philos ophy
and t~e
~hree conce ptions of philos ophy discus sed earlier.
The philos ophy for childr en appr oach repres ents a seriou s atte~~p
~
to confla te into a single cur ric'..llum two key conce pti ons of phil0so
p:1::,
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namely , the notion o:' philos ophy as a specif ic body of proble
ms and the
notion of it as a pa~tic ular menta l method ology .

The curric ulum is

design ed prima rily ,...-ith a view to develo ping thinki ng skills ,
putati vely
those thinki ng ski1:s pecul iar to the reflec tive habit of mind 8
.
What
makes this program ~ique , howev er , is the contex t in which the
thinki ng
skills are taugh t.
Thinki ng is cevelo ped by way of encou raging the studen ts to
strugg le
~rith the tracii :.::.0:12.: ;,::-ot-le:ns of philos ophy and these
are set :.:1 the

contex t of everyd ay :ife .

In other words , studen ts are taugh t to develo p

t ."ld refine their thinki ng skills by way of thinki ng about the
classi cal
proble ms of philos op~y.
This aprroa ct to teachi ng preco llege philos ophy then, rests heavil
y
upon two of the pri::-.ary conce ptions of philos ophy .
does it make for de,:elo ping the love of wisdom ?

What provis ion, howev er ,

In the book 'Philo sophy

in the Classr oo~ 1 Pr~~e ssor Lipman writes at great length about
the
import ance of :-::.eani:::~ to the integr ity of' life, and he evokes
many
reason s suppor ti:::g t~e vatue of studyi ng philos ophy in this vein. 9

The

childr en ' s novels ar.~ the Teachers' Manua ls, howev er , focus more
intent ly
upon the develo p=ent of thinki ng skills and the develo pment
and
assess ment of reason s for belief .

If it were undou btedly the case that

clear and .valid thinki: 1g and the establ ishme nt of sound reason
s were the
sole purvey ors of mea:::ing, then the philos ophy for childr en approa
ch could

8The thinki
ng skil:s referr ed to here a re listed in append ix 3.
Q

/!,latth ew Lip;:w.:1, ,\:-.:1 >1. S:1arp , and Frede rick S. Oscany an, Philos
ouhv in
the C:bssro 0!:: ( :'::Ea.:.e::..phia : Tenple Unive rsity Press , 1980) ,
pp . 3- 11.

34

be cons idere d a co~;~ ehens ive progr am for prom oting
the love of wisdom .
Jnsof ar as the rela:: :.ons hip betwe en reaso ns for belie
f and know ledge is
controvers i al, howe·:e~ , and insof ar as the relat ions
hip betwe en know ledge
and wi sdom asym metr: 2al, t he love of wisdom is not,
as the philo soph y
for childr en appro ac:: would have it , such a strai
ght forwa rd achie veme nt .
'l'he devel opment of -:::e love of wisdom, there fore
, would seem to requ ire
more t han this prog~ ~~ offer s.
?~ogr ams i:. ; ~ecol lege philo soph y desig ned by indiv
iQua l teach ers
who harbo ur a spec ia: inter est in philo soph y are
much more likel y , on the
other hand , to be 2a;ab le of gene ratin g, i~ not ,
an actua l love of wisdom ,
then at least , an ap?~e ciati on for what that enta
ils . As a resu lt of their
speci al int eres t ani enthu siasm to initi ate philo
soph y progr ams in the
schoo l s, it is not -.:..:-.reasonable to concl ude that,
these teach ers have a
love of the disci pl:.:. e and an unde rstan ding of its
impo rts to the life of
the mind. It is these chara cteri stics which in the
conte xt of the
class roo~ trans mute ~ca love of learn ing and unde
rstan ding .
With regar d -:c teach ing both philo soph y as a spec
ial body of
probl ems and philo s c~C-Y as a ment al meth odlog y ,
it is the indiv idual
teach ers inter ests a:.~ abil ities which defin e the
scope of the philo soph y
progr am. The philo s ophic al subje ct- matt er cover
ed in a progr am will be ,
for exam ple , a funct io~ of two thing s . Firs t , it
will depen d upon the
t eache rs know ledge c: the range of philo soph ic probl
ems that actua lly
exis t , and secon d, i~ ~ill depen d upon the philo soph
ic probl e~s in which
he/sh e is most inte~ ested a nd feels most comp etent
to te~ch . Simi larily ,
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the exten t to which ~hese progra ms devel op think ing skill
s and the menta l
appar atus for conce ~~ual analy sis is also subje ct to the
teach er ' s
inter ests and abili ::es.

In the first place , the teach er needs to be

aware not only that ~~i s dimen sion of philo sophy exist
s but that it is
a worth while pursu ::. In the secon d place , the teach er
needs to be
knowl edgea ble about ~he field and adept in the skill s the
progra m itsel f
~recl aims to advan ce. Witho ut the first , the speci fic
aspec t of
philo sophy in quest ::~ could not be inclu ded in the progr
am, and wit~o ut
the secon d, it coul~ :e inclu ded but would likel y be unsuc
cessf ul . In
other words then, p~eco llege philo sophy progra ms desig ned
by indiv idual
teach ers can only ~~;e to incor porat e dimen sions from
the three conce ption s
of philo sophy to the exten t that the teach er is aware
of their existe nce
and has the inter est and abili ty to teach them .

CHAP T E R I I

THE DOMINANT ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY
:
AN IMPROVEMENT IN THINKING SKILLS

At prese nt, the prima ry mot i vatio n for preco llege
philo soph y is
that it will devel op and impro ve the stude nt ' s think
ing skill s. This
argum ent in favou r of philo soph y for child ren has
recei ved the most
atten tion, and in many cases it is the only one which
is advan ced.
There are two expla natio ns for the posit ion of prio
rity enjoy ed by this
claim . On the one hand, it relat es direc tly to the
almos t univ ersal
conc ern for the poor readi ng leve ls and lack of
criti cal think ing abili ty
displ ayed by scho olchi ldr~n and colle ge freslu nen.
On the other hand,
the claim is by its very natur e the one most amen
able to empi rical
valid ation .
My task in this chap ter is three fold :

Firs t, I will exam ine mere

closel y the clai~ that philo soph y can enhan ce think
ing skill s .

Secon d ,

I will exam ine the viab ility of the claim by cons
ideri ng the exten t
to whic h think ing skill s are , on the one hand , teach
able, and on the
othe r, trans ferab le into diffe rent subje ct areas
. Fina lly , I will
evalu ate the exten t to which philo soph y ' s cont ribut
ion to the impro veme nt
of think ing skill s is uniqu e. I shal l concl ude by
argui ng that in ligh t
of the many prog~ams simi laril y desig ned to impro
ve think ing skill s, it
is not prod uctiv e to use this claim a s the domi nant
argument in favou r of
preco llege philo soph y .
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'l'he Natur e of the Claim
State d most s~cci nc tly, the claim is that throu gh the
study of
philo sophy child rer.'s think ing skill s can be impro ved.

The major

expon ents of this view are Profe ssor Lipman and his assoc
iates who have
worke d prodi gious ly to promo te the philo sophy fo r child
ren appro ach.
The claim it5el f is straig htfor ward enoug h.

There is an appar ent

confu sion in the li:e~ ature , howev er, conce rning the
think ing skill s
whi.ch are s uppos ei:..:: eff ected .

This is indic ated by the varie ty of ways

in which the clair.: :-.as been state d .

Sometimes, for examp le, the claim has

0een cast in terms c~ reaso ning abili ty:

' philo sophy for c hildr en is a

system atic and co~p:. .ete curric ulum which foste rs the
impro yemen t of
reaso ning abiJi ty . ,-

On other occas ions it is const rued as the develo pment

of indep enden t thinf. i~g:

' the main purpo se of a progra m in philo sophy for

child ren is to help :iildr en learn how to thi nk for thems
elves '; 2

and at

other times , it is a~~irm ed as the encou ragem ent of refle
ctive think ing,
' the aim of a think i"g skill s progra m is not to turn child
ren into
philo sophe rs or decis ion-m akers , but to help them becom
e more thoug ht ful ,
more refle ctive , mo~e consi derat e, and more reaso nable
indiv idual s' . 3
Moreo ver, the terms 'indep enden t think ing ski lls ', 'refle
ctive think ing
1
Matth ew Lipman , ? ~iloso phy for Child ren, Sprin g 1983 ,
Pamp hlet from
Insti tute for the ),:::e.nc ement of Phi los ophy for Child
ren .
2Matth
ew Lipmar. , ..:..::~ M. Sharp , Frede r ick J . Oscan yan , Philo
sophy in the
Classr oom, 2nd ed .
3 Ibid

. , p . 15 .
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skill s', ' criti cal and creat ive think ing skill s ', and
' reaso ning skill s '
have been used interc hange ably , and it is not uncommon
to find , for
~xamp le, a discu ssion commencing in terms of ' think ing
skill s ' and
concl uding in terms of 'reaso ning abili ty' .

Both Lipma n and Berge n

have made this mi stake . 4 • 5 The issue has been confo unded
furth er by the
introd uctio n of the terms ' philo sophi cal think ing ' and
' philo sophi cal
think ing skill s ' .

The develo pment of philo sophi cal think ing is espou sed

as R.n aim o:' the philos ophy for child ren curricullL':'1 and
it too is used
incon sisten tly .

' Philo sophi cal think ing' is const rued at time s as

conce ptual analy sis and the analy s is of langu age , while
at other times
it is used to refer to think ing about the tradi tiona l
proble ms of
philos ophy .

This type of termi nolog ical confu sion tends gener ally
to

indic ate the prese nce of a deepe r, under lying -conc eptua
l hiatu s.

And

indee d, withi n the area of preco llege philo sophy conti
nuing theor etica l
progr e ss now depen ds upon the delim itatio n and clari ficat
ion of the terms
prese nted above . With this in mind , I have tried to
ident ify those aspec ts
of the ~laim in respe ct of t hi nking skill s which provi
de some sort of
coher ency when they are broug ht toget her.

Let us now turn then to these

key featu res of the claim .
In gener al terms the claim that the pract ice of philo sophy
impro ves
think ing
issue s .

skill s admit s of anato mizat ion into three rathe r more
speci fic
The first is that philo sophy affor ds a uniqu e oppor tunity
for

4:-tatthew

Lipman , ' Why aren ' t think ing skill s being taugh t? ' , Thinkin
.=-t

3(/4) , 1932 , p. 45.
c;m
·
':1y ,,; ..L1r-1ot

·,
. ...,!)crce:1 , ",.. . -_ . ..w~:m
Cr1· t 1co..
· l 1'h1nK1.n
· · · g:
o,
Times ', ,\i~::t.lvtic Teac!'linr: 3(2) , 1983 , pp . 31-33 ,
1
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i nstructi on in the improvem ent of thinking skills;

the second, that

i.t provide s the f ramewor k in terms of which instruc t ion in the subjects

of mind, thought and thinking styles can occur;

and finally , that by

virtue of the above logic al features , it encourag es the inc l ination
towards reflecti ve thi nking .
Let us conside r the fi r st of these.

The enc ouragem ent of thinking

skills is thought t o be achi eved initiall y by introduc ing children to
formal and informa l logic and subseque ntly, by bringing these processe s
to bear upon classroo m discuss ion.

The thinking skills which are most

often discusse d in this context are those pertain ing to critica l analys is ,
for example , classify ing, drawing inferenc es and identify ing
inconsi stencies . 6

Phil9s op hy

for children is based on the assumpt ion

that discussi on skills ·are the foundat ions of thinking skills. 7

By

assimil ating the procedu re of a well-co nstitute d philoso phic discussi on
the argumen t is that children concornm itently enhance their capacity for
clear and correct thinking .

In other words; by utilizi ng the logical

structur es implici t in ordinar y discours e philosop hy for children is
believed to instruc t children in the art of mental hygi ene .

And this is

suppose dly the uniquen es s of philosop hy ' s contrib ution to thinking skills ;
a contrib ut ion t hat the traditio nal subjects alone cannot afford .
Lipman contend s t hat traditio nal schoolin g fails either to explain
directly to children what is meant by ' good thinking ' or to cultiva te

6A list
of the thinking skills which the philosop hy f or children
program is aimed to develop is given in appendix 4.
'7
1

1,1atthew Li.pman , P'l-i iloGophy in the Classroo m , p . 22 .
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those practi ces whereb y it may be achiev ed. 8

Moreo ver, he conten ds

that while the tradit ional subjec t areas like maths , scienc e
and
readin g may contri bute to good reason ing, they are not in thems
elves
suffic ient to genera te it .

The sugge stion is that in mathe matics where

reason ing is highly abstra ct and often conte nt-spe cific, there
is no
guaran tee of transf erabil ity of reason ing skills to the verba
l conce ptual
mode.

Simil arily, in the scienc es where ouch empha sis is placed upon

infere nce~ st:::ess is given to induc tive in::'ere nce, leavin g the
more
rigoro us deduc tive infere nce relati vely untouc hed. 9

Lipman ' s second

invect ive again st the tradit ional cl aim is that childr en are
not
speci ficall y encour aged to reflec t upon the type of thinki ng,
or logica l
form of thoug ht, appro priate to the er.ter: prise in whfch they
are engage d.
In other words , an expli cit accoun t of the variou s forms of thinki
ng, of
their roles and legitim ate applic ation , is not overtl y develo
ped in these
subjec ts .

It is not as if he wants to deny that the brigh ter childr en

can indepe ndentl y synthe size an unders tanding of the releva nt
though t
proces ses.

Hi s point is rather that a better unders tandin g of the sc ope

and limits of reason ing can be broug ht to all childr en by virtue
of the
type of curric ulum interv ention he is propos ing .

In respec t of readin g

instru ction, he argues that it has become an end in itsel f where
the
thinki ng proces s it was intend ed t o encour age assur.:e
lesser i mporta nce .

a role of

In other words , instea d of readin g being used as a

tool to develo p furthe r, the child ' s t~inki ng proces ses and h
is/her body
8

Matthew Lip~:~n , ' Philos ophy for Childr en ' , '.V!etaphilosophy

:'..~76, p.18 .

9 Ibid ., p
. 19 .

'( ( 1) ,
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of knowl edge, good readi ng defin ed by verba l perfor manc
e has become the
educa tiona l objec tive .

Lipman cases the interd epend ence betwe en think ing

and readi ng diffe rentl y.

He propo ses that an impro vemen t in readi ng

impro ves conco mitan tly with an impro vemen t in think ing
abili ty .

He

sugge sts that, in learn ing how to reaso n, child ren learn
to grasp the .
meani ngs of words and phras es in their relev ant conte
xts there by ensur ing
that the conno tation s, sugge stions and other sorts of hidde
n meani ngs
C;ontaj nea withi n co:cun unicat ions a.re made more acces s ible 10
•

Spons ored on

the assum ption that we read to get meani ngs, he concl udes
that philos ophy
tn the schoo ls would serve great ly to make readi ng a 1:i.ore
r:1ear.ingf11l
exerc ise.
The secon d key poirit to the claim that philo sophy impro
ves think ing
skill s is that it also provi des a frame work suita ble
for teach ing about
the mind and thoug ht.

The sugge stion is that the philo sophi cal discu ssion

famil iarize s child ren with virtu ally all aspec ts of think
ing, that is,
with the sundr y capac ities of mind and the varie ty of
style s of thoug ht
which deriv e from it·. A prope rly condu cted philo sophi
cal discu ssion
affor ds its parti cipan ts an oppo rtunit y to obser ve the
ways of think ing
adopt ed by the other parti cipan ts.

In this way chil dren thus come t o

appre ciate the varie ty of ways in which it is possi ble
to think about
an issue .

They learn to appre ciate that other think ing style s can
elici t

propo sals as · valid and as appro priate as their own.

The impor tant point

her e is that expos ure to a varie ty of thoug ht modes puts
one's own thoug ht
in persp ectiv e, which itsel f in turn devel ops healt hy
attitu des towar ds
10Ib.
l 1d,
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thinkin g.

Without this, ill- founded belief s about the less common styles

of though t are :nore readily formul ated, and childr en with unusua l insigh
ts ,
for example , are less likely to be discou ragen.

An awaren ess of variety

in thinkin g strateg ies, moreov er, is though t to be valuab le for enhanc
ing
childr en's thinkin g ~epert oires.

Some situati ons, for exampl e , require

strict fornal thoug~ t, others require insigh t and specul ation , others
involve memory and que stionin g, while others involve nonlog ical and
creativ e proces ses.

Inasmuc h as differe nt situati ons are better served

'oy dif f' eren"t ti::.r_{.::.::~ strateg ies the claim is that a famili arity
wi t:i

philoso phic discl!ss :.on should facilit ate the selecti on of the 'best
thinkin g strateg y .
The final pcint related to the claim that philoso phy improv es
thinkin g abil5 ty nc~, pr esents itself .

The argume nt in this case is based

on the clai m that ;~iloso phy , by virtue of its longhe ld and persis tent
inquiri es i nto the r.ature of though t and mind provid es an abunda nt source
of ~ateri al su~~ao :e ~or enrichi ng childre n ' s unders tandi ng in this
ar ea .
Lipman contend s that by discuss ing this compon ent of phil osophic subjec
tmatter in a philoso p~ical ly standa rdized discus sion, studen ts are
afforde d the opport·..:.!".ity to experie nce what it is to think about thinkin
g,
what it is, that is, to turn their though ts to a consid eration of the
thinkin g proces s itself.

By explori ng the nature of though t and by

observ ing in the~se :ves and i n others the aspect s of though t and mind
being discus s ed , t l: e propos al is that childre n acquire both an unders
tsndinG
of the traditi onal c o~c epts formul ated about mind and a capaci ty for
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In conclu sio~ then , philos ophy is believ ed to promo te good thinki
ng
skills and a deeper .ed unders tandin g of the nature of thinki ng
and though t
itself .

These qualit i es suppos e dly form a sound basis for the

develo pment of effect i ve , independent thinki ng strategies and
t he
reflec tive habit o~ ~ind.

Instea d of being encour aged merely to acquir e

signif icant re~lec t~cns by trying to think someone else ' s though
ts ,
childr en are - on t~is view - encour aged to develo p and expres
s their
nwn ideas.

The Viabi lity of tte Claim
The time has now come to consid er two contro ve rsial issues which
are closel y tied to the claim that progra ms in philos ophy can
signif icantl y
improve thinki ng skills .

Both issues , namely the teach abilit y and

t r ans ferabi lity of thi nking ski lls , demand exami nat i on in this
contex t
since t heir valid i t:: effec t s the immedi at e viab i lity of t he more
genera l
argum ent in favour ~f philos ophy for childr en .
Before col!lI:le~cing this task , howev er , a little more still remain
s
to be said about the term ' thinki ng skills '.

The confus ion as to wheth er

the ter m means logic al, anal ytic , creati ve or r eflect ive thinki
ng was
discus s ed i n t he forego ing di scus sion .
this issue , and I

a:::

The discus sion her e transc ends

now concer ned to desc r ibe t wo br oader conce ptions of

t:iat term.
Wheth er refe~r ing to ' logica l thinki ng ' or 'reflective thinki
ng ' ,
the propon ents of r"ecol lege philos ophy c~ara cteriz e thinki nc
skills as
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techn iques t o be taugh t a nd devel oped throu gh the mediu
m of some
parti cular subje ct-ma tter.

By and large , the natur e and dynam i cs of the

skill s thems elves are not ~augh t.
not devel oped direc tly.

That is, metac onc eptua l awar enes s is

Rathe r , skill s are learn t s olely by exerc i sing

them withi n the bound aries of speci fic conte nt mate rials
.

An alter nat i ve

appro ach is to view think ing skill s as metac oncep tual
knowl edge .
accou nt, think ing skill s are devel oped throu gh:
the strPc ture e.na app:.. ice.tio n o:' skiJ ls ;

On this

(1) an expla natio n of

and ( 2) tr e pract ice of

actua lly apply ing them to diffe rent mate rials.

Eere impro vemen t in

think ing is not so much depen dent upon exerc ising the
skill as it is upon
acqui ring knowl edge about what the skill actua lly is
and knowl edge about the
range and means of its appli catio n.
The implic ation s for the trans fer abili ty of think ing
ski lls which
these two appro aches engen der serve as their key dist
i nguis hing featu re .
On the first ace.cu nt , the trans ferab ility of ~hink ing
skill s is a somew hat
hapha zard affai r.

Child ren are not instru cted speci fi cally in the

proce sses of trans fer.

Rathe r the succe ss of this proce ss depen ds, fo r

examp le upon thing s like a high degre e of simil arity
betwe en situa tions
and the stude nt ' s abili ty to detec t this .

On the secon d ac count , howev er ,

the trans ferab ility of skill s i s a l arge compo nent of
the metac oncep tual
knowl edge that child ren acqui re.

Accor dingly , the ident ifica tion of

situa tions suita ble for trans fer is made easie r, and
the proce ss itsel f
made more syste matic .

With these two concept ions of thinking skills in mind , let us
return now to conside r in more detail issues pertaini ng to the
_teacha bility and transfe rability of thinking skills.

The Teachab ility of Thinking Skills
It is clear that unless thinking can be shown to admit of
instruct ion, then the clai.m that philosop hy can improve thinking skills
j f;

·;ac;.1ous .

?':1e

extent to which thl.nking is deemed. to be teachabl e

depends upon the underly ing concept ion of cognitio n f rom which it
derives .

:hree possible concept ions of cognitio n present themselv es -

cognitiv e deve l opment brought about by : ( i) the natural process es of
biologi cal maturat ion;
environm ent;

(ii) the individ ual's interact ion with his

and (i ii) some combina tion of (i) and ( ii).

does not yield the process es of thinking teachab le .

Position (i)

On this v iew,

cognitiv e developm ent depends entirely upon changes in physiolo gy brought
about by the inbuilt process es of b iologic al maturat ion .

The t heoretic al

postures describ ed in (ii) and (iiiL however , suggest that instruc tion
in thinking skills is far from being a futile exercise .

On vi ew (ii ) ,

for instance , cognitiv e developm ent can be brought about only t hrough
learning , and the conjunc tion of ( ii) and (iii) would presupp ose the
truth of (iii) .

On these two latter views , that is, cognitiv e developt !ent

is guarante ed , at least partiall y , by learni.:-:

This being so , we can

see that t he subs~an tiation of the claim that philosop hy i mproves
thinki ng skills wil l depend upon the extent to which the supporti nG
ar.;;wnen ts in (i i) and (iii) can be sufficie ntly elabc;,ra ted to articula te
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a theory of learning to think.

Some research has been done in this vein,

and indeed, there is now an accumula tion of persuasiv e evidence attesting
to the teachabi lity of thinking skills . 11 , 12 The evidence , however,
tends largely to demonstra te the teachabi lity of thinking skil l s in
terms of the acquisiti on of metacogn itive knowledge .

David Perkins ,

for e~ample, has shown that metacogn itive strategie s like the search for
counterfa ctuals, the hunt for alternati ve causes of an effect, and the
search for causal chains leading from the same initial situation to the
same or contrary consequen t all admit of instructi on.

Susan Carey , on

t he other hand, a ddresses t he problem of the teachabi lity of thinking
skills different ly.

Rather than cite particula r examples which

denonstra te the teachabi lity of thinking skills , either content- specific
or metaconc eptual in nature, she chooses to reinterpr et the tradition al
findings , in terms of metacogn itive acquisiti on .

What is important

here is that bot h these lines of research suggest that , when construed
as metaconc eptual knowledge , thinking skil ls admit of successfu l
inst ruction .
The Transfer ability of Thinking Skills
Let us turn now to consider some of the issues relevant to the
transfera bility of thinking skills.

Two aspects of the controver sy

11susan
Carey , ' Are Children Fundamen tally Different Kinds of Thinkers
and Learners than Adults? ', In Chipman , S . , Segal , J . and Glaser , R.,
Thinkin~ and Learni ng Skills Vol . 2 . (Cambridg e : Er l ball!ll As sociates ,
forthco:!li n5) , p:p. 7- 16 .
12David
Pc rk i r.s , R. Allen and J . Ha fner, ' Diffic ulties in Everyday
neasoni1:s ', Ir, :,: . :.:~1xwe ll ( ed) , Thinkin,-: : ':,.he ~r ontier :::x::-~!:<ls ,
(Philadel phia : '!ne Frankl in Institute Pr ess , f orthco'.ni n.;) , pp . 11- 13 .

deser ve e l ucida tior. here :

(i) the theor etica l debat e, and

empir ical evide nce a.~ass e.d in suppo rt of the claim .

(ii) the

The issue of

trans ferab ility is i~por tant to the claim that philo sophy
can enhan ce
think ing skill s.

:tis impor tant since the claim would have little to

recommend it if t~e think ing skill s philo sophy suppo sedly
engen dered
were eithe r not ab::.e to be used in a ny other situa tion
or restr icted in
their spher e of in::~e nce t o situa tions simil ar in type
to those where
lhey were firs~ a cq~i~ ed.
Let us begin our analy sis of trans ferab il i ty then by
exami ning
the relev ant tteo~ e~i cal debat e .

Philo sophy putat ively gives rise to

think ing skill s broad er than the reaso ning skill s of
forma l and inform al
logic .

Most discu ssion about think ing skill s in the philo sophy
for

child ren liter atur e, however, is confi ned to reaso ning
abili ty and criti cal
think ing.

This is a s~gni fican t stric ture, and the curre nt debat
e

conce rning the tra,.s :erab ility of think ing skill s, a debat
e stimu lated
prima rily by the Ko~·::. of John Mc Peck , is centr ed aroun
14
d it .
In the
broad est sense , criti cal think ing has been under stood
as a set of
gener al think ing skill s that can be devel oped throu gh
conti nued pract ice
and whic~ have the capac it y to impro ve ' every day ' reaso
ning . The dominant
works i:. :~e field - Ennis , Blair , Scriv an and Beard sley.
- attes t to this
view. 1 5 Thus const rued , the motiv ation for the inclu
sion of gener al
reaso ning skill s into the schoo l curri culum is obvio us
.

14 John E. ;:'.cPeck
, : ritic al Thinkini;.!; and Educa tion ,

Marti n ' s Press , 192: ) , p . 39.
1 5Ib.
. .,
.1.,1c1

}'.) . ~9
.) .

That is , it has

tNew York : St .
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gene rally been belie ved that gene ral reaso ning skill
s affor d a unifo rm
tool for perfo rming c r itica l analy sis in any disci
pline . In other words ,
the main moti vatio n for the inc lus ion of reaso ning
skill s progr ams in
the schoo ls has been spons ored on the assum ption
t hat gene ral think ing
skill s are trans ferab le acros s disci pline s to situa
tions diffe rent from
thos e in which they were acqu ired . John l·icPeck ,
in his book ' Criti cal
Think ing and Educ ation ' make s perha ps the first
serio us attem pt to
c:onte st this claim abou t t.he trans ferc. bil::: ~y of
tht;1k i ng skill s. iie
sugg ests also that the trad it ional , unexa mined view
of trans fer abili ty
promi ses the rathe r opaqu e hope of a shor~ cut to
intel lectu al profi c i ency
in a diver se r ange o~ subje cts. His argument again
st t he trans ferab ility
of think ing skill s rests prim arily upon two criti
cism s . The first conce rns
the t ransf er powe r of gene ral think ing skill s.
He conte nds that while
,..1e nctio :: of e:-::::z:..is-.:::.ve -::rans:;.'e:' po·.,· e~

':J:~

ger,e ra: t:1i nking s"'il.:..s

repre sents a s treng th of the tradi tiona l appro ach,
it also cons titut es
its grea test weak ness .

Acco rding to McPeck , univ ersal gene ral izabi lity

is a sign of vacu ity, r ather like the way in which
a tauto logy ' s
cons isten cy with every state of affai rs ensu res
that it is empi rical ly
unin forma tive . His s ec ond attac k upon the trans
ferab ility of gene ral
think ing skill s , name ly that gene ral think ing skill
s simp ly cann ot be
trans ferre d is based upon the work of Stephan Toulm
in. Accor ding to
McPeck , Toulm in argue s that diffe rent disci pline
s func tion throu gh
di ffere nt logic s .

~le Peck then propo ses his ' somew hat "weak er
" view ' ,

that is, that each field or disci pline has its own
epist emol ogy which
itsel f proh ib i t :; the t~·ans fer of think ir.g skill s
fr om one doma in to

anoth er.

In the absen ce of a direc t statem ent about the trans ferab
ility

of logic one is left to concl ude that McPeck is decid edly
symp atheti c
with Toulm in ' s alleg ed chara cteriz ation of logic as being
not trans ferab le
from one domai n of knowl edge to anoth er .

On this latte r point , one can

only await a clear er statem ent from McPec k .

What is clear is McPec k ' s

view that the type of think ing which contr ibute s to an
under stand ing of
any spec i fic domai n of knowl edge is a uniqu e funct ion
of the disci pline
from which that knowl edge deriv es . In other words ) for
McPeck there is
no poss i ble style of t hinki ng const i tutiv e of gener al
reaso ning abili ty
which might rente r succ essfu l episte mic inves tigat ions
withi n diffe rent
disci pline s.

On this view , there are no such thi ngs a s gener al reaso
ning

skill s which can be succes s~uJ.. ly emplo yed in the proble
m- solvi ng tasks
or the proce sses of knowl edge acqu isitio n typic al of the
diffe rent
d:.sc::..pline s .
While :-1cPeck ' s contr ibutio n to the trans ferab ility debat
e is
engag ing and deser ves furth er analy ses, there are two
consi derat ions which
serve to tempe r his somewhat extrem e view of this issue
. The first relat es
to McPeck ' s own inter preta tion of Toulm in ' s thesi s in
respe ct of the
trans ferab ility of logic al think ing . McPeck would have
it that Toulm in
denie s the trans fer abili ty of logic al skill s from one
subje ct- matte r area
to a nothe r. Admi ttedl y , situa tions have been adduc ed
wher e parti cular
rules of logic canno t be gener alized for the whole of
langu age;

the rule

of the exclu ded middl e in quant im mecha nics being a cas
e in point .
None theles s , it is hard to belie ve that this is what Toulm
in had in mind
in hi s disco urse on ' dif f erent lor,ic s for eac h disci pline
'. :n light of
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the extent to whicr. th e rules of logic - propos itional , modal , and
ontolo gical -

£§!:.!l

ce applied meanin gfully to many domain s of knowle dge,

it seems unreaso nac:e to interp ret Toulmi n as inveigh ing agains t the
usefuln ess of the tasic laws of logic in a vari ety of subjec t- matter
areas, most partict: ..:.arly in respec t of epistem ic analyse s .

On the

contra ry, it seems ~ore reason able to interp ret Toulmi n 's use of ' logic'
as referri ng largely to what is usually meant by the term ' epistem ology
'.
Conseq uently, one :::: ~it argue that ~.lc Peck ' s argume nt is based upon a
uomewhat s!)ecio:.1s :::.-~ erp:ret: ation o:' 'l'oU::..~i n' s thes is.

'!'his ir. its el f

temper s the credit ::: ~y of his own clai~ that genera~ thinkin g skills
are not transfe rabl e .
The second c~~sid eration which s erves to mitiga te the force of
McPeck 's argume nt c~::cer ns the concep tion of ' thinkin g skills ' in which
'-:cPeck is

<; O~~~':_::.. :ted

pril".l.arily to

acccun t of thinkin g skills describ ed earlie r , the view,t hat is , which
fails to acknowlec.ge a metaco nceptua l interp retatio n of thinkin g.
Metaco gnitive skills can be viewed as genera l thinkin g skills and, as
such , must be regarte d as thinkin g skills releva nt to the transfe rabi
lity
debate .

Unfort unate:y , McPeck fails to consid er this .

Susan Carey has

shown how met.aco gni-:ive skills admit of instruc tion16 and a cogent
argume nt in favour o :' their transfe rabilit y has been advanc ed by David
Perkins . 17 Perkin s , :'or exampl e, has shown how the metaco gnitive

16

susan Carey , ' _.'.,re Childre n Fundamentally Differ ent Kinds of Thinke rs
and Learner s'? ' , pp . 2'... - 28 .
17 David

Perkin s , •::.ffic u.lties in Everyds.y 'Season ing ' , pp . 1 1- 13 ,
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strate gies like the s earch for count erfac tuals and the
hunt . for
alter nativ e cause s of an effec t can a l l be used to impro
ve every day
reaso ning and the r eason ing appro priat e to the eluci datio
n of knowl edge
in many disci pline s.
think ing skill s

The argument in favour of the trans ferab ility of

then i s that the use of metac ognit ive quest ions such a
s

those sugge sted above toget her with quest ions that help
direc t ·
episte molo gical inqui ry such as ' Why not?' , ' What if ..
. ? ' , and ' How do
you know that ... ?', would serve gre atly to estab lish
a comp rehen sive and
thoro ugh critiq ue of an issue indep enden t of the disci
pline withi n which
it occur s .
Havin g provi ded a theor etica l framework which a dequa tel
y
accom modat es both the teach abilit y and trans ferab ility
of t hinki ng skill s,
let us now turn our atten tion to the empir ica l f i nding
s a dduc ed in suppo rt
ot ~be claim t~at philos op~y i~pro ves ~hi~~ ing skill s
which can be ~sed in
a varie ty of disci pline s .

It is beyon d the sc ope of this thes is to

provi de a detai led analy sis of all the empi rical resea
rch on
trans ferab ility i n the philo sophy for child ren litera ture
.

Rathe r, my

prima ry goal here is that the pre sent disc uss i on shoul d
provi de an outli ne
of the issue s which suc h an analy sis must consi der if
it is to rende r
legiti mate concl usion s in respe ct of trans ferab ility .
The first i ssue which needs to be clari fied whe n the resea
rch on
trans fer is exami ned , is the speci fic degre e of trans fer
i n quest ion .
Two level s of trans fer prese nt thems elves for consi derat
ion :

(i) near

trans fer , whic~ refer s to appl icatio ns of the think ing
skill to
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situations that are l ike the original learning situation in many
important regards;

and (ii) remote transfer, where the learner has to

extend the skill to acconunodate a new task where no clear relationship
between the original learning situation and the new task is evident . 18
Empirical investigation in the philosophy for children literat ure to
date has focused upon 'remote transfer'.

In particular, the concern

has been to s how that the improved thinking skills whi ch come about
~hrou.gh the study of phil osophy manif est t:1emsel ves as improvements in
reading~ mathematics, and english.
not unequivocal.

The research findings, however, are

Some st udies, for exampl e , report t he transfer of

skil ls to these subjects 19 , 20 , 21 whereas others fail to establish the
h ips
' . 22,23,24
.
same re 1a t ions
r esearch reporting.

The situation is furt her confounded by poor

A variety of crucial variables, i ncl uding rigorous

statisticai :-:!ethociclogy ar,:;;;ear i.:o have ·.::.een o·;e rlooked
studies.
18

=-~

:-::an:,.· c: t~,e~;::

One can only hope that the absence of such features in the

Bryce B. Hudgins , Learning and Thinking,
Publishers, :l-977) , pp . 142- 143.

(Illinois:

Peacock

19Matthew Lipman, ' A State Evaluation of a Philosophy for Children
Program', Thinking 2(1), 1980, p.32.
20Mary I . Yeazell, 'A Report on the First Year of the Upshur County,
West Virginia, Philosophy for Children Project ', Thinking 3(1), 1981,
pp . 12-14 .
2

1nolly Cinquino, ' An Evaluation of a Philosophy Program with 5th and
6th Grade Academically Talented Students' , Thinking 2(3 / 4) , 1980 , pp . 79- 8 3 .
22william R . Hi ga , ' Philosophy f or Chil dren in Hawaii :
Evaluation ', Th i nking 2(1 ) , 1980, pp . 21- 31 .

A Q1.1a nt it:1ti\"e

23 Linda
.
~
r . Annis and David B. Annis, ' The IMpact of Phi losophy on
Ch ild r0n ' s Cr j ti c al Tl:inkinG Al~il i t y ', Conte!-rpor a r v Educ:1ti0r12.l
T-" .~vcholo,-:y 4(3 ), 197? . pp . 219 - ::?26 .
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publi shed repor ts is ::1or e a resul t of incom peten t repor
t writi ng than it
is a neglect for tte actua l pract ice of carry ing out rigor
ous exper iment al
proc edure . In lig~~ ·of these resea rch inade quaci es, wheth
er they are
real or appar ent, s·.:."::> stant i ve claim s about the trans ferab
ility of
think ing skill s a re i:ffi cult to make.

Progr ess i n t hi s field is depen dent

then upon the extri :atio n of the se inade quaci es toget her
with the
:inve stigat ors tr.er.:se.:.·.-es devel oping both a great er respe
ct for the

find ings.

'.:'r.e s::.gc.:: ~:can t effec ts upon readi ng , mathe matic s
and menta l

~at ur1· t y 24 , 2 5, 26 w~::~
· · ph"l
1 osophy f or c h i"ld ren h as b een sown
h
t o h ave,
is encou raging and ~.-:::ithy of the type of pursu it s ugges
ted here .
The fin~in gs :c. respe ct of near trans fer are muc h ~ore
consi stent ,

on test s de signe d tc :::easu re rea sonin g abili ty. 27, 28 , 2
9

The basic

instr ument us ed to e·:e.luate the suc cess of the phi losop
hy for child ren
progr am in tea chir.~ ~~ink ing skill s is a criti cal think
ing test devel oped
24

Mary I. Yeaze ll , ' West Virgi nia Philo sophy Proje ct ',
pp . 12- 14 .

2 5Dolly

Cinqu ino , ' :::valu ation of Philo sophy Program ', pp . 79- 83.

26Matth
ew Lipman , ' ?hilos ophy for Child ren Progra m Impro ves
Stude nt ' s
Basic Skill s ', r:ASS: 3ulle tin Febru ary , 1979 .
2 7virg

inia C. Sh:;=. an, ' Evalu ation of the Philo sophy for Child
ren
Progr am in Bethl ehe~, ?enns ylvan ia ', Think ing 4(1),
1983 , pp . 37- 40 .
28Ronal d
Reed anc ~:len Hende rson , ' Analy tic Think ing fo r Chi ldren
in
Fort Worth Ele::1enta~~- Schoo ls ', Think ing 3(2) , 1981,
pp.27 - 29 .
29Dolly Ci
nquin o, 1 :::-.raluation of a Philo sophy Pro£5ram 1 , pp . 79-83
,
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by the Educa tional Testin g Servic e at Prince ton in conjun ction
with
Profes sor Lipman .

The latest test assess es studen t ' s profic iency on some

twenty defina ble thinki ng skills includ ing:
ambig uity;

syllog ism , induc tion , and

as well as the less formal skills such a s the use of aut horit
y

in reason ing , and jwnpin g to conclu sions .

The thinki ng skill s tested

here are in fact the thinki ng skills that the philos ophy for
childr en
approa ch spec ifical ly sets out to teach.

The positi ve findin gs,

theref ore, attest to little other than the succ ess of the progra
m in
t e aching those partic ular reason ing skills it set out to teach
.
wish here to underr .iine the i!:!por tance of this !'indin g .

I do not

Rathe r , I want to

make a c aution again st conclu ding that phi losoph y for childr en
improv es
'reasoning abilit y ', where that t erm is either left globa l and
unspe cified , or where it includ es skills other than those tested
by the

studen ts in t he philos ophy for childr en progra m has been tested
by other
measu res, incon sisten t result s have been found. 30 Certa inly
, the exten t
of reason ing abilit y of these studen ts needs much furthe r inves
tigatio n .
Given that ther e is a theor etical framew ork capab le of
accom modati ng not i ons of transf er , and given that there are positi
ve
findin gs in respec t of both the near and remote transf er of thinki
ng
skills , one might reason ably antici pate the transf er of some
thinki ng
skills after studyi ng philos ophy .

Howeve r , the resear ch to date is not

yet sophi sticat ed enough in design to formu late defin ite conclu
sions in
this ret;ard .
30,,.1.
-·.
,~ 1 .i.131:: 111 Grt ,
' Phi1.o.sophy in !"i:1wo.ii ' , pp . 21- 31.
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The Cont~: bution Made by Philoso phy to the Develop ment
of Thinkin g Skills
As intima te~ earlie r, the prime motiva tion for introdu cing
philoso phy into the school s is that it develop s and improv es thinkin g
skills.

In light c : the wide curr ency that this claim has come to en joy ,

two issues deserv e closer examin ation:

(i) the extent to which philoso phy

can actual ly be cor.sid ered the sole purvey or of thinkin g skills;
' ·. :') ~

·

_:;t, '2£=<:-

and

-:.::= t t:· is Y·o] e :for phi: osophy is fcun d to ·:e 1..:.nterl~'c:..e,

the extent to whic:: :philoso phy can actual ly contrib ute someth ing unique
and desirab le ~o ~:::::kin g skills develop ment .
The claim t::at philoso phy improv es thinkin g skills has its genesi s
in the philoso phy :er childre n l iteratu re where it is genera lly explica
ted
in ter~s t~at c~s~ :-: as the sole purvey or of thinkin g skills .

Constru ed

in this war, fr.e c:.a::n stands in need of emeno.a tion , and I sha.:..1 in what
follows endeav our -=~ show why .
In a recent edition of the New York Ti mes, t he educat ional supplem ent
feature d article s ~::::ch address ed both the need for thinkin g skills
develop ment in the schools and the practic es curren tly employe d to achieve
this end . 31 Philoso phy for childre n was but one of the many method s
identif ied.

A nur:::er of thinkin g skills program s curren tly being used in

educati on both at
Structu2:e

~::e college and precol lege level were describ ed. The

o: tr.e :::::-=lle ct, the Strateg ic Reason ing, the Instru: ::ental

3lEduca t 10n
·
Sup; -_e:::ent , New Yor.k T'imes, 9 J anuary

1983 , sec. 12 .
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Enrich ment and the Latera l Thinki ng Progra ms were given as examp
les of
major comme rcial approa c hes, wherea s the critic al thinki ng course
s at
~arym ount Manha ttan Colleg e, Xavier Unive rsity, LaGua rdia Commu
nity
Colleg e and Hunte r Colleg e Eleme ntary Schoo l were includ ed to
indica te
the range of differ ent approa ches that indivi dual schoo ls have
taken to
teachi ng thinki ng.

The import ance of these progra ms and the conseq uent

positi on of priori ty that thinki ng ski lls develo pment has come
to assume
:in educa tional practi ce was c l early portra yed.

For example, Hunter

College Elemen tary Schoo l 'has signal led its recog nition of the
import ance
of such skills b y includ ing on the report card to paren ts a sectio
n ~a t ing
thinki ng skills .

~:larks are given for critic al, creati ve and logica l

thinki ng . ' 32
The articl e clearl y reveal s that the develo pment of thinki ng

G. ~. as a n~ j or educat ional
and that a variet y of progra ms in servic e of this end have been
develo ped
and succe ssfull y instit uted in the schoo ls .

The implic ation for philos ophy

and thinki ng skills develo pment then is that it is simply no
longe r
realis tic to aggran dize philos ophy instru ction as the sole, or
even the
domin ant, method for develo ping thinki ng skills .

And indeed , the New

York Times articl e charac terize d philos ophy for childr en as the
tradit ional
approa ch to teachi ng thinki ng skills - ' workin g out of a more
tradit ional
!:1ode, a gr owini; m...::!"::- e1· of s chools , e spec ially in i·!ew Jers ey ,
a re us i::..:
philos ophy as the vehicl e for teachi ng thinki ng skills . • 33

32 Ibid
33

. , p.37.

Ibid.

It is clear
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that if philosop hy ' s inclusio n into the school curricul wn cont i nues on
the bas is of the thinki ng sk i lls argumen t alone, then i t will have to
vie evermore strenuo usly wi t h the increasi ng nwnb er of compet i ng program s
bei ng develop ed in thi s area.

Its success here will depend upon there

be ing devel oped a coge nt argumen t i n favo ur of philosop hy which
emphasi zes its unique contribu tion to thinking skills .
Let us turn now then to examine of what this unique contribu tion
might consist .

Philoso phy's uniquen ess needs to be formula ted i n terms of

the developm ent of philoso phical thinking skills .

For,in view of the wide

range of thinking skills - critica l , creativ e, logical , etc t~at the
other thinking skills program s purport to teach , it is di fficult to
formula te an argwnen t for the uniquen ess of philosop hy in thes e terms .
Moreover , it would not be easy to constru ct an argumen t showing that
p:1i:..os opt:;f co1.;.::..d i:~.pr0°re on "t:1ese o~her r.:e"thods .

:nere is, -:::at :.s

1:.::::

say, no l ogical reason why the tool s of formal a nd informa l logic , any
~ore than the learning which takes place within a conununi ty of inquiry ,
ne ed be viewed as a peculia rly philosop hic enterpr ise .

Moreove r , the

use of these techniqu es in non- philoso phical thinking skills program s
does not charact erize those progra.~ s as philoso phical.
Let us c onsider, therefo re , t he nature of philosop hic thinking
$kills .

T!le te!.':!ls ' pnilosop hical t hinking ' and ' philoso phical t h ::. nld:c.-

skills ' are not yet well explica ted in the literatu re .
interest ing work has begun in this area . 34

HOi,ever , sor.ie

Profess or Jack Zevin ' s article ,

34Jac k.· ..,ev1n
r
,
, ' Th inkinG Critic ally, Thinki nc Philoso phically ',
Social Studies ]ov. / Dec . , 1978 , pp . 265 - 272,

The

58
'Think ing Critic al:.::, Thinki ng Philos ophic ally ' perhap s repres
ents the
first seriou s a tte~; t to define philos ophical thinki ng by clarif
ying
the distin ction be-::,.-~ en it and cr itical thinki ng.

Althou gh Zevin fails

to provid e a de:~in: :::ive defin ition in respec t of either t erm,
his a r ticle
sugge sts that c rit: ~al thinki ng is concer ned more with the correc
t , or
most valid, reso:~~: ~;1 of a given proble m, wherea s philos ophic
al thi nking
is concer ned more ¥:t h the meani ng of the proble m in terms of
both its
origi ns and c o~s eQ~e~ ces.

His cont enti on is that ' critic alnes s i nclude s

signif icant groN-t~ ::i awaren ess and sensi tivity to proble ms and
views ,
as we:: as a c.ee;e~ ::·.~ under sta nding of al-;:;ern ati ves and cons
equenc es
availa ble to solve a. given proble m or resolv e a partic ular issue
',
wherea s , ' philoso pr.~- encour ages us to prob e motive s and reason
s , val ues ,
and cheris hed bel i e~s.

This is not merely done to cause troubl e but to

conseq uences of tte ~elief s we hol d and act upon . 135
articl e is in r.:a:-:y ~-ays obscu re.

Profes sor Zevin 's

He does not , for examp le, settl e the

issue as to whethe r critic al thinki ng is itself a necess ary
part of

philos ophic al thini:: ng or wheth er there are parts of critic al
thinki ng
altoge tner distin ct ~rom it .

Noneth eless , the articl e do es serve to

highli ght the cardi~ al role which the analy sis of meanin g pl ays
in
philos ophic al thinki ng.

Thi s is the first point that could be addres sed

i n uri:~sin5 toce-:::e~· ~n argtu11em for phil c sophy ' s u:1i q_ue
c :)r, -;;.rit ut i c ::

to t hi ~~ing .

..
•

4

....

35 rb " ,

.1.u . ,

)" t ~~-:~ the a nalys is of meani ng is const rued in Zevin' s

"'
l:"" • 267 •
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articl e largel y as the contri bution of phil osophy to an unders
tandin g
of the meanin g of life, it is as pertin ent to the unders tandin
g of
langua ge, as it is to though t itself .

Hospe rs expres ses the relati onshi p

betwee n philos ophy, meanin g and langua ge well when he writes
:
We shall not primaril y be asking t h e questi ons that laymen
usuall y think of when they hear the world 'phil osophy ' ,
namely 'philo sophy of life' .. . One must f irst develo p tools
for dealin g with them . • . Where , then, shall we begin? ...
with a study of langua ge: not a study of the histor y of words
,
or the deriva tion of words , or the struct ural simil aritie s of
words, or for t hat matter a nythin g about words which is pecul
iar
to specif ic langua ges, but rather the nature and functi on of
langua ge in gener al - espec ially t h e relati on of words to what
words stand for. ' 36
In other words , philos ophy's contri bution to thinki ng made -i.n
terms of
the analy sis of meanin g applie s equall y well to the meanin g of
langua ge
and though t as it does to the meanin g of everyd ay l ife.

may be no di fferen t to those requir ed, for examp le, in a critic
al
analy sis of the valid ity of an argum ent.

This being so, phi losoph ical

thinki ng constr ued prima rily as the anal ysis of meanin g may not
requir e
a specif ic set of thinki ng skills pecul iar to that undert aking
alone .
The analy sis of meanin g needs a furthe r qualif icatio n, there
f ore, before
it can adequ ately serve to identi fy philos ophy's unique contri
bution
to thinki ng.

The unique ness is perhap s best unders tood more in terms

of· t he :::ea~i ngs 1·:hic~ one s elects to think about .

Fer exampl e , t t i r'!~:: :1i·

phil osophi cally about anothe r person ' s di sc our se involv es , on
-:his \·ie"; ,
thinki ng about the meanin g of what is said by choosi n6 t o th
i nk about

36John Hospers , An
Introc uction to Philos onhi c3l .\no.l:r sis , 4t h ed .,
(New Jersey : Prenti ce- Hall , 1957) p . xii.
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thing s like the range of possi ble motiv ation s the perso
n has for sayin g
whate ver it i s he is sayin g, and the range of possi ble
inter preta tions
of which t he di sco~r se admit s.

A criti cal asses smen t, on the other

hand, is more like::.~- to selec t for an analy sis the valid
ity and
relia bility o: a ais:o urse where thoug hts t urn to issue
s like coher ency,
consi stenc y and ev::. ienti al insta ntiat ion.
The abil ity ~o susta in inqui ry for long perio ds is a
secon d point
which J be:1.:.e·: -:: , ~·· ' ""eat u'::"e :in a!". ar;;·:..'-:le:-:t for philo
sophy ' s uniqu e
contr ibutio n -co th:.::~:ing abili ty.

':i:his capac ity entai ls not only the

capac i ty ::o!· :;:r.:~c,.; e~ atten tion on a parti cular proble
m and all it s
nuanc es, but it also entai ls a willin gness to engag e
in an inqui ry where
answe rs are not guara nteed and, in some cases , may not
even by possi ble.
The analy ses o: ~ea:-:: :-:g , in parti cular , the meani ng of
langu age , and
-,

...

._

-

... :: ~-

philos ophy bot:: ser-:e to devel op this capac ity by provi
ding situa tions
where analys ::.s car: ·::e susta ined virtu ally ad infini tum
.

In bot h cases ,

inqui ry can be uphe: d for at least as long as i t takes
the inqui rer to
reach his /h er desir ei level of under stand ing ; maybe
one hour , maybe a
lifet ime.

The iCTpor~ance of these types of flex i ble, open ended

situa tions to the c.evelo pmen t of think ing abili ty is als()
ackno wledg ed
by Zevin .
=~~..."!:: e?.·s

2 .. : ·..:.:...:

':".=:. ce u!'~"'ai~ o :~

:~a~. . :.::c ?!~ov oc ati ve q1..1e s:.:.v!1

r:
unans ~ered or ; ar ~iall y ans~e red . .. Thi nking , critic
al o r
othen..-ise , is ·:::..e~;ed by most peopl e as unnec essary a f
ter ·.rery
defin ite c oncl~ s ions have been reach ed.37

37 .Jack '.:.e
\· :'. . :: , ' ':':-::.~~: ing Crit i c::.lly , :'tink ing P~ilo sophi cally
', p . 268 .

In conc lusio n then, it would be inacc urate to char
acter ize
philo sophy as the sole purve yor of think ing skill
s unles s the term
'thin king skill s ' was being used in the sense of
'phil osop hical
think ing skill s ' alone .

The more impo rtant poi nt to be drawn from the

f orego ing discu ss i on , however , is that if the i mplem
entat ion of philo soph y
:i.nto the schoo l curri culum is to conti nue solel y
on the bas is of its
capa city to impro ve t hink ing , then it is the devel
opme nt of phi los ophic a l
think ing skill s that needs to be emph asize d .
I belie ve, howev er, that phi losop hys cont ribut ion
to educ ation is
nuch !!lore ·:ari ed. t han i ts bene ficial eff ects upon
t hink ing abil it y .
Moreov er, I subm it that the other adva ntage s of
study ing philo soph y which
I will consi der i n the next chapt er , are equa lly
, if not more , impo rtant
than those discu ssed here . It is unfo rtuna te that
the think ing skill s
......
.. , -::: '
.;. .......
,

whi le it is not diffi cult to show philo soph y's impo
rtant cont ribut ion to
think ing , t ~e ori enta tion tends to trade on the
unde rplay ing of t hese
other bene fits which phil osoph y has for those who
study it .

C HA P T E R I I I
OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR P~ECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY

In this chapte r I will examin e three propos als which have been
advance d in suppor t of precol lege philo sophy.
can act as a buffer to indoct rinatio n;

They are:

(i) philoso phy

(ii) philoso phy afford s a

framew ork in terms of which the curric ulum can be integra ted;
1Jl'. :i :!.osophy

C:8'1

and (iii) .

'c!"ins; :-:ore meanin~ :: m., -:.:;e: J.i ves of thos e whc pursue it,.

My primary concern is to explain eac h claim and to consid er its streng th
in l ight of both its co~eren cy and tne coject ions that have been rai sed
agains t it.

Each of the clai ms has at some time been cast in terms which

render the purpor ted benefi ts of studying philoso phy as being peculi ar
to that di sciplin e alone.

Acc ording ly, I a.~ also concern ed in this

cha1:r~e r to deter:::-.ine -:.~e valicii '.;-:, o: ~~~·s.:-:-. ir.;; ~he c _ai:ns as ce:.::.~ t:.r.iq_~~
to philoso phy .

Precol lege Philoso uhy a~d Indoctr ination
A key po int deline ating the rationa le for precol lege philoso phy
is that philoso phy can serve as a buffer to indoct rinatio n.

This is the

view that phi losophy can afford a protec tion a gainst indoct rinatio n ,
a
protec tion that is, abains t the closing of mi nds on matter s tr.at a re
fundam entally open , ,..:hether it be value theory , social and pol itical
theory , or scient ific theory .

In this section I will examin e this

argu.r:ie nt , conside rint:; also the maj or objecti on that has been rai sed
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again st it.

Befo re conunencing this task , howe ver, it will be
usefu l to

provi de a brief exp~ sitio n 'of the term ' indo ctrin
ation ' as it is used by
the propo nents of ~reco llege philo soph y.
The term 'intoctrin ation ' has been used in the philo
soph y for
child ren ' s liter at~re in two ways .

Firs t, ' indo ctrin ation ' is used to

refer to that proce ss wher eby, as a resu lt of a parti
cula r cours e of
study , stude nts are ·.1:1q uestio nably imbued with a
spec ific set of value s
.r ~el i e~s . 8~ ~~:.7 ::.e~ 1 jrioc trina tion can occu
r by vir~u e o~ the
cours e c:::mte;.t and/~ r "!;he way in which it is taugh
t. In both case s,
i ndcct r:.nat ::.on is sa:.i to have occu rred whet her or
not the resu lt was
inten ded. In other ~ords , the crite rion for indo
ctrin ation here is not
so much the natur e c: the held belief , as it is the
way in which it is
r.eld. Cn t i is acco·.::.::, indo ctrin ation is the proce
ss which resu lt s in
:..t.c- unc r:.1. :..:::a::.. ac e e:;-: ;. .::ce of' inf orma" tion; i?.I'o
rmati on conce rr.ine ; a::. l
human endea Yours w~e-::-.er it be value s and mora lity
, for exam ple , or
scien ce and polit :.cs. Gran ted this exten sive frame
work , howev er, the
issue is most typica::..~y discu ssed in the preco llege
philo soph y
liter atur e ~ith refer ence to mora l educ ation .

Diffe rent theo retic al

appro aches to mora li~y have led to the imple ment
ation of a varie ty of
mora l educ ation pro~ra..~s .
Some ' portr ay mora lity as effic ient
reaso nin~ , other co~s~ rue moral ity as obed ienc e and
accep tance of
disci pline ', while ' : -:~ers inter pret the child as
being natu rally
virtu ous so that goc~ ~eha viour will natu rally ensue
if only the
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emot ions are unthw arted a nd sens itivi ty to other s
heigh tened ' . 1

What

is i mpor tant is t hat eithe r one of two extre me goals
for mora l educ ation
~s presc ribed : eithe r , that there exist s a spec
ific set of value s which
child ren shoul d a cquir e; or , that becau se value s
are relat ive and
becau se t here are diver gent opin ions with respe ct
to those value s , nothi ng
is right or wrong . The poin t which advo cates of
philo soph y fo r chi ldren
want to emph asize i s that in neith er case are child
ren equip ped with the
skill s requi site for asses sing the vali dity of eithe
r posit ion nor the
value s it enta ils.
·.- 'he secon d sense in ~.,hicc.

1

indoc~ri!'la"'...ion ' cas teen usea. ir- t.he

preco llege philo sophy liter atur e relat es direc tly
to the notio n of the
hidde n curri culum . On this accou nt , 'indo ctrin ation
' is used to refer
to that proce ss where by the elim inati on of poss ible
cours es or cours e
_......... .
reinf orce s both the value and auth ority of those
that are i nclud ed .
Three exan ples are given below by way of illus trati
on of this proc ess.
The first conce rns relig ious educ ation in Aust ralia
.

In most cases , t~e

Chris tian poin t of view is expou nde d to such an exten
t that even the ~ere
recog nitio n of the exist ence of othe r poin ts of view
is absen t . On the
view de fende d here , such a pedag ogy could be indic
ted as indoc trina tio!'l
on the groun ds of being a cove rt, yet power ful means
to inst il in the
mi nds of those w!",o ,:nce rtake its study a :\mc.a "'::ent
al belie f i~ t.l1e
supre macy of Chris tiani ty.

The secon d exa'l: ple i s affor ded by Jane ~ .

~:at thew :.ip:::a r, and Ann ;,1 . Sharp , Growin.---:
Un with Ph i losop lw , " 2an
, ',i:. lO!~ '.te
,
t,:ora l E..:~tc:
'
J. .::.auc
- • at ion
'2iv01:-ced f ro::, f 'rn. J.osop h ica
' ". 11 ( ~.::.._::;
Pl ' •
, . :
.d e ...• -::-:":io

Te:nple Ui~iv ersity Press , 1978) ,

p . 341.. .

Mart in in her artic le 'What shoul d socia l philo sophy be
for child ren ?' ,
where she simil arily accus es the schoo l syste m of encou
raging in our
young an uncri tical accep tance of the statu s quo . 2

The ar gumen t in this

case is that unles s educa tion can activ ely encou rage quest
ionin g and
critic ism of the exist ing socio- polit ical backg round and
the perce ption
of viabl e alter nativ es, it will carry with it a socia l
and polit ical
presu mpti on in respe ct of accep tance of thing s as they
are;

in terms

ti:s t j_s $ of' an unthi nki ng accep tance of exist ing instit
ution s and
pract ices.

A third examp le, this time in respe ct of scien ce and

indoc trina tion , is a f for ded by R.S . Laura who argue s that
scien ce and
its techn ology have been trans ferre d into insti tutio nal
compo nents of t he
statu s quo, in despe rate need of criti cal appra isal . 3
As a resul t of the
perva siven ess of the scien tific idiom that stems from
such autho rity, it

appro aches to proble ms and dispo sition s in think ing which
do not
appro ximat e the tradi tiona l conce pt of being ' scien tific
' are disco urage d ,
and in some cases suppr essed .

In other words , the conte ntion is that the

uncri tical accep tance of the autho rity of sc i ence has
so influe nced the
value struc ture of educa tion that the educa tive proce ss
itsel f can now
be indic ted for indoc trinat ing the autho rity of scien ce
.
How then do propo nents of preco llege phil osoph y propo se
that
?::L.:.o.sop:1y can ser ve to count era..::t --ches e for ces of i ndoct.
r ina~i on ·,'
2 rbid , "What
Shoul d Socia l Philo sophy be for Child ren?"
~

::.::c-

p.180 .

.JRona ld S . Laura , "The Philo sophi cal Found ations of Scien
ce Educa tion" ,
;:,,"..uca t i on, ? hi loson hy and Theor y 13, 1980 , pp . 1- 1 3 ,
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dominant argwnent in the fie ld has been advanced by the advocates of the
Philosophy for Children Approach to precollege philosophy.

Consistent

with this origin, the argument focuses upon philosophy as a method of
critical and conceptual analysis and the ways i n which these ski lls
function to buffer indoc trination .

The proposal is that by developing

an appreciation for the philosophical method, in particular the skills
of reasoning and of inquiry through discourse, philosophy affords its
st.udents acc e ss to the ~abj_t of :i.ndependent, r e flective thi nki!lg .

Tte

c1a.i n that follows, a claim. that is also a rather strong claim is that ,

once children have acquired the skills they need for critical assessment
they can turn to any of the probl ems in moral education , science ,
social or political education , with the legitimate hope of reaching a
h?.la~c ed unders t anding of t he issues involved .

Moreover , the contention

is t hat as chil dren appropria te these i;;idl.:'..s and C!"'i:,5 ti,er.. -: ::: "i:e:;;.::- .~r-.,.:
those situati ons confronted both within and without the school context,
they are to a ~uch greater extent protected against i ndoctrination , since
all experiences and poi nts of view which they encounter are screened
through this framework of critical assessment .

A closer examination of

the philosophic method , that is , phi l osophic reasoning and discourse,
will provide a better understandi ng of the spec i fic ways in which
phi losophy is believed, on this view , to act as a buffer to i ndoctrination .
As it is used in the context of philosophy f or children , ' philoso r:!1::. -::
reasoning ' refers to both that form of deductive reasoning derived from
the tradition of formal logic, and that mode -of rea soning subs umed unde~:
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informal l ogic which includes inductive reasoning and the reasoning
employed in the search for establishing 800d grounds fo r argument.
When these reasoning skills are brought to bear upon problematic
situations, t he probab ility of an adequate critical

appraisal is

supposedly enhanced, and the child i s better placed to advance
constructive ideas which can be acted upon to bring out changes where
necessary.

For exanple, the principles of informal logic such as

c01isistency , i::,par t ::.a:j ty, and. COJ:ll, rehensi veness , are believed to be
important for developing an objective framework fo r cr itical assessment.
I n other wo:::·ds , tne philosophy for children a pproach teac hes c hildren
that the appropriate assessment of reasons etc. is made in terms of
their consistency and comprehensiveness wherein personal biases are put
aside, if not overcorr.e.
·" r1el"!

This is particular ly apparent in the program

the c::1 ::.::_dr·e::: &re cor:.cernec. ·..;i t:h c.e-:e:i.·.:::ining 'the q_ua=.i t:f of an

information source .

For mal logic , on the other hand , is taught as a

method more appropriate f or assessing the credibility of an argun1ent i n
terms of its logical cohesion.

That is , children are encouraged to use,

for example, the rules of syllogistic inference when determining the
truth of a claim .

The skills from both the formal and nonformal arenas

are believed to work co-operatively to buffer uncritical acceptance of
the ideas of those who, consciously or unconsciously, seek to indoctrinate.
'-!oreover, what is generally n:eant by ' independent thinking ' in children
refers to a fac i lity with these comprehensive skills of reason in their
application both to an analysis of the thoughts of others and to the
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critica l analysi s o ~ one ' s own thought s.

'Indepen dent thinking ', that

js, involves subjec: :ng one ' s own musings to the same rigorous analysis
to which one would :·.:.bject the thought of others .

Philoso phical discours e ,

on the other hand, :s said to provide an environm ent which is~oth s ensitive to
philosop hi c issues a~i respect ful of differin g po int s of view.

The

philosop hy for c hi: i =en approach a dvances this framewo rk as being crucial
for both critica l as sessmen t and philosop hic modes of inquiry .

In abiding

by t he pri ncipl es c:· :nf orma l l ogic s et down f or philosop hical discuss
ions,

the particip ants lea=~ that an array of opinion s differen t from their own
uay l eg :i.t. i ~atel:,· :.c: ::::;,any the reaso nin6 t ied to a. part icular a:::-ea cf
interes t.

Partici~ a::on in philoso phic al discussi on is believed to

strength en one 's ir.:t..;.iry skills as they are openly practice d , and it
broaden s t he c hilc :::' e~'s reperto ire of skills as they observe the critical

the scope of releva~ : argumen ts and countera rgument s upon which children
can dr aw s3ould b e =::::'e extensiv e and more accessi ble a f ter t hey have
particip ated in a c:=...::-.unity of inquiry .

Children can mentally rehearse

the range of positic~ s both similar to and differe nt from their own and
in so doing , bring a ~eeper understa nding to b ear upon the issue in need
of apprais al.

The s·.:.ggest ion is that an experien ce of the ways in which

others think and t~e ensuing familia rity

with

a wide range of intellec tual

habits should enco~·s. ge broader , more comprehe nsive assessm ents of
s i tuations than i ~ :~i nki ng skil ls are presented atomisti cally in the
ab sence of t he oppc=:~ nity of shared express ion .

This is the main argumen t that has been proposed to show that
philosop hy for children is an appropr iate tool for counter acting potenti al
forces of indoctr ination.

It is also the argumen t which has led parents

to object most strongly to the introdu ction of philosop hy into the schools .
Before then conside ring the l imits of this claim, let us examine both the
objectio n that parents are wont to make and the type of response that is
most often provide d to counter it.

The objectio n made by parents is

t~et the develop nent of indepen dent thinking in our young , also affords t;.e~:
the opportu nity to reject more readily the values of the home and society .
Based on the fearful assumpt ion that the clear a nd unbiased cri ticis::! of
these values will lend automat ically to their rejectio n, the argumen t has
been extended by means of specious reasonin g to the followin g types of
conclus ions.

First in the case of parenta l values, it is conclud ed

and adopt values other than those of the home .

Second , i n the case of

societa l values, the conclus ion dra,m is that children will become anarchi cal
or revoluti onary .

While it is to be granted that some children will follow

these courses , it is neither the case that all children will do so, nor
that there will be a larger proport ion that do so after having undertak en
a philosop hy program .

To assert, for example , that the children who

undertak e philosop hy will reject the society 's values, is to make two
unwarra nted assurnpt ions.

On the one hand it suggests that children have

s i~ilar prioriti es with respect to values and, on the other ttat they
would choose to behave similari ly and reject those values.
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Clyde Evans in his article 'Philosophical Thinking:

An Ally for

Parental Values ' responds to this objection by arguing that if parental
teaching is to be successful, it must be capable of withstanding the
critical assessment of those to whom it is taught.

4

The philosophy for

children program i s concerned equally with drawing out bot h t he negative
and positive aspects of any given situation so that children come to
understand ~ore clearly what the ethical possibilities are within that
s i t uation b e~~o re :,;ald:ig a c.ecision about it .

According to Evar.s, this

process of critical a ssessment is important for two reasons .

First , on

the assumption that parents are not merely interested i n pr ogra~ill1ing
their children to behave rightly, moral education needs to encourage
children to question and assess a whole range of values for themselves.
It is only after such analysis that any value can be held with cor.unitment
and reason.

I:'}c.eed , part of what it means to have benaveo. r i g:~t.lJ is

that one is suffi ciently informed to discriminate right from wrong and
freely chooses to do so.

Secondly , he argues that if the re j ection of

one value fro~ a system is not to l ead to the rejection of the enti re
·system of values, then each val ue needs to be assess ed cri tically
according to its own merits.

In the case of parental teachi ng , for

example, the rej ection of one value from the set will automaticall y lead
to the rejection of t he entire set of parental values.

Needless to say ,

Evans is not alone in thi nki ng that it is almost i nevitable t hat a t a
certain stage in the child' s devel opment he/she will reject s ome
partic ular aspect of t he parents teachings .

4Li pman and Shar p , Gro1dnG Up with Philosophy , "Philosophi cal Thinkin; :
.,.\n .t\lJy for ?a!"ental Values ", b;{ Cl yde Evans, p . 375 ,
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In t:ie l ight o:' this respons e, the objectio n raised against
fosterin g indepena e~~ thinking in young children cannot be so easily
sustaine d.

For i f ;arents a re conc erned that children uphold their

values , then it is ~he capacity to think indepen dently and reflecti vely
that will ensure t~a~ those values are held with the required conunitment .
Such commitment car. only be given after a full conside ration of t he
assumpt ions underp:r .~ing, and the implica tions of, those values.
Philosop hy for ch::~~en then is designed neither to undermi ne children ' s
beliefs nor to erole parenta l values .

Its purporte d obj ec tive is rather

to help childrec es:atlis ~ firner foundati ons for believin g tho se things
they have chosen,
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re fl ection, to believe in.

I n sum, the ;rimary argumen t in favour of philosop hy for children
as a means to cou~~e~ act the forces of indoctr ination is advance d on the

thinking strateg ies .
in the reasonin g

a~~

On this view of philosop hy for children , practice
i isc ourse enjoined by philosop hy enhance s the

capacity in those ..-:-_:; study it not only for assessin g the structur es in
terms of which thei~ own thinking takes place, but also for bringing to
bear upon all matteis the f ramework of critica l assessment.

I n other

words, the uncritic a: acceptan ce of subject -matter , belie fs or values is
discoura ged in favo~r of that kind of acceptan ce WQich accrues as a
result of the indi,:~~al' s own pursui t for th e meaning , relevanc e and
credibi lity of t he :ssue at hand .

Of course there is still the threat

of parents and teac~er s who consciou sly seek to program children into
believin g certain t~:r.gs or behaving i n certain ways .

In this case ,
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there is no guaran tee that the philoso phy fo r childre n program will be
succes sful in bufferi ng the e ffects of indoct rinatio n.

Indeed , it would

be difficult to guaran tee the ~uccess of any program which hoped to
counte r the effects of indoct rinatio n when it was placed in the hands
of
person s with such rigid goals for childre n.
Let us now turn to a more critic al examina t ion of the indoct rinatio n
claim .

There are three feature s of the philoso phy for childre n pr ogram

·,::· :.c-h ac t ually se::._··:e to mitiga te ~he si:::-e:ng th of this pr oposa l.
'r he first relate s to the t opics about which reason ed cri ticisr:: i s
encoura ged.

While the Philoso phy for Childre n program cla il.~s to provid e

the tools requis ite fo r engagi ng in reasone d critici sm in all situati
ons
both within and withou t the school setting , it has been critic ized for
E.r.coura gi.ng reasc~e d c:."i :.icism in a li!':li ted co!:.t e:(t .

\1cre s-;ecifica:i.::..:, ,

it has been indicte d for ignorin g t he politic al and social backgro und
agains t which most of the teachin g mat erials are s et .

In her article ,

' What Should Social Philosophy be f or Childre n? ' Jane R. Mart in points
out that the moral dileI!lil'.as which are used in this program for instru
ction
in ethics do not turn critica lly upon the framew ork in which they are
set . 5
Accord ingly, she argues that in this regard the philoso phy for chi ldren
program ser ves to reinfor ce the vi ew that the contex ts in which the
dilem.~ as arise are themse lves unprob lematic .

The critici sm is that in

t~e absence of soc~~l and politic ~l critica l rei'lec tion , t:,e r:~·ocr::i.::
;

serves to foster an unthink ing accepta nce of the s t atus quo .

5roid . ,
t.lartin ,

Stated more

"1,nat Should Social Phi losophy be for C:1ildr en", by Jane ~ .

pp . 188- 192.
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stron gly, the accus ation is that of indoc trina tion for
soc ial and pol it ical
c0nse rvati s!!l.

Thi s c ritici sm is sever e, yet the condi tions for its

avoid ance a re easy ~o est ablis h .

Any progra m which hoped to buffe r the

force s of indoc trinat ion by reaso ned critic ism, that
i s, would need onl y
encou rage the use o: this techn ique in all domai ns inclu
ding those ,
socia l and politi ca2..

While time may not perm it the actua l pract ice of

reaso ned critic ism ::.n all areas , it is neces sary that
child ren be made
aware not or:l y of i ·_ 3 :re2. evanc e t o all cont exts but a
lso of w~at tr..ose
conte xts can be .
'I'he second c::-:. ~icism of philos ophy f or chil dren conce
r::s the
hidde n curric ulum w::ich the progra m itsel f appea r s to
enge nder .

The

under lying claim of t,his progra m is that reas oned cri
tici sm will suffic e
as a prote ction aga::: st indoc trinat ion.

While indep enden t , refle ctive

1,hou.gh-t i s i ::iport,ar.-: ·:o ou ffer indoc trinat ion, t te view
t nat, -:his is a.:.l
which is requi red needs to be resis ted .
twofo ld .

The basis for this criti c i sm is

First , the philo sophy for child ren progra m ne i t h er subje
cts the

limit s nor the tools of philo sophi cal reaso ni ng and disco
urse to criti cal
refle ction .

On the contr ary, these metho ds , most parti cular ly forma
l

and infer nal logic , are prese nt ed as techn iques adequ
ate for estab lishing
the comp lete critic a2. appra isal of an issue .

The po i nt here is not that

chi l dren need , fo r examp le , to confr ont t he soph i stic
ated philo sophi cal
debat es in respe ct c : the actua l power s of logic to ascer
tain truth .

It

is rathe r t hat , in : ::. 5 nt of the existe nce of these debat
es , teach ing
whic h does not acknc~,-:.edge sone degre e of flexi bility
with respe ct t o
the::.r powe1· s is susce ptible of t he ti tle, ' indoc trina
tion ' .

T."'!e s ec ond

problem with using reasone d critici sm as a tool suffic ient to buffer
indoct rinatio n is that it assume s that all the potent ially indoct rinatin
g
aspects of a situati on admit of critica l reflect ion.

This assump tion is

unsoun d, unsound becaus e even in those situati ons where time permit s the
delibe ration of all possib le alterna tives, there are alterna tives which
are made inacce ssible to the individ ual by virtue of his knowle dge and
experie nce.

Theref ore, any program which hopes to use reasone d critici sm

as a means of ?Yotec tion agains t indoct rinatio n must also addYes s these
two issues .

On both accoun ts the recomm endatio n which might perhap s

1~cs1.. dispeJ. tr.e negatj_v e feature s of t:.1e hidden cur:!'.'iculum
is one which

encoura ges the develop ment of awaren ess :
critica l thinkin g;

an awaren ess of tne limits of

and, ~n awaren ess that a situati on might contain

factors presen tly incapa ble of being recogn ized .

This type o~ approac h

is both readily access ible and easily implem ented .
The third major problem of the approac h of reasone d critici sm to
indoct rinatio n is that it depend s for its success entirel y upon the
studen ts actual ly using their newly acquire d skills and this in turn
depend s upon their being motiva ted to do so .

Reason ed critici sm as a

means of buffeY ing indoct rinatio n has much to recomme nd it when the skills
peculi ar to it are employ ed .

It is not enough , howeve r, that the studen t

acquir e and be adept with these thinkin g skills , he/she must also choose
to use the::: in t::e approp riate contex ts .

':he dif ..~icult:, · o::.~ ::cc ti·,::itit~:.:;
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stude nts to think is widel y ackno wledg ed . 6 •7

The proble m is well state d,

for examp le, by Joh::i :-~cPeck when he write s that ' gettin
g peopl e to think
critic ally may=-~ :'a:~ be like gettin g them to act mora
lly ' , and he
concl udes that
train ing in par~: .cular criti cal think ing skill s is not
suffi cient to pr~iu ce a crit ical think er. One must al
so
devel op the di s;~si tion to use these ski lls .8
'I'here fore, any progr ~~ which hoped to devel op th e capac
ity for reaso ned
c ritic ism as a ·... oo:. ·:o buffe r the effec ts of indoc trinat
ion would also
need to inspi re t~e ~ot i vat i on to use that t ool . The
philo sophy for
c-hildre!1 apprca :::. i='. :-.:)t direc tly conce rn.ed with -chis
objec ti,·e , althou gh
~tis intim ated a~ ~=-~es . In this appro ach, for examp
le , the philo sophi cal
issue s are set in cc~"t exts typic al of the real life situa
tions of its
reade rs. Inso~ ar a s stude nts come to appre ciate the role
of reaso ned

legiti matel y ant:.c i~e.~e that the motiv at i on to use the
skill would i tself
be enhanced·. Eo·..,e,·er , for this type of philo sophy progra
m to be
succe ssful in cour. teract ing the force s of indoc trinat ion,
t he t echni ques
for inspi ring no"tiY a~ion would need to be addre ssed more
direc tly than
they are here .

It :sin this capac ity that a

bene fit imme asurao ly

philo sophy progr am would

from compo nents de signe d to inspi re a love of

wisdom.

6,rimot

hy J . Eerge:-. and E . I . Nwamuo , "Crit ic al Think ing : A Sign
of t he
-=,?~. ~ ·:-. :. r.:- 3l 2), ::.9e3, PP . 31- 3:. .
1
J ohn E . ~-!cPeci< , 2::-iti cal Think ing and Educa tion , (New
York: St .
Martin ' s Press , 198::. , , p . 19 .
8
Ibid .
~::..::!e;·s ", ..1.:1, ly": ::
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These three proble ms then are perha ps the ones which
prese nt the
most sever e limit ation s upon r eason ed critic ism as an
appro ach to buffe r
jndoc trinat ion .

Phil osoph y progr ams which choos e to use this appro ach
,

howev er, need littl e amendment to make their impac t upon
poten tial force s
of indoc trinat ion much more marke d.

Now that some limit ation s of the

' indoc trina tion' claim have been cons.i der ed , let us exami
ne the exten t
to which phil osoph y' s purpo rted bene fits in this regar
d a re uni que. The
philo sophy for child ren appro ach re sts solel y upon the
acqu isitio n a nd
develo pment of reaso ned criti cism a nd cri tical refle ction
as a means of
prote ct i on again st i ndoc tri nat ion . Thi s philo sophy progr
a~ , indee d any
philos ophy progra m whic h adopt s thi s appro ach to indoc
trina~ ion, there fore ,
does not off er a techn ique which diffe rs great ly from
any of those
acqui red in a gener al crit ical think i ng progra m .

uniqu e.

Const rued in this way ,

Does philo sophy then have anyth ing uniqu e to c ontri bute
t o the

fight again st indoc t r inati on?

Yes.

One such cont ribut ion is t hat which

is made possi ble by the •,1ealt h of' l iterature known as
philo sophy .

This

r ole for philo sophy is , on the whole , l eft poorly artic
ulate d in the
literature .
Philo sophy has tradi tiona lly conce rned itse lf with t he
kind of
issue s ~hat perva de every day l ife and the meani ng of what
it is to be
human . For examp le, the proble m of ident ity , the conti
nuity of existe nce ,
the existe :;ce o:..' Go~~. :·~e: :,i2.l o.:,d dete~:~!ini ::::: , the
richt -:.o 2.i:'e an.i
abort ion , and a host of other moral i ssues a re of centr
al conce rn to
philo soph ers .

It is from t h is frame work of know led g e
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that philosop hy has a unique contribu tion to make in respect of indoctr ination.
'J'h:roue;h rec ogn:i.zing that many -riewpoi nts c an accrue to an issue, stude::ts
are less likely to succtunb to the unexami ned acceptan ce of any one
particu lar view in respect of it.

Moreove r , by explorin g a wide range of

viewpoi nts, students come to appreci ate that it is not only the widely- held
beliefs that are worthy of attentio n.

Students learn also to appreci ate

the value of many differen t respons es, even the unusual respons e.
is one caution that needs to be made here , however ,

There

If a range of vie,,s

is presente d for conside ration on ~ost occasio ns, then one needs to be
aware that a co=.":citment to a neut ral ~ ' always non-c ommital ' att i tude i s
not unconsc iously encourag ed.

While it may be importa nt to harbor this

view on some issues, it would be !'llisleadin g to uphold it as the ideal
or jentatio n to all situatio ns.

One would need to conside r seriousl y, :or
......................... _
't

holocau st.

•

• -

..

~

...

In other words, the acquisit ion of the general skills

appropr iate to reasoned criticis n are importa nt to counter indoctri natio~ ,
but equally inportan t is an understa nding of the materia ls to which they are
applied ;

an appreci ation, for example , of the ethical consequ ences of

logical choices .

Precolle ge Philosop hy and t he Unificat ion of the School Curricul ur:

.. -

..... ~ . .: .... ... _.,, ....
:-··.L. - ........ ; ··,·

was first raised by :-1atthew Lipnan in his book Philosop hy in the Class~·o o::. .
Basical ly, the clai:n is t hat philosop hy provide s a frar.1ework suit able :~o!·
experien cing ed~ca~io n as a unified whole .
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From the ti~e of Plato Weste rn educa tors have projec ted two
fundam ental goals :

~~e

integr ation of all knowle dge and the full

develo pment of 1.:-:e :.:-:ii vidua l.

Lipman and his co-wo rkers see philos ophy

in educa tion as a ~eans to resurr ect these goals;
childr en ' s abil:t y

~~

a method fo r enhanc ing

interr elate knowle dge from variou s fields ;

a method of inprov i~; their genera l capac ity for learni ng .

and

Lipman argues

that philos ophy ser·:es to integr ate the diffus e eleme nts of the
schoo l
c- ,J.:rric1.1ltL~ ~~;t: c:_ :. -:E-::.~ in turn minim izes the frustr ation
experi enced by
·J
childr en as .::ie~- Se-:~: to unite the pieces of a segme nted schoo
l day . ..,

':he i ,'.'.:;:a~·; - -' ~:iis argum ent is partic ularly forcef ul since it.
:r.us
been brough t forwar::. at a time when the knowle dge explos ion appea
rs not
only to be fragrr.ent::.::-:g all learni ng but also when the specia lisatio
P. it
invoke s seems U!1a•;c:..:.able for the for eseeab le future .

It is easy to

. . .,. ... =-- c onfron t:
.... - •\ -' ---ns ~heir sc hool exper ience rni €h: ~ee _
-- -·-

daunte d by the pros;e ct of obtain ing exper tise in one area or
even a
fat":il iari ty r.-;i t:1 a ,:..:...-::ber of areas .

Indeed , it is reason able to

antici pate that c~i:~~ en will expect only to acquir e bits and
pieces of
knowle dge in the ho:;:e that it will bec ome meani ngful or usefu
l at a later
time.

The view t~a~ the presen t fragm entari ly struct ured schoo l day

reinfo rces this at~:~u de has, there fore, much to reconunend it
.

Lipman 's

argum ent in favo~r c : philos ophy i n the schoo ls gains its full
purcha se
in this contex t.

:: ·:en the growth of knowle dge and its di visio:1 into

separa te discip: ii'.:e;; , it is not so much that the presen t subjec
t by
9Matthew Li p:-~e.:: , ..:. ,.:: ~ii . Sharp and Frede rick J . Oscany an , Ph i l
osophy
i n t he Cl~::-s !'<'"'::-., : ::::. e d . (Phila de l phia : Temple Uni versit y Fre
ss ,
1980, p . 26 .
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subjec t struct ure of the schoo l day is inapp ropria te, rather
it is the
manne r in w1:l i ch t r:e s ub jects a r e generally pre s ented that a dmits
of
improv ement.

Instea d of presen ting the discip lines as discre te entiti es

in terms pecul iar only to themse lves , Lipman ' s point is that
phi losoph y
provid es a single framework from which all discip lines can be
simila rly
appre ciated .
The 'framework' to wh i ch Lipman refers here is chara cteriz ed by
two
~eatur es.

~t c~~s~ itute3 both an awarer .ess of the epi stemol o i cal ,
5

metap hysica l, ethica l and aesthe tic dimens ions of differ en~
discip lines ,
and a f ac ility 1-itn t he reflec tive or analy tic habit of mind
.

By

virtue of its concer n to clarif y conce pts and make expli cit
the framew ork
assum ptions upon which they depend , his claim is t hat philos ophy
provid es
t he necess ar y co~c ept ua l tool s f or analy zing a nd c ompa r ing a
l l t he
c.i i'i'eren t 1.::scip.:..:. r.es i n the curric ulur.-. accord ing to "these dimens
ions .
In other words , the educa tional experi ence becom es unif ied throug
h the
under standi ng that most subjec ts a dmit of philos ophical analys
is, whethe r
it be epi ste~ol ogica l , ethica l or aesthe tic .
In additi on to these two aspec ts of philos ophy , one of the
pedago gical princi ples which is encour aged by propon ents of
precol lege
philos ophy is an openn ess to childr en ' s questi ons .

Unlike the more

tradit ional approa ches to t e aching which have tended to reinfo
rce only
·,.·:-.ich pe:r:::i t of a sir.1ple s0luti on ,

.t'I"i!"lc i~~e
-

to\,..• .L..
.:_- •...
...

J._

those quest ions •.; hich ch ildren ask l ike ' What is a f act ? ', '
Wha t is
histor y?' and ' How can we be sure of anythi ng? ' into bold r elie
f.

\•:i thin
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the philosophy for schoolchildren program, for example, these questions
· " e ne i t.h<:n ·i r.ncred nm: treated per:.:'un(:i:.o;--j 2..y with respons es such as

'That's not i mportant' or 'Don't be silly!' .

On the contrary it is

believed that it is just such questions that can, and should be, used
to nurture the reflective habit of mind.

By considering questions such

as these, the resulting analysis affords examples of the extent to which
a wide range of subjects a&~it of the same conceptual foundat i ons.
c x2.:'.1p1e , the c:;_uesticn

1

::c·,;

For

ca!'l you k!'l.o" t.bat ? 1 i n a ::1aths c las s can lesc:

to the discovery that the epistemological problem to which i t refers
transcends discipline boundaries and may just a s readily be of relevance
to english, french or history lessons.

These philosophical questions

are basic, basic in that they underpin the disparate subject matters which
they a l one can unify.

I t is the children, then, who in this sense

The conceptual tools imparted to them serve to dissipate the previously
unavoi dable frustration of having to understand a school experience whi c:-.
by the very nature of its structure, is fragmentary .
The argument given here serves to mitigate the view that philosophy
merely represents another subject to be added to an already overcrowded
curriculum.

In anticipation of this objection, it is argued that

precollege philosophy is given its most correct ascription when it is
v::. ewed as provi di ng a f r a..>nework i n terms of which t he entire cur :d cttl u:-::
can be better understood.

This model of philosophy is described as

havine; hi storical precendence in John Dewey's theories on education .
Dewey is quot ed :
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philos9phy can be the comprehensive and foundational
discipline for a~~ curricular undertakings, so that . • .
:1enef'i.ts .. . , 2.:-. -,::c rue to the ent:i.re range of subject
:,.1.i..tc- ;-;; "'~: . .-:· : ~: elementary school students have to deal .
Philosophy, t.::e::-., could be appropriated as a subject area,
and transformed :::· simplification, into a single elementary
school subject, -: .:- be inserted into the curriculum along
with other suoject.s . Here, philosophy may be seen as an
ideal way of o:: :- e=.::i zi ng the somewhat chaotic fie ld kno.m
as ' language arts' so as to encompass all forms of thought
and creative exp~·ession. Or , most ambitiously, philosophy
may be taken as ~~e central methodology or armature around
which all subjec~s can be organised, in that it provides
the model of c::. s:: :·:ery and participation that can be
u~i.li s e d "oy :::z :::· ::.::.:~ f~rent tes.c:::e::'s ~·or ~any different
sub.jects . : :: -_::.:.~ 3ense , :phi.:.:,sophy ca:l beco;::e a flrnds:::e:-:-:s.l
discipline i r.-:;o ·.::-.ich all others are integrated and from
which they ce::--:. ·:e ~heir theoretical and methodological
ori entation . :_~·
The integrat ::.c:: of the curriculum then, is a uni que contribution
that philosophy can ~a~e to precollege education.

A vari ety of thinking

skills programs c a:: :.:;·.relop the tools of conceptual analysis .

s ~ch

upon the episte~o~og:.::al , metaphysical or aesthe~ic dimensions of a
su_b ject unless

~~e:.· s.iso educate for an understanding of those aspects

of philosophy .
Although Lip~an brings foTward his argument here as a strong
motivation for doir.g pnilosophy with children, the philosophy ~or chi ldren
program itsel f does ::ot directly address the ways in which the experience
cf integration is tc 8e achieved .
ir.te~rat::..on occ ·.:::::- s

s.2

Rather, his approach implies that

an a uto!::2t ic ty- product of doing philoso:;,:1.y .

In

other words, Lip~an 1 s proposal is that the development of thinking ski lls
10

narrell R . S:-.e;:::!·::. ,
9(2), 19';"3 , pp . : ?~- :~·.: ;

11
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and their application to various philosophic analyses will be sufficient
to experience the curriculum as a unified whole.

While I do not wish to

deny that there are some children who may achieve this understanding
without any further elaboration by the teacher, I
view that this will suffice for all children.

am

not inc lined to the

Given the range of

individual differences in interests and intellectual ability, there is a
need for explicit i nstruction concerning ways of integrating the
curriculum.

Not only would this ensure a better understanding of the

}J~enol~!enon fer ~12.. c:i.:l.ldr eD ~

i "v ,, oul:i e,l.so e:1hance t hat ur.ders t c.nd.ing

where it had in sorr!e way_been already grasped.

Any philosophy program

which hoped to generate the experience of curriculum unification,
therefore, ~ould on this account also be required to:

(1) increase

student awareness of curriculum unification and the ways in which it is
achieved;

and (2) recommend techniques for both demonstrating and

practising the t ransf er of philoso:ph::.c::c~ ar..aly.:3es 1::.cro.:;s cor..-:.e::-.-.;s .

Precollege Philosophy and A More Meaningful Life
A third significant point adduced in support of incorporating
philosophy into precollege education is that philosophic reflection can
bring more meaning into the lives of those who pursue i t .

The argument

here is sponsored on the basis of three more specific claims, each of
which proposes tr.at the study of philosophy is corrunensurate with
investin,S the s-:·

~ ' s life ~i th more mea:1ing .

The first claim relates back directly to the previous discussion,
-the argument being that philosophy brings more meaning into children ' s
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l ives by providin g a framewo rk in terms of which the school experien ce
can itself be unified .
discussi on.

This argumen t is elaborat ed upon i n the previou s

The point to be stressed here , however , is that chi ldren will

almost inevitab l y cone to distrus t an educatio n they find meaning less
which makes the experien ce of curricul um int egrat i on an opportun ity to
embrace warmly and openly the events of the school day .
The second claim relates to the view that philosop hy can improve
reasonin g skills , anQ that an improvem ent in reasonin g bestows an
improvem ent in reading. To recapit ulate, the suggest ion is that we read to
get meaning s, and ttat the ability to grasp meaning involves not only an
ability to discern wr.at a sentence says , but also what a sentence implies .
Gi ven that this account is correct , it follows that the more readily
children can draw inferenc es, the more meani ngs they should be able to
:f'ind in what they r eE.c. .

This in turn provide s a bet ter comprehens ion of

bot h the obvious and more subtl e meaning s i n wri t t en passage s .

A second

compone nt to this argumen t is that a greater appreci ation of literatu re
develop s through the realizat ion that reading enables the acquisi tion of
specific meaning s.

Philosop hy is believed , therefo re , to afford children

the opportu nity of finding more meaning in what they read, as well as
fac i litat ing their use of readi ng as a tool to ac quire the specific
informa tion which might bring greater understa nding to their lives .

In

ot her words children come to see reading as a tool in service of their
needs, those needs which either demand probl em solving or concern ing
which they are particu larly desirous of knowled ge.

The philosop hy for

children ' s literatu re tends to emphasi ze the relation ship between

8~

philosophy, meaning, and the written word.

However,when reasoning skills

are brought to bear upon verbal communications, a broader understanding of
wh~t others mean is also more likely to be sustained.

As a result of an

enhanced appreciation of the panoply of interpretations that accrue in
spoken communication, philosophy also has the potential to make personal
interactions more meaningful .

By way of facilitating the process of

thinking, philosophy thereby enables children to think more comprehensively
a bout wha·:, c"t:'!ers say .

I t enables them to understand the views of

ot her people r.,ore fully and to consider respectfully what it means to
hold those ·n.-s•.,rs .

I~sc:'ar as there are a number of nonphilosophically-

orientated curriculum which are also designed to develop reasoning capacity,
it is not in the ways outlined here t hat philosophy's contribution to
enriching lives is unique.

For a better understanding of what this unique

studying philosophy and having a more meaningful life.
The third clain suggests that precollege philosophy enriches
children's l ives oy contributing to their understanding of the world in
a way in which neither the development of critical reasoning nor the
' . 1·ines can d o. 11
. t ma tt ers o f o th er d 1sc1p
sub Jee
aspects of this clai~ separately.

Let us consider the two

First, what are the alternatives to

critical reasoning being intimated here?

The suggestion is that

philosophical thinking also requires the development of the intellectual
and affective iMagination , t hat is, the ability to speculate imaginatively
about ideas and feelings.

Whereas logic and critical reasoning skills

llL.ipmo.n and.. 8'narp, •..:row1np;
~
'
Up 'Wl' th Ph
'l osophy, p . 8 .
~ 1
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refine childr en's thinkin g so that the meanin gs they seek become more
access ibl e and open to evalua tion, the argume nt is that these other skills
afford even a deeper underst andi ng of the differe nt discip lines and life
events .

In other words, the contex ts from which meanin gs are derive d,

whethe r it be an academ ic discipl ine or a l ife event, are the~se lves
believe d to be made more pelluc id .

For exampl e, in sub jects such as

history , the development of the affect ive imagin ation enabl es studen ts
to i dentify with the h1.L~an be ings of t he past t hroug~ a n unders ta nding
of the propen sities of human nature under differe nt condit ions .

In t his

way chi l dren can better appr eciate t he circum stance s t hat prec i pitated
certai n histori c al decisio ns, includ ing those decisio ns which critica
l
analys is alone may render -as being absurd .

And in mathem at i cs , f or exampl e ,

a greate r unders tanding of t he importa nt rol e pl ayed by number s i n h~a
n

Perhap s what is more import ant to the i dentif i cation of philoso phy's
unique contrib ution , howeve r, is t he s ubject - matter of the di scipl ine;
the subjec t- matter, t hat is , which onl y phi l osophy can provide .

Of

part icular importa nce is the body of literat ure that has accumu lated
from
the grappl ings t ha t phi losoph ers have had with the problems of unders
tand ing
l ife itself .

This includ es, f or example, debate s about metaph ysi cal i ssues

such as the true charac ter of reality and the form of experie nce through
which i t i s appreh ended , to et h i cal and ae sthet ic issues whi ch are a lso
relevan t t o cont e~porar y life, suc h as childre n' s rights , the value of
art , nuclea r holocau st and capi tal punishment .

Consid er , fo r exampl e ,

the value t hat di scussio r.s about the nat ure of real i ty and its vo.riou
s
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interpretati on s might have f or studen ts confro nting psych edelic
drug
experi ence.

If philos ophic al ideas a nd thinki ng could not replac e the

neeo. f or this experi enc e t hen at least th ey mi ght ass ist to
put t he

experi ence in perspe ctive and to bette r orient ate the chi ld toward
s it.
Consider also t he assis tance that ethica l discus sions about aborti
on ,
for examp le , may provid e for young person s faced with such monwn
ental
life choice s.
Oll

Philos ophic litera ture presen ts an array of viewp oint s

a ny given iss~e.

This can assist studen ts · in two ways :

first, it

can impr ove their unders tandin g of life events by provid ing them
with a
r ange of unthou g~t of altern atjves ;

ar.d s econd , it can s erve to ease

the proces s of ma.king impor tant choice s by showi ng them that there
is
often not one correc t sol~t ion to a proble m, but rather , a numbe
r of
equall y valid and worthw hile ones.
! rrt:i.nei::. ::ere

:...s

t.}1e

vi ew a..J.va,.:.; ei by ~~us sell in tn.e ::.as·c; cha:: =.:'.'

of his Problems of Philos ophy, where he discus ses the value of
philos ophy .
He says that i f the study of philos ophy has value for those ot
her t ha n
s tudent s of philos ophy , it must be thr ough its effect s upon the
lives of
12
t hose who study it.
He goes on to claim that phi l osophy is to be
studie d becaus e the questi ons it raises ' enlarge our conce ption
of what
is possib le , enrich our intell ectua l i magina tion , and di minish
t he
dogma tic assur ance which closes the mi nd again st specul ation
...' .
same sentim ents pervad e the philos ophy for childr ens ' l iterat
ur e .

The
If

the releva nce t hat philos ophy has f or ordina ry peopl e l iving
or dinary
12Bertra nd Russe ll , The
Proble ms of Phi l os ophy , 8t h e d . , ( London :

Oxford Unive r sity ?ress, 1978) , pp . 93- 94 .
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l ives were accepted , ::. t is urged ·, then ways of letti ng philosophy enr ich
thos e same J :i :es no :-:-:~":. ".: e r what the age o f t he person must al so be
0

possible .

Having ta~e~ pract i cal steps to bring philosophy into people ' s

lives, those worki ng ~-ith precollege philosophy have designed progranunes
in philosophy speci:::.:~l l y aimed at enriching the lives of children .

CHAP T E R I V
THE VIABILITY OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY

This chapte r is concern ed with the viabil ity of precol lege
philoso phy.

Two aspect s of viabil ity are consid ered here:

(i) the

viabil ity of a curricu lum in respec t of the studen t's actual ability
to
think in the ways that the subjec t matter requir es;

and (ii) the

vja.bili iy of a curr:icu lum in respec t o:' the studen t ' s intere st in or
readine ss for confro nting the kinds of issues that the subjec t matter
e::::tails .
The first section of this chapte r is concern ed with the viabil ity
of precol lege philoso phy fn terms of the younge r studen t's cognit ive
ability to deal with the type of thinkin g that it require s.
::::ct,

An objecti on

i::; cons-ca::-:.::..;i- ~·a:'..3e.:: a 6 a:.1:st pro;:::s a:.s ~c-:: the introdu ct ion o:·

philoso phy into the classro om is that elemen tary and most middle schbol
childre n do not posses s the mental capaci ty for the abstra ct thinkin g
which philoso phy requir es.

The source of the objecti on can be traced to

the classic works of Jean Piaget , and the argume nt adduc ed is t hat it
is not until a child has reached the stage of formal operat ional though
t

(12-14 years) that he/she is capabl e of abstra ct, hypoth etical thinkin b .
In thi s sect ion of the chapte r I will firstly outline

(i) the major

tenets of the traditi onal Piaget ian view pertain ing to cognit ive devel
0p1~er.~
and the implic ations for educat ion which it engend ers, and

(ii) the

major objecti ons to the inclusi on of phi losophy in the school s which
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this view tends to support.

Secondly, I will discuss the responses that

are typically made to these objections and I will consider the strength
of these replys with particular reference to the broader context of T. S.
Kuhn ' s work.

Finally, by exploring possible conceptualizations of

cognitive development alternative to that of Piaget's, I conclude with
the argument that the 'Piagetian objection ' to philosophy for children
is not insuperable .
Tne viability of a curriculum, however, is not entirely dependent

upon the prospective students possessing this or that cognitive skill.
Viability is also a f unction of their displaying a readiness to confront
the types of issues that t he proposed course will raise .

The second

section of this chapter, therefore, is concerned with the viability of
precollege philosophy in terms of the studeLt ' s readiness to confront

extent of the young child's readiness to do philosophy.

Gareth Matthews

has made the most significant contribution to date in this field .

His

argument, which is the focus of this section, is based on an extensive
selection of excerpts from children's speech.

In short, his argument in

favour of children's readiness for philosophy is that , upon close
inspection, much of children ' s apparent whimsical dialogue actually
overlays deeper philosophical puzzlement .
~'he Cognitive Canacity of Precollebe Students
Let us defer no longer and turn now to the first section of this
chapter 1::y exa.":1ining the traditiona l Piagetian conception of cogniti ve
development and the implications for education which it engenders.
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Piaget's writing s on cognitiv e developm ent admit of a number of
i nterpre tations with respect to both the concept of a stage and the means
of progres sion through them.

The followin g account , however , represe nts

that interpre tation of his stage theory which has become the most
entrench ed in educatio nal setting s.
of cognitiv e development namely

3) formed operati onal thought .
as a res:il t o:.· !':'.atur ation .

First, Piaget advance s three stages

1) preoper ational,

2) concret e, and

Progres sion through them is sai d to occur

Second, the ages at which these stages are

reached are generall y set at 2, 5-7, and 12- 14 years respect ively.

And

third, an indivi dual is held to be capable of only those forms of thinkin~
charact eristic of the putative stage in which he is current ly located and
those prior to it .

For example , while an individu al at the stage of

concrete operations is presume d to have access to patterns of thinking

the individu al is not capable of enterta ining thought s charact eristic
of the next stage, namely formal operatio ns .

The pervasiv eness of this

interpre tation of Piaget and the extent of its ac ceptance have led many
to assume that knowled ge about children ' s thinking styles and capacit ies
is a matter of age alone.

It would seem as if the termi nology that once

s erved to de scr ibe what at most might be the dominan t modes of thinking
in children at differen t ages , now serves to define the range of thought
chi ldren are capable of .
This view of cognitiv e developm ent has a number of serious
~mplica tions fo r the educato r .

For our present purpose s , however , I
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have includ ed only ~~ose which have given rise to the
major objec tions
in respe ct of intrc: :.:.cin g philo sophy into the schoo ls.
A major i~pl: :atio n of this view is that a child ' s educa
tion
shoul d be tailo red~ ~ confo rm to the int ellec tua l capac
ities consi stent
with the cogni tive 2:~uc tures which occur at each succe
ssive stage of
logic al

devel op~e~ t.

Inasm uch as progr essio n throu gh the three

intel lectu al phase s :s the natur al outcom e of an indiv
idual ' s overa ll
cev e] op!r,ent , e:::.:.: a: :.:::-. i s subor dinat e to r.:atur ation in
terms o-:: its
power to enhan ce CC€~ itive growt h .

In other words , educa tion can on this

view facil itate ~~:-.e ·.~se of conce pts alrea dy made acces
sible by the proce ss
of matur ation , but:- : can do little , if anyth ing, to advan
ce an
under stand ing of hi;~e r order conce pts.

The sugge stion her e is that it

would be futile ~c =~~ag e stude nts in activ ities that
requi re think ing at

even go so far as -: : propo se, for examp le, that such an
activ ity const itutes
educa tiona l !'.".al;ra:-: ::.~e . In this case, the sugge stion
is that highe r order
conce pts give r:se -:: confu sion which itsel f in turn foste
rs the devel opnen t
of rote- learn lr.g s~~at egies and negat ive attitu des towar
ds learn ing.
A secon d i~;:.. ::atio n of this view and one which to some
exten t
offer s an expla nat:~ ~ for the pauci ty, in our recen t past,
of educa tiona l
progra ms speci fic al:..:: desig ned to enhan ce think ing skill
s is the
jnevi tabil ity c~ :~-:e: ..lecti ve-log ical develo pment .

The point here is nc ~

so much tha t it i s :~pos sible to push the child up the
inclin ed plane of
impro ved reaso ning, :ut rathe r that it is not neces sary
s ince this
progr es sion wil: cc:·..:.~ its elf as a resul t of norma l human
develo pmen t.
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Philosoph y for children is thus susceptib le to indictmen t on both
accounts:

first, inasmuch as it requires facility with abstract concepts,

it is considere d unsuitabl e for children younger than 12-14 years;

and

second5 insofar as one of its major goals is the developme nt of
reasoning skills and reflectiv e thought, its major source of
justifica tion becomes untenable .
Those in favour of philosoph y for children have responded to these
criticism s in one of three ways:

1) attemptin g to identify weaknesse s

jn Piaget's theory (Gareth Matthews) ;

2) interpre~ ing Piaget in such a

way that his theory can be made to accommodate the possibili ty of
philosoph y for children (Hope J. Haas);

3) by ignoring the discrepan cy

between practicin g philosoph y for children on the one hand and thinking
in Piagetian terms on the other.
::.n what fo:..low s l snalJ. elucidate the weaknesse s i:ihe:cen-c i:1 eac:1
of these 3 responses .

I shall then proceed to construct a framework in

terms of which t he 'Piagetia n objection ' can be more adequatel y met .
Gareth Matthews 's criticism of the basis of Piaget ' s theoretic al
formulati ons is an example of the first type of response .

In the course

of formulati ng an argument concernin g the appropria tness of philosoph y
for children, Matthews inveighs against Piaget ' s research technique s on
the grounds that Piaget wittingly excluded from his data those unusual
responses fro1!: chilcren ,,hicl! r.e himself called ' mere ror.tanc::..~. ; ' . 1
1
Gareth Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child , 2nd ed . (Cambridi; e :
Harvard Universit y Press, 1930) , p.39 .
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According to Matthews, it is the unusual response which is more likely
t o be the res ult of honest r eflection and philosophic speculation and
reasoning.

Moreover, ·he adduces many examples of children ' s speech both

from Piaget's work and his own research which lend convincing support to
his claim.

Matthews's point here is an i mportant one.

However,

insightful criticism of a theory upon which objections are based is not
in and of itsel f sufficient reason to dispel those objections.

Undermining

the theory wil l of course undermi ne t he i~.mediate theoretical justification
which the objections might have, but it remains to be seen whether an
alternative a c count of cognitive develop::.ent conduc i ve t o t i e i ntroduction
of philosophy in the school, can be provided.
The second typical response to objections from the Piagetian
framework is t o make interpretative manoeuv~es within that framework suc h

and the training of thinking or reasoning in general .

Hope Haas, for

example, points out that in a more recent version of hi s t heory Piaget
concedes t hat t he development of formal operations is not inev itable. 2
While this claim makes possible the teaching of abstract thinking, it
has no similar i mplications for those defined pat terns of t hought
typical of the earl ier development al sequence.

In other words,

preoperational thought and concrete operational thought remain t he
inevi table cons equenc e s of the natural pr oc e ss of maturat ion .

In or cer

to acco.mnodate empiri cal fi nd i ngs f r om a variety of s ource s which divt,lf;e
2

Hope J . Eaas, "The Ve.lu e of ' Ph i l os ophy f or Childr en ' Hi thin t he
Piaget ian Fr ameworl\ ", ~.'.etaphilosonhy 7 ( 1) , 1976 , p . 73 .

the capacity for formal thought in children much younger than 12- 14 years ,
a number of strateg ic theoret ic-inter pretativ e adjustm ents have been
pos ited .

The suggest ion has been made , f or example , that the t r ansition

between stages is much more gradual than previou sly believe d, and that ,
for any given stage, the thinking pattern s which it sustains may manifes t
themselv es at differen t starting times and at differen t rates .

Moreove r ,

in some i nstances the sol ution has been to push back further to younger
and younger chi2.c.re n the age at which formal thought is believed to
surface .
:finally , there is the response one finds in persons ·rho are at
one and the same time committ ed to the Piagetia n model as a result of
their education and happy to teach philosop hy and philoso phical t hinking
skills to youn 5 :~ildren .

Confron t ed wi th the theoret i cal dis sonanc e, t rey

may respond with a s houlder - shrug clair.iing t hat they persist with t he
practice of philosop hy because the childre n can manage it and do like it,
and because they find t hat its practice facilita tes chi ldren ' s learning
in other areas.

In the next breath , however ,the s ame people continue their

disc ourse drawing upon Piageti an ter ms and concept s .
The second and third points made above are interest ing , particu larly
in light of T. S . Kuhn ' s work on concept ual revoluti ons .

The latter point ,

for example , see~s to be a typi cal case of treating as ' a pesky little
that dee!: r.ot fit wi t::1 the co11te:::p0-:.· :1r:r

-"t\"'').:,.:_

:

..... _ ..... ~ - ! . ••

of choic e, that is, the paradigm which on account of its wide acc eptance
i1as becor.ie rit:;idl y er:!'bedded in everyday think ins .

Sir.1ila.r ly , the

phenomenon describe d in the sec ond point above addresse s the issue
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surroundi ng the unrej itting resistanc e encounter ed to challengi ng the
existing dominant ~a~adi gm with altogethe r alternati ve conceptio ns .
Rather, the typi cal course of action is to attempt to squeeze t he
intractable data in~o the existing paradigm , or to stretch the fabric
of the theoreti cal ::-arnework in the hope of accommoda t ing the discrepan t
data .

Piaget 's s~a;e theory of cognitive development has been subjected

ext ensively to both ~inds of treatment .

However, theoretic al moves of

this kind are t he!::.s e:.. ·;es not unproblerr .atic.

New issues concerning t he

extent to which one can manipula te and reinterpr et a theory and still
claim to be •,;orki :-:.f ·~·:.. thin t he sar.:e theoret ical fr amewo!'k er::erge .

'.·:i t r.

~articul ar refe rence to Piaget' s work, for example, it becomes
questiona ble whethe:- the conc ept of s tage remains viable given the
theoretic al manoeu~c."es mentioned above.

Moreover, one might also contest
~r c~itables t o continue ta

think solely within -:he Piageti an framework .

The point that needs to

be stressed here is ~iat while manipula tions of the Piagetian model may
in the end produce a ~ormulati on of stage theory which can embrace the
divergent empirical :indings , this act i vity , should not preclude the
pursuit of equally •:alid , if not more adequate , concept ual models .

To

the contrary, the exclusion of this pursuit from research design constitut es
irrespons ible theor i zi ng and an unnecessa ry stric ture upon the range of
p o ssible altern a -'::.ves. In respect of some of the claims Piaget r.iakes
about cq;:li ti 'le st!.. ::-:ures , ~l a.;e::.~ nar:es c. s imilar poi nt ,,:;er. :1e
writes , " In certair. cases, a little reflectio n establish es that Piaget 's
claim could only be :eopardiz ed by logical count erargtL~en ts , or by some
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superior alternati ve conceptuali zation of the whole domain - in other
words , by some sort of nonempir ical philosop hical-the oretical type
rebuttal . 11 3
It is not so much, however, that the rejection of Piaget ' s model
is necessita ted by th ese deliberat ions .

Indeed , one should be willing

to identify and develop the insights of a great thinker , particula rly in
those areas where the appropria te claims are wel l supported by evidence .
Rather) wha~ is of u~~ost importanc e is the develop~e nt of an openness
to the weaknesse s of the theory and to the idea that this model represent s
only one ct possibly ::ar.y cor.ceptu ali za~i ons of cog~itive developme nt .
The work of Susan Carey presented in her article "Are Children
Fundamen tally Different Kinds of Thinkers and Learners than Adults? " is
apposite he~e.

By way of investiga ting possible interpret ations of what

learners ', she has arrived at five plausible conceptio ns of cognitive
developm ental change , four of whic h may be viewed as the beginning s of
genuine al te:mati ves to the Piagetian framework .
Let us begin with the interpret ation most commonly aligned with
the Piagetian position .

Although Piaget ' s writings at times admit

of

interp.ret ations in keepi ng with one of the other four interpret ations ,
the followin g in~erpret ation has featured prominen tly in the literatur e

3 ,Toh!J :: . ?:!.avell , "Sta,:;e- related
propertie s of c ocnitive developme nt" ,
Cocniti\"e :-:::·:cl':o l o,··,·

2, J..971 , p.~1lt6 .
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but has also directe i the course of research in developm ental psycholo gy.
On this interpre tat:.~:: "Ch ildren differ from adults with respect to the
kinds of concepts t:_e~- can represen t mentally , and/or with respect to
the logical operati: ~s that can be compute d over their mental
represe ntations .

~::::er type of differen ce is called one of
represe ntationa l :'cr::at. 114 Developm ental changes at this level represen t
the most funda.~e nta: ~i fference s in thinking and learning possible and
are conside red

"':::e

!':s·..1lt of maturat ion.

On this view , children are

limited by these :'c!·::.ats in terms of the ways in which they can think,
3.;,d these .:'~r ::.e.:.:s !a~·~ : !:e~selve s in turn li!:1.i ted by the rate of

maturat ion.

( 'E"lis ·::ew togethe r with its educatio nal implica tions was

discusse d earlier) .

By contras t, :~e other four interpre tations of 'fundam entally
-· ~· ,..... .;:.·..-.5

in terms of t he ac~~:sit ion of knowled ge .

Carey makes a furth er

distinct ion , na."::e::.· :::at between ' donain general ' and 'domain specific '
knowledg e .

1

::-o~ai:: fe~eral ' knowled ge is that knowled ge whose

acquisi tion is capa-::e of affectin g thinking and learning across
discipli ne boundar ies .

In this category Carey incorpo rates: ::.eta-

concept ual skills; ':oundat ional concepts ' , that i s , conc epts which are
putative ly a part

c:

all theories ; and, 'tools or ideas of wide applica tion',

for example , ~atie::.~ ::cal tools like calculus and logarith ns .
specific knowl ec.ge, : :: the other hand , refers to

4

Domain

knowing the conter.t o:·

s. Chip::!an , .: . ~~ ~al, and R . Glaser, Thinking and LearninF-: Skills ~
Vol . 2 , (C2~::bri:::;e : ~r:oaum Associa tes : forthcom int;) , "Are Children
Funda:::e ntal ly :::::':'e :·: ,_~ Kinds of Thinker s and Learner s than Adults':'" ,
by Susan Carey , p . l .

98

specific disciplines, for example, physics and chemistry.

According

to Carey, it is a truism that on this interpretation children are
fundamentally di fferent thinkers and l ear ners - ' children are novices in
a multitude of domains where adults are experts 1 • 5
Whereas most explanations of cognitive development have been cast
in terms of representational format or foundational concept change, Carey
finds little, if any, support in the research for this rat ionale.

As a

result of reviewi ng much of the empirical work of both Piaget and
contemporary devel opmental psychology in light of these five different
conceptual frameworks, Carey concludes that perhaps the best explanation
of cognitive development is to be made in terms of the acquisition of
metaconceptual skills and/or domain specific knowledge.

Car ey examines

the evidence which is typically adduced to support Piaget ' s notion of
major cognitive shifts in the child ' s logical structures which are said
to be available between both preoperational and concrete operational
thinking and concrete operational and formal operational thought.
According to the tenets of the Piageti an model, children who have not made
the shift from preoperational to concrete operational t hinking (occurring
around age 6) have difficulty, f or example , with class inclusion simply
because they cannot mentally represent the relation of class inclusion.
In other words, prior to this shift it is held on the Piageti an conception
that children do not have the cogni tive structures capabl e of representing
the concept of class inclusion.

Carey

insists that t he research findings
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'leave no doubt that the young child differs from the adul t in his
ability to impose inc l usion hierarchies on new materials ... 16 •
However, she claims that explanations for the phenomenon , other than that
of representational :ormat, are possible.

Indeed, she suggests that they

are most strongly incicated in light of ·the findings of Smith (1979) and
Markman (1978).

These findings show that the very young child (4 years)

is capable of represe~ting inclus i on.7

Carey offers, (1) lack of

specific knowledge a~out the language used in describing the classes,
(2) lack of knowledge about classes

themselves, and (3) lack of knowledge

about the nature of ~t e class inclusion concept and how it works, as
~~ree compelling alt ernative explanations.

First of all, rather than

the difficulties witt class inclusion being brought about by an inability

to represent class inclusion, it may be that questions like 'Are there
1;:i.0:re flowers than da:.s ies? 1 which are typically used in tests of class
inclusion, violate Lcrmal everyday conversation maxims rendering t hem
easily misunderstood.

In other words, the difficulties may accrue as a

by-product of obscure syntax.

The meaning of the syntax in these cases

stands in need of clarification, a feat older children have probably
already accomplished.

With respect to the significant effect of

specific knowledge a~out the classes themselves on class inclusion task
performance, the point is that a comprehens i ve knowledge of flowers and
their hierarchies would greatly enhance performance.

Instruction about the

hierarchies of flowers, for example, is expected to improve performance in
young children since most of them have had little instruction , either
formal or informal, in this way of looking at the world.
6 1· .d
01 • , p. 11.
7 ~b·d
.l l
• ' p . 13 .

Carey cites her
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own series of studies which show, for example , the importa nt role that
the acquisi tion of biologi cal knowled ge plays in the constru ction of the
hierarch y of plants and animals , on one l evel , and living things on the
next. 8

At one point the evidence even tempts her to suggest that ' the

acquisi tion and reorgan ization of strictly domain spec i fic knowled ge
probably account s for most of the cognitive differen ces between 3 year
olds and adults . 9

Secondl y , Carey believe s that lack of metacon ceptual

awarene ss of the inclusio n relation preclude s the child 's appr eciation
of the necessi ty of various consequ ences of inclusio n .

In other words ,

knowledg e about and an explana tion of the dyna.."nics of the class inclusio n
r elation would serve to facilita te a correct understa nding of the
spec ific class i nclusion relation i n question .
In conclus ion then, cognitiv e develo.J?ment can be viewed primari ly as
a fi..nction of l ear::1ing ·..rhen it is explaine d in terms of the acquisi tion
of

knowled ge, domajn- specific and/or metac onceptu al , as opposed to changes
at the level of represe ntationa l format .
What does all this ha·.-e to do with philosop hy for children ?

The

recogni tion that cognitiv e developm ent might be conceiv ed more adequat ely
as a process of learning meets the objectio ns to the introdu ction of
philosop hy into the classroo m which were promoted on the basis of the
traditio nal Piagetia n view .

First , insofar as children are no longer

l i~it ed in ter~s of their cognitiv e capacit ies by naturati on , there is no
8

Ibid. , p . 14 .

9 rbid ., p . 40 .
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reason to suspec t ~~at given the approp riate inform ation they might not
manife st a nd be prc:'ic ient in abstr act thinkin g at young ages .

In

other words , the o·::·j ection made agains t philoso phy for childre n proc l
aiming
the inabili ty of yc~r.g childre n to unders tand higher order concep ts is
not
tenable on this lat~ er view.

Second , philoso phy for childre n and indeed

any program aiMed ~: rectl y at develop ing thinking skills is elevate d
to
the status of a ~or:.~w hile , if not vital, educat ional practic e .

The view

that cogniti ve gro~-:-:.:1 is predom inantly a functio n of learning reinfor ces
this concep tion .

.. ; longer is educ ation relega ted to the role of provid ing

practic e in thinkic .~ c apacit ies made access ible by virtue of matura tion
c'.~olle.

.::nstea:5., c:-. :.~is latter view it can approp riate the role of

initiat ing and deve:op ing a variety of thinkin g styles in childre n .

It

need not be argued ~tat the Piaget ian positio n could not be extende d
eventu ally to acco::.:: ~date this role of educat ion and the conseq uent
·d.abil i ~y of p:-.:.: c5::;:::y for childre n .

'::.!'le point is rathe~ tr:at in li;'.:t c.:'

the alterna tive co~:ep tions to cognit ive development shown here, the
viabil ity and i~pcr~~ ~ce of philoso phy for childre n are at onc e rat ifi
ed .
The Readi ness of ?rec ollege Studen ts to Confron t Issues in Philoso uhy
The foregoi Lg discuss ion has provide d an orienta tion to c ognitiv e
develop mental theory which grants younge r, prepub escent childre n the
capaci ty to deal with abstra ct and higher- order, metaco nceptua l thinkin
g.
In so doing, it r.as ~rovide d a framew ork i n terms of which precol lege
philoso phy can be c::-:s i der ed a viable curricu lum endeav our si!lce youn[;
childre n can partak e in the type of thinki ng that the subjec t require
s ..
Precoll ege philoso f:::: program s which involve the study of philoso phy '
s
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tradition al problems, however, have an additiona l requireme nt to be met
before their viability is fully attained .

Viability in these cases is

also a function of the children' s readiness to deal with the subject- matter
of the disciplin e;

that is, a readiness to confront issues in metaphys ics ,

epistemol ogy, the philosoph y of science and the philosoph y of religion .
The remainder of this chapter is concerned , therefore , with an examinati on
of young children ' s preparedn ess for interacti ons with this type of
subject- matter.
Professor Gareth Matthews offers the most convincin g evidence in
support of the claim that precolleg e age children are ready for philosoph y .
Matthews has amassed an enormous selection of excerpts from children ' s
dialogue which he believes indicates their propensit y for philosoph ic
speculati on and reasoning .

Even among very young children he has found

dialogue which strongly suggests this tendency to wonder about problems
typical of philosoph y.

He contends that the embarrasi ngly unanswera ble

questions which children are wont to ask are generally signs of philosoph ic
puzzleme nt.

While children 's language is mostly naive and unsophis ticated

the claim is that the questions they ask are in essence the same as those
of professio nal philosoph ers;

indicativ e of a similar desire in children

for meaning and understan ding.

Examples of the type of dialogue referred

to here by Matthews occur frequentl y throughou t the precolleg e philosoph y
literatur e.

The following examples which are particula rly notable have

been drawn from Matthews book ' Philosoph y and the Young Child ' and are
included here to further illustrat e his point .
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Jordan ( 5 :.-:-s), going· to bed at eight one evenin g , asked ,
' If I go tc bed at eight and get up at seven in the
mornin g, he·., do I really know that the littl e
hand of tte clock has gone around only once? Do I have
to stay up all night to watch it? If I look away even fo
a short ti=e, maybe the small hand will go around twice .'

(a)

10

In this case Matthe ~s points out how Jordan ' s puzzle ment is inextr
icably
bound up with proble ::s of induc tion.

In other words , the impli cit

conce pts with which Jordan may here be concer ned, have to do
with what
const itutes ' e!'loug:i evide nce', 'enlar ging the eviden ce base',
and ' worry
about how to extra; c:ate justif iably from observ ed period s to
unobse rved
ones'. 11
(b) A l ittle gi~: of nine asked:

'Daddy , . is there really God?'
The father a::swe red that it wasn' t very certai n; to which
the child re~ort ed: ' There must be really , becaus e he has
a name! 112

Matthew s bring£ Ber~~a nd Russe ll ' s argum ent as applie d to Romulu
s to bear
upon this pro":):'..e:: .

i

If 'Romu:~s ' is a name, there exists an entity named
Romulus . (A name has got to name someth ing or it is
not a na.::e)
There exi s~ s no entity named Romulus

ii

iii

Romulus is not a name

And now:
iv

If God is a name , there exists an entity named God
God is a name

v

vi

There exists an entity named God

lOMat thews, Philos :;c~v and the Young Child , p.2.
11

Ibid., pp . 3-4 .

12Ibl.d .

,

p . 30 .
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He explains that the princip le needed to justify i and iv is debatab le ,
the debat e extendin g as far back as the pre-Soc ratic phil osophers to
~ontempor ary discussi on of 'free logics ' in which ' empty names ' are
allowed .

In thi s way, he reveals the extent to which a child ' s reasonin g

may be philoso phically based and cor respond ingly admit of philoso phical
elabora tion.

Matthew s argues that to the extent that

children ' s question s

are phi l osophic al , they deserve the appropr i ate respect and sensitiv ity
of' :respons e that. philoso phically trained t eac hers can give them .

Anc,

similar ly, in both:
(c)

Ian (6 yrs) found to his chagrin that the three
childre n of hi s parent ' s friends monopol ized the
televisi on; they kept him from watchin g his
favour i te programm e. ' Mother', he asked in
f rustrati on , ' why is it bett er for three peopl e to
be selfish than for one? 1 13

(d)

Some question of fact arose between James and his
father , and James said , ' I know it is !' His father
replied , ' But you mi ght be wrong !' Denis (4 yrs
7 mths) then joined in saying , ' But if he knows,
he can't be wrong ! Thinkin g's sometim es wrong , but
knowi ng ' s always right ! 1 14

and

he showed that the child ' s thinking is suscept ible of further philosop hic
discuss ion, teasing out an appropr iate level, conside rations such as the
princip le of utility and the theory of knowled ge , respect ively .
example drawn from

An

my

own teaching experien ce with a ,class of 6 year olds

may also be ~pposite .

I was in the midst of a lesson on the solar system

when two children in the class spontan eously brought forward :for consic.e rntion
the followin g example of ,philoso phical question ing .
13
11

Ibid . , p . 28 .

~Ibid ., p . 27 .
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Child 1:
Child 2:
Child 3:

'Who made the wor ld ? '
' Oh, you know. God did .'
' Yes, but who made God? '

Matthews ' content ion is not that every piece of dialogue whic h
appears philosop hically rich is necessa rily a reflecti on of genuine
philosop hic puzzlem ent .

Moreover , he does not suggest that every child

has a predisp osition for this particu lar form of wonder .

His point is

rather that s ince many children display charact eristics of phi losophi cal
puzzlem ent , at 2.east some of which mi ght be genuine philosop hical
deliber ation, the n . these questio ns and speculat ions deserve respect and
conside ration.
In favour of actually enc ouragi ng ' the impulse to philos ophize ',
as he calls it , Matthews argues in the followin g way :
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

Some c hildren naturall y do philosop hy
Some c::ildren nat-u!'al ly <io arthnus ic e1;c.
Childre n' s art/mus ic impul ses are encourag ed (not
condesce nded to)

therefo r e,
(iv)

Children ' s philosop hic impulses should be encourag ed
(and not condesce nded to)l5

The strength of his argumen t here , however , depends largely on the exte~t
to which (i) is ~rue.

Apart from the selectio ns of childr en 's dialogu e

Matthew has brought forward in suppor t of this claim, there is an ever
increasi ng

body of support t o be found in Th i nking :

Philosop hy for Children .

The Journal of

Througho ut this journal many example s of nc~~~l

l5 Gareth B. :.:at thews , ''On Talkine Philosop hy with C:iildren " , Soy::i.l
I nstit·1te of P!: ilosop~v Lectures , 1975- 1976 , p . 47 .
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class dialogues in h~ich philosoph ical issues are being discussed with
both elementar y and ~iddlesch ool children are presented .

Here again ,

the dialogues serve to reveal the extent to which many children are
very intereste d in e~d capable of delving into the classical problems
of philosoph y.

For example , in Volume 2(1) a very engaging transcrip t

of a dialogue from ~:~th graders discussing the epistemol ogical questions
of evidence, knowlec.ge and truth clearly indicates the interest level and
capab i lity o~ this a~e group t o grappl e with such issues. (See Appendix

4 for a copy of this transcript. )
j1

s::.::!ilar 1:.::-.-:: of argu."!'lent in f avour of er:courag ing pni:'.. os o;,hic

thinki ng suggests t:.at because we underesti mate children ' s readiness for
philosoph y, we do t t en less than education al justice.

Drawing from t he

work of R.D . Laing a""d his thesis that chil dren and adults often live up
.

.

.

~--=-::-.e:. :.~~

.._.
<""\

______.... ··" -

' ... ".' • •

as incapable of phi!osoph ic deliberat ion , we are ensuring that they will
act that way . 16

The i~plied recommen dation on both account s that will

ensure the fair trea~nent of children in respect of their philosoph ic
propensi ties, is the adoption of a more open and positive attitude
towards their capabilit ies .

Instead of approachi ng children with

expectati ons which a priori restrict the extent of t heir .philosophical
inquisitiv eness and understan ding , the recommen dation is for an
environ.me nt which a ~~ords the opportun ity for both explorat ion and
cons iderat ion of the children ' s ideas .

. 16~1atthew Lipman , ,. ?hilosoph y f or Children" , ~-letaPhilo sonh\·

1976, p. 25.

7(1 ) ,
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I s the encourag ement of philoso phical thinking and/or the
encourag ement of a confron tation with philosop hic issues potentia lly
harmful to children ?

It is not unreaso nable to anticip ate the following

kinds of objectio n to philosop hy for chi ldren :
mode of thought is unprodu ct ive;

first, the philosop hi c

and second, the deeper philoso phical

issues a re disturbi ng to children insof ar as they disrupt established
concept ions of reality , etc.

In respect of these concern s Matthews

advances a n ir.t e:!:'est i ng vi ewpoi nt , one that could be develope d to
provide a compelli ng argumen t in favour of doing philoso phy with
cl:ildren .

:.:a'~~::ews propos es that the ea.rly appeara nce of philosoP.hic

tendenc ies in children indicate s that the search for meaning and
understa nding which instiga t es
preroga tive of adulthoo d. 17

~·-H: (·

philosop hic inquiry is not the exclusiv e

Rather he view3 philos ~phyas being more

to the · :.:e of t :r..e !":ir:d :.::~::i

Matthews , children s' philoso phical question ing is an expressi on of the
same i mpulse that brings adults to philosop hy, and therefo re, toe s earch
for philosop hic meaning is an importan t , if not necessa ry, function of
the mind .

The argumen t surfacin g h ere and one which admits of further

elabora tion is t hat a healthy intellec tual progres sion through chil dhood
is as much depende nt on philosop hic discove ry as it is upon discove ries
about the more empirica lly orienta ted body of knowled ge .

If the

argument were correct then the appropri ate educatio nal response , would
oe one ,,:iic h enc our aged philos oph i ca l inquiry at least to ,:.he s 3.;::e ext c::t
as those curricul um subjects which sponsor definite , readymade a ns wers .
17Matt h e\,S ,

11

':alking Philosop hy with Childre n",

p . Lf1 .
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The issue of readine ss with regard to children and philosop hy
is not yet fully articula te.

In the absence of theoret ical and empiric al

elabora tion, however , it seems reasona ble to conclud e from the evidenc e
to date that many children have some sort of readine ss of philosop hic
inquiry .

Matthew s has been a forerunn er in this field of investig ation

and his findings provide a firm basis for arguing in favour of childre n's
r eadiness for philosop hy.

Two problems do emerge , however , with his

particu lar line of research ;

probler.i s whose resoluti on would serve t0

ensure fur ther progres s in the field.

The first relates to the

assess~ ent of readines s, the second to i~dividu al differen ces in
philosop hic propens ity .
(i)

Unt i l now philosop hic readine ss has b een deter mined on the

basis of the content of children ' s everyday and classroo m dialogue s .

deliber ation in their di alogues .
has two major limitati ons .

That

This method of determi nation, however ,

On the one hand , it does not provide a means

for assessin g the extent to which the apparen t philosop hic display
charact erizes truly philoso phic delibera tion as opposed to mere childhoo d
whimsy.

On the other hand , it is an inadequ ate method for maki ng an

assessme nt about philoso phic readine ss in childre n who do not make any
such overt display s .

It may be that for this small percenta ge of

childre n there is no predispo sition for philosophic inquiry , that is , no
reaciine ss for philosop hy .

Other explana tions can be provided , however ,

which equally well account for this absence of overt philosop hic displ:iy .
The chil.i mi bht 1Je , fo r example , char a.cteris tically quiet and unspoken .
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Progress in this field of research is, therefore , very much dependent
upon the developme nt of technique s more comprehe nsive in their
assessmen t of philosoph ic readiness .
(ii)

The probl em of individua l differenc es in philosoph ic

readiness is twofold.

First there is -che problem related to teaching a

group of children, some of whom display a readiness and some who don 't.
Second, there is the problem of individua l differenc es in actual areas
of philosoph ic interest.

For example, evidence of interest in

metaphys ical issues does not guarantee an interest in or readiness for
issues in the philosoph y of science.
The problem concernin g teaching those with a readiness for the
subject and those without .is not a problem peculiar to the subject of
philosoph y.

Without me aning to appear terse, the most obvious solution

would see!':l to involve the division cf the group fo:- teaching practice .
The problem of heterogen ous interest a reas, however, is more complex and
deserves more attention .

It is not the aim of this chapter to elaborate

upon appropria te teaching strategie s .

Rather , I will conclude by

suggestin g a direction in which these programs might best proceed .
Ideally, the teacher would ass ess each child for interest areas
and degree of philosoph ic curiosity .

Given that the teacher was

sensitive to philosoph ic . issues and their ramifi cations then, a
heterogen ous group should benefit from most philosoph ic inquiry .

In

other words, the success of a philosoph y program see~s very much
dependent upon the teachers ab i lity to select and present those parts of
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a philoso phy progran ~ost suited to his/he r studen ts .

It is the

teache rs who are fa:::i l iar with their studen ts, and it is within their
respon sibility to tai:!..or a program to the pupils ' needs.

It seems

unreal istic to expect a program to cater to so many differe nt needs
particu larly .:ithou- : specifi c knowled ge of what they are.

Rather , a

more genera lly struc~~ red program with specif ic sugges tions for
cateri ng to differe ~t intere st areas seems more approp riate.
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A P P E ND I X 1
AN OUTLINE OF THE PHILOSOPHY FOR
CHILDREN CURRICULUM

Figure lA:

Curriculum Outline Through Grades K- 12 .
(Adapted from Fig.1 ., p.54, "Philosophy in the Classroom")

K- 2

3-4

5-6

6

General Philosophical Foundations
Language
Aquisition

Kio
and
Gus

Language
Aquisition

Elementary Philosophical
Specialization

Aquis ition
of Formal
& Informal
Logic

Pixie

10

Lisa
Suki
:fark

Harry

11-12
Advanced
Philosophical
Specialization

Ethics
Epistemology
Metaphysi~s
Aesthetic.3

The following grade by grade description of the Philosophy for
Children curriculum has been constructed from extracts taken from the book
'Philosophy in the Classroom' and a series of course description leaflets
published at IAPC, Montclair State College .

I.

The Early Childhood Curriculum

(i )

Program:

Reasoning About rature

Grade Range:

K- 5

Novel:

Kio and Gus

Manual :

Wondering at the World
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Kio and Gus:

Kio visits his grandpare nts ' farm and becomes friendly with
Gus, who lives with her family not far away. The novel consists
largely of conversat ions . The children are sensitive to language
ar.d ideas as well as to the animals, people and things in the world

around them .

Among the contrasti ng concepts they wonder about are
make-beli eve and real ity, fear a nd courage, saying and doing, and
truth and beauty .
As a result of the intens e interest shown by Kio and Gus in
animals, in space and time, and in many other aspects of nature,
the book se!··.res in the prograr.i as an introduct ion to science , as
well as the relations hip between language and the world .

Wondering at r.1·. e ~-."orld :

The stress is on language acquisiti on with
part icular attention to t he forms of reasoning implicit in children ' s
everyday conversat ion . Also, there is an emphasis on intensifi cation
of perceptua l awareness , sharing of perspecti ves through dialogue,

classific ation and dist inction , and reasoning about feel ing .

(ii)

Pixie :

Program :

Reasoning About Language

Grade Range:

K- 5

Novel :

Pixie

Manual :

Looking for Meaning

Among the goals of the Pixie program a re the following :
- to prepare children to study Harry Stottleme ier . Discovery in
the following year of philosoph y by improving those inquiry
skills which make for success when doing the Harry program.
- to stre ss r.!eaning acquisiti on and reading comprehen sion .
- to help students develop facil ity in handling c lass and family
relations hips , as well as rules, reasons and excuses, the Pixie
cours e concentra tes upon strengthe ning t he awareness of
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relations hips (logical, social, familial, aesthetic , causal ,
part--who le, ::-.athema tical, etc. ) , as well as the competenc e in
dealing with such relations hips .
Looking for ~1eaning :

Continues the emphases of Kio and Gus paying
greater atter.t ion to semantica l and syntactic al structure s, such
as ambiguity , and abstract philosoph ical notions such as causality ,
space, number , person, class, group.

II.

7he Curricu:·~ :: for the Middle- School

(i)

Program :

=~sic Reasoning Skills

:J.rad.e 3&.r:ge : - - ..,r

Novel :

~arr y Stot tlemeier ' s Discovery

Manual

?hilosoph ical Inquiry

Harry : Harry is the ~asic text in the middlesch ool program in philosoph y
stress is on -::-:e acquisiti on of formal and informal logic . The
novel offers a model of dialogue both the children with one another
and with adu:~s . Its story is set within a classroom of children
who begin to thi nk about thinking , and in the process discover
principle s o: reasoning . They also discover, in the events that
follow both within and outside the classroom , that they can apply
their thinking effective ly to situation s in real life . The story
is also a teaching model , it points out the value of inquiry,
encourage s ~te developme nt of alternati ve modes of thought and
imaginati on, and suggests how children can learn profitabl y from
one another. Further, it sketches what it might be like to live
and po.::.·ticir:.:: -::e in o. sr.-,all communi t:)' whe1·e the cni ld::.·e!1 r.a,,e t:-.e .:.::
own interests , yet respect each other as people and are capable
at times of enfaging in cooperati ve inquiry fo r no other reason
than the sa.tis:'act ion of doin5 so .

118
(ii)

Lisa :

Program:

Reasoning in Ethics

Grade Range :

6-12

Novel :

Li sa

Manual ;

Ethical Inquiry

Lisa is a sequel to Harry Stottlemeier ' s Discovery and focuses
upon ethical and social issues such as fairness, naturalness,
lying and truth-telling, a.nd the nature of roles and standards.
Other i ssues explored include the rights of children, j ob and sex
(lj_ scrimi nation , · and antma l r i ghts .

:!.", isa is c oncerned with the

interrelat ionship of logic and mor ality .

The curriculum is

designed t o help student s establish good reasons in justifying
t heir beli efs a s well a s in j ust ifying cert ain departures ::'ro!l1
normal patterns of conduct.
(iii)

Suki:

Program:

Reasoning in Language Arts

Grade Range

6-12

~fovel:

8;;ki

1,:anual :

·..:ri t i ng :

How a nd

. ~:t

~

Suki is a novel about the same group of children who are now
freshmen in hi gh school.

Faced with assignments in writing poetry

and prose, Harry protests that he cannot write at all .

The novel

explores the ways in which this writer's bloc is dealt with a nd
overcome.

At t he same time, it considers such underlying issues

as experience and meaning, criteria f or the ass essment of writinb ,
relationship between thinking and writing, the nature of definition,
and the distinction between craft and art.
Writing ; . How and \\Thy:

c o ncent r a tes on the ;.rr i tin~; of poet r y,

with numerous exercises and activities.

Among other t hings , t he

manual is an impressive anthology of hund reds of poems by and for
children .
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(iv)

Mark:

Program;

Reasoning in Social Studies

Grade Range;

6-12

Novel:

Mark

Manual:

Social Inquiry

The fictional characters i n Mark are now high school sophmores.
of ther.1~ ~;ark is accused of vandalism.

One

In an effort to ascertain

wbo is guilty Mark's class find themselves impelled to inquire
into a nlL~ber of general social issues such as t he function of law ,
the nati.;.~·e of bureaucracy ~ the role of crime in modern society , the
freedom of the individual, and alternative conceptions of justice .
Again tt e ~anual~ puts these and many other concepts into practice
throug:-: c lassroom acti vit ies and exercises.

III.

The Curriculum for the High School
P:rogra::::

Advanc ed Philosophical Spe~ializations

This curriculum is not yet developed .

It is planned , however, to

consist of a number of approaches each representing a more advanced
area of philosophical speciali zation.

Five separate novels, eac h

with its own manual , is to be construc t ed i n the areas of ethics,
epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and logic .

Each of thes e

will carry on and reinforce the thinking skills and the techni ques
of applying such skills t hat had been developed in previous
experience to philosophy f or children.

AP P E ND I X
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BOOKS AND OTHER ~1ATERIALS USEFUL FOR THE TEACHING
OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY
(i)

Litera ture reconunended by Gar~th ~1atthew s

I n a coltlr."n entitle d ' Thinkin g in Stories ' which appear s regula rly
in 'Thinki ng: Tie Journa l of Philoso phy for Childr en', Profes sor
Matthe w~ describ es the phil osophic al conten t of certain childre n ' s books
.
'1 he literat ure ~e has i dentifi ed to da-.:.e as be:.ng philos ophica
lly rich
1

include s:
Frog and Toad Toge~h er

by

Arnold Label

Albert 's Tootha che

by

Barba ra ·.:i lliams

Hildil i d ' s Ni ght

by

Cheli Duran Ryan

Tom ' s Midnig ht Qarden

by

Phillip a Pearse

Leese Webste r

by

~:.e ?. eal Thief

by

Ursula K. LeGuin
~'1illia::i Steig

':y

The Upside - Down Cat

by

Eli zabeth Parson s

Morris the Moose
Wally ' s Storie s

by

B. Wi seman

by

Vivian Gussin Paleg

Raging Robots and
Unruly Unc les

by

~largare t. }~ahy

An exampl e of the type of analys is he provid es is as follows :
In Thinkin g, Vol.1(1 ) , he discus ses br i efly Arnold Label ' s stories ,
drawing attenti on particularly to a passag e in one of these stories
called ' Cooki es ' . Here Frog and Toad are discuss ing their will power
in respec t of resisti ng freshly baked cookie s . :.:atthews writes :
The notion of wi ll , and the associa ted r.otion of will power ,
are phi losoph ically both vexed a nd vexjng . Some of the
vexatio ns have to do wi th the idea of determ ini s~ and ~hethe r
deter!:ii!"lis::: is compat it::.e ,,:i :.h :'::.·ee ,dll . 3t.it 0t :1e~·s have t,~
J20
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do with the idea of weakness of will , incontine nce (akras ia )
- lack of will power . Frog says that will power is ' trying
hard not to do something you really want to do '. There is
something very puzzling about the i dea of trying not to do
what you really want to do. If you really want to do it , you
won ' t really try not to . On the other hand , if you really
try not to, it will be because you want not to do it . What
Frog (and we) describe as lack of will power begins to look
l ike a case of conflicti ng desires . Toad wants to stop; but
also (and even more strongly) he wants to continue to eat
cookies . ... etc .
Arnold Label ' s gentle and loving ~ockery of Frog and Toad invites
us 'to re fl ect upon the phenomenon of weakness of will ~nd to join
philosoph ers from Aristotle (see Book VII of his Nicomache an Ethi cs) to
the present iP- ~rying to understan d it. :-ne phenomenon is as familia~
as it is difficult to be clear about .

(j_i)

5ecommend ed Texts for Teaching High School Philosouh v

teaching high school philosoph y :
the classical approach which centred
on carefully pre - selected reading ; the ' issues ' approach which was
structure d around topics with readings chosen for their i lluminati on of
the problem more than for their inherent or classical contribut ion to
philosoph y; li:e- style auproache s which explored alternati ve life styles
based on major philosoph ical positions ; and , t he ' open-proc ess ' ap oach
which sought to develop altogethe r inductive ly, letting topics and r
readings be det ermined by students either from their own suggest io
from their choice of material suggested by the instructo r .

or

Examples of books used for:
:::ntrd.'.lc- :ion

'to

?::ilosopby

' Invitatio n to Philosoph y ' , Honer and Hunt (Wadswort h) , C
' Learning to Phi losophici ze ' , E.rt. En'lmet (Pelican) , Chapt

1

•
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Classical Philosoph y
Aristotle :
Descartes :

Ethics , Books I and II
selection from Meditatio ns

Dostoevsk y to Sartre : selection s on existenti alism
Plato: Crito, Apology, and the story of the cave from the Republic
Philosoph y of Science
'The Structure of Science ', E. i-Iagel (Harcour t), Chapter 1 :
and Common Sense
'Naturalis m ' ,

Science

A. Danto

r1•ne Encyc:.ope deia of Pr:.i::..osoph y

'Science as an Adventure of the Human Spirit '
Selectior. s from Whitehead , Bror,mowski and W. \ieaver
Phil osophy of Religion
' The Lost Dimension of Religion ' , Paul Tillich
'Man's Search for Meaning ' , Victor Frankl
F'ilm :

'Hi ght and Fog '

(:.:ass :-Iedia ::inistrie s)

Logic
'Introduc tion to Logic ', Irving Copi
In addition, the following were used by two or more teachers in the program:
Freud:

The Future of an Illusion

Fromm:

Marx's Concept of Man

Hesse :

Siddartha

Kaplan :

The New World of Philosoph y

Kaufmann:
Malcolm X:

Existenti alism from Dostoevsky to Sartre
Autobiogr aphy

~ i ll , J . S .:

On Liberty

Ruby, Lionel: The Art of ::aking Sense
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B.

Philosophy Thr ough Literatur e
-program developed by Ms A. Merringto n .
Course 'outline :

high school philosoph y

Introduct ion - an under standing of what is meant
by philosoph y
·The Nature of the Mind
Appear ance and Reality
Free Will vs Determini sm
Moral Proof and Principle s, Eth_ics
The Reasoning Pr ocess - Informal Logic
'i'he Quest - the universal search for answers and
uni ty

Examples of literatur e used in the course :
On the i:ature of the :-!ind
1
Zen a!'lc 1,he Art of :.:otorcyc le ~iding', Pirsig , Chs . 7 and 14 .
'Faith and the Good Thing' , Johnson and Charles
' The Celestial Railroad ', Hawthor ne: The Birthmark , Rappacini ' s
:aughter
' 'l'he i,:artian Chronicle s ' , Bradbur y
' Brave Hew World' , Huxley
On Appearanc e and Reali t y

Classical works :
Plato ' s concepts as shown in ' the Cave ' and ' the Meno '
Descarte ' s theories revealed in e xcerpts from the ' Medit ations'
Statement of the problem by B. Russell
Literatur e :
' The Turn of the Screw ', Henry James
' Alice in Wonderland ' and ' Through the Looking Glass ', Lewis Carroll
'The Trial ' , Kafka
'Steppenw olf ' , Hesse
' The Te~pest ', Shakespea re
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' The Mysterio~s Stranger'
'The Man who Corrupted Hadleyburg' , Twain

(iii)

Programs for ~eaching Logic and Critical Thinking in Precollege
Education
Schools and colleges are using many different methods to teach

thinking skills .

Tte following programs, based on various educational

philosophies, ha•:e received considerable attention.
r::.:l1e Struc-:":!:'e ::.:~ the I ntellect ?rogram :

this approach developed. by

J.P. Gui lford, has t:!:'oken intelligence into 120 discrete skills , 26 of
which are sai d ~c ~e critical to success in school.

Thousands of

s epa:.A ate lessor.s ca,.-e ·:::ieen created to teach the skills.

The program ' s

headquarters is t~e 3.J.I . Institute in El Segundo, Cal ifornia .
The Strategic ~easoning Approach :
Albert Upton.

is based on the ideas of the late

~~is a~?roach concentrates upon six problem-solving

sec_;_'..:.er:cj_ng , see:.:.; :::-e~ationslnps a:::l synthesizir,.5 .

:::xercisea ·..;.::relat.;;l:

to school are used , and the principles are transferred to classroom
applications and the~ to life situations .

Innovative Sciences in Stamford,

Conneti-::.ut markets t~e lessons .
The Educati or.a~ Enric hment Program :
Feverstein and is geared to low achievers .

was developed by Reuven
It attempts to tap- the intrinsic

motivation to learn , using problem-solving tasks to bring out abi l ities t hat
can be applied to sc~ool work.

Many of the exercises require little

reading so that all ciildren can address the task.

Curricultun Development

Associates in Washington distributes the mat erials and trains the teachers .
The Ed,,ayc. c.e 3ono Lateral Thinking Approach:

Mr de Bono ' s theory,

disseminated :fr c:7: i1:2 :1.eadquarters in London, inc ludes breakinG oi..;.t. o :.·
traditiona l thinking patterns by trying to devise new ways of l ooking at
problems .
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Other progra ms includ e :
The Produc t ive Thinki ng Progra m : a course in learni ng to think
by Coving ton , ~.1.v ., Crutch field, R.S ., Davies , L. and
Olton, R.M. Charle s
E. Merril Publis hing Co., Col ombo, Ohio. 1974
Critic al Thinki ng:
by Anita Harnad ek .

with childr en's workbo ok and teach er's guide,
;,liddle school progra m . :-lidwest Pu.bl ishi ng? Pacifi c

Grove, Califo rnia .

1980 .

Snowf lakes and Clouds : Readin g , Thinki ng and Reason ing Skills
Progra m by Dorr Barnes , and Burgd orf, A. and Wenok, L.S. Stock
and Vaughn
Co . , Austin , Texas. 1975.
Mathem atical Reason ing:
'4..ir,J ishers , :.:ic::i~ a:1 , l9'72 .

for Junior High by Anita Harnad ek , Midwe st

AP P E ND I X
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TH::::;:--:ING SKILLS Ai'.iD THE PHILOSOPHY FOR
CHILDREN PROGRAM

I n a recent ; aper, Professor Lipman list s thirt y thinking skills
supposedly taught c~· ~he Philosoph y for Childre n Program . He claims
that t he list i s net exhaustiv e , and f or each skill he a lso c ites an
example er exercise :~volving the us e of that skill . The examples are
taken i'!'o::-. :.::e i:1s-:::-·..:.::~ion manuals whici1 accorr.pany t:1em . For t he purposes
of this thes i s , I i:a::e chosen to include only t he list of thinking skills .
For further i:i:o~~~-=: ~n : see ' Th:nking Skills Fostered by Philosoph y fc!'
Ci1ildren ', ~nfubl::.s::.e:: paper by :l';atthew Lipman , f.lontclair State College ,
N .J

. , 1983 .
The thinking skills he cites in this paper include the following :
- fo r!:'.ul a ti:-,f concepts precisely
- l'orwulati r.f :::ause- effect relations hips
making i r.:.:eiiate inference s from a single premise
- drawing s:,,·:.:..::)gistic inference s from two premises
- knowi ng ele~entar y rules of standardi zation
- knowin& t::e !'ules governing ordinal and relationa l logic
- recognizi ng consisten cies and contradic tion
- drawi ng in~erence s from condition al syllogism s in propositio nal
logic
- formulati n; questions
- identifyi ng underlyin g asswnptio ns
- grouping pa::-t- whole and whole- part connectio ns
.• }c1c·,rin:; ·,:::-2:·. to n.void, tolerate- or ut ilize ar.1biGui.t ies
- recognizi n~ vague wor ds
- taking rele·::rnt considera tions into account
- recot:;!1izi ::c -:::e interdepe ndence o!' ends and means
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- recogniz ing informa l fallacie s
- operatio nalizing concepts
- giving reasons
- recogni zing the context ual nature of truth and falsity
- making distinct ions
- making connect ions
- working with analogie s
- discove ring alterna tives
- constru cting hypothe ses
- analyz i ng values
- instant iating
- constru cting definiti ons f or familiar words
.. j dentifyi ng and using c:ri teria
- taking differen ces of perspec tive into account

A P P E NDI X 4
fIFTH- GRADERS DISCUSS EVIDENCE ,
KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

Fifth- graders discuss Evidence, Knowledge and Truth - a transcript
made by Ronald Reed and published in Thinking,
- 1980, 2(1) ' pp . 68 - 71 .

Firs t time on tape - 4-5 minutes
giggling.

Ron

- Let's talk about some of
the words that have come up
in previous classes. Words
like "certainty,
evidence
"
Shaun - "Proof."
Ron
- "Proof."
Wendy - "Knowledge ."
Beth
- "Belief."
Ron
- "Knowledge, be lief."
Craig - "Convince. "
Ron
- And "convince." I didn't
think we'd come up with
that many. Let's stay with
these. These are
important words that have
come up recently in our
discussions. These words
might stand a l ittle more
definition.
Gail
- Who's got the dictionary.
[Pause] I got it.
Ron
- Wait. Let's see what
definitions, what relations
among words we can come up
with.
Beth
- You want to be wrong .
LAUGHTER
Ron
- No, I just want to find out
what we mean when we use
the terms. These are
ordinary words, right ? We
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Beth
Ron

-

Shaun
Ron
Holly
Ron

-

Uolly Beth

-

Holly -

Mi tch -

Beth
Ron

-

should be able t o unpack
. . . , to say what we mean
when we use these terms.
You always take the hard way.
I ' m sorry (jokingly). It
will be fun.
Hey, recorder How y' doing .
O.K., how about "proof" .
What ;:ibout "proof".
Can I prove to you someth ing
th a t is false. Can I prove
t o you 2 + 2 = 5.
Yo u ca n ? rove it, but I
woul dn 't believe it because
I know it's not true.
But then you wouldn't be
proving it. I mean I ' d know
it was false and you ' d know
it was false and it wouldn't
be a proof.
So if we bo th knew it was
false then it would not be
proved.
What about if you were proving
it to ten people and make
believe some people knew it
was true and some peopl e knew
it was false. Then could yo~
prove it?
If some peopl e knew it was
true . ..
Isn't that a di fferen t case .
Weren ' t we talking about it
being false .
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Mitch

- Right. It is false for some
people, but it is true for
other people.
Ron
- Remember the discussi on
we had on contrad iction. A
sentence can 't be both true
and false at the same time.
2 + 2 = 4 is either true or
false. Can't be both, right?
Mitch - Right.
Ron
- Right. You did agree before.
You can change your mind if
you want.
Mitch - O.K. What about if
If
. .. what Beth said was
some thing ... Be th said
somethin g would not be a
proof because I know it was
false and you know it was
fals e.
Ron
- Beth is saying ...
Beth
- ... that you can't prove
something that everybod y
knows is false . ·Or really
you can't prove somethin g
that is false.
PAUSE
Ron
- Tha t's a pre t ty big chaP.g~ ,
an addition you made there?
No?
Beth
- What.
Ron
- Well first you said you
can't prove somethin g that
everybod y knows is false.
Then you said you can ' t
prove somethin g that simply
is false.
Whether
people know its true or
false doesn't seem to
matter then .
Beth
- O.K.
PAUSE
Ron
- Well, what do you want to
say now.
Beth
- The se cond one . I t does n't
matte r whethe r anybody
knows or not.
Ron
- O.K. Anybody e lse have
anythin g to say.
PAUSE

Ron

- I bet there's a lot more
we could say about proof.
But maybe we have enough
to begin comparin g things.
If you prove somethin g,
what you prove must be
true. Right.
SERIES OF NODS, SMILES ETC .
As I remembe r it.
Ron
- Is there any differen ce
between evidence and
proof.
EVERYBODY SAYS NO.
Ron
- Do you ever get nervous
when everybod y agrees. Or
when somethin g se ems
obvious . When you think
you have the right answer
right away. PAUSE Th ink
about Harry. He though t
he had th e answer in Ch.l .
Poor Harry is still looking.
It's now what, Ch . 7, Ch.8?
You guys agreeing so quick
makes me nervous .
WHAT SEEMS TO BE A UNIVERSAL NO
FOLLOWED BY HUCH I..AUGHTER . A kird
o~ joke is b~i~; ~lay~~ h~~2. :
suspect .
Ron
- What is . . . Give me some
example s of evidenc e.
Stacy - I have evidence that this
glass, that someone , that
Jim drank from this glass.
Craig - You didn't see him.
Gail
- She doesn't have to s ee
him. She could know from
other stuff.
}{itch - Like his fingerp rints on
the glass.
Shaun - Or if somebody else saw him.
An eyewitn ess .
- Anything else ~ Another
Ron
example of "having evide nce
for."
Shaun - I have proof f0r a nd I have
evidence for this: Th e
Dodgers will win the
pennant.
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Ron

- Aw, you can ' t have proof for
that. Obvious ly, the
Dodgers won't win. Only
kidding . Only kidding . But
seriousl y we agreed that
you can ' t have proof for
somethin g that is false.
Right? So you can ' t prove
that the Dodgers will win
if in fact, they lose. I
wonde r, also, if you could
prove that the Dodgers will
win even if the Dodgers do
win . I mean could I prove
it now? Anybody?
NO RESPONSE .
Ron
- We said that belief, I mean,
we said that proof gives you
a kind of guarante e of truth .
Now, say, I pi ck up this
glass and I say "Jim used
this glass to have a drink
of water because the glass
i s \ full now and Jim's
fingerp rints are on the
glass." Two qu estions (1)
Do we have evide nce to
suppo rt our claim that Jim
drank wat e r from the glass.
Stacy - We can't say for sure that
Jim had the glass because
his finger prints
Craig - His fing erprints are on the
glass.
Jim
- Somebody els e could have
put my fingerp rints on the
glass. They could have a
machine that st eals
fingerp rints, comes and
gets them in the middle of
the night. Or like a
camera. Takes a picture of
your fing e rprints and puts
th em on the glass.
PAl'SE
Ron
- You're saying it's possibl e
to sort of forg e
fingerp rints. Counter fe it
finge rpr ints .

Jim
- Yeah.
CONVERSATION VERY LOUD, HARD TO
MAKE OUT ON TAPE.
Six minutes of discussi on and
anecdote s on the art of steal ing
fingerp rints. Class agrees that
it is possible but highly unlikely
that anyone would want to ''forge"
Jim's fingerp rints.
Ron
- O.K. Say they r ea lly
were Jim's fingerp rints.
Mitch
- Then Jim ' s guilty.
Craig
- Just because J im's
fingers are on the glass
doesn't mean he couldn ' t
have just handed the
glass to Stacy.
Wendy
- ... Then
St a cy
- I didn 't do it, honest. I
promise . I didn't even
see the class.
Ron
- Just make beli eve .
Mitch
- But Stacey's fingerp rints
are not on the glass.
Gail
- How do you know?
Mit.:h
- (to ·her) Are they on t he
glas s?
Ron
- No , I don't think so .
- Then she wiped them off.
Mitch
Debbie - How could she just wip e off
hers and not Jim' s? You
can ' t do that. You can't
even see the fin ge rprints
to wipe them off.
Beth
- Bu t even if Jim' s fi ngerprints are only on the
glass, it still doesn't
prove that Jim drank
somethin g else or he could
have just held the glass.
Ron
- So, we haven't proven our
case against Jim. But
what can we say about
Jim ' s fin ge rprints. Does
that, th e fin e rprint~,
count as evidence .
Debbie - They ' re sort o f evid enc e
but they don't prove.
0
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Wendy
Ron
PAUSE
Ron

PAUSE
Ron
Holly

- Proof gives you a
guarante e. Evidence doesn't .
- O.K. What does evidenc e do.
- Well, if someone gives you
a bunch of real good
evidence ... I wish you
liked Sherlock Holmes
What do you do?

- Do you believe them then?
Sometim es. Sometim es I
don't. No natter what the
evide:1c e.
~ That's int e resting.
Ron
Let's
get right back to that
after we finish this . A
lot of goo~ evidence may
not cause you to believe
but doesn't it give you
some real ly good reasons
for be lievi ng?
Shaun - Yeah.
- And a litt le ... some really
Ron
"shaky" evi:::enc e might just
give ; ou a li tt le reason to
believe .
Shaun - But if it was really shaky ,
you wouldn' t believe it.
- Right, but if it was really
Ron
shaky evidenc e, if it was
evidenc e, couldn' t that give
you some, just a little
reason to bel ieve.
Shaun - Yes, but not enough to make
you believe .
Ron
- I see you and Holly want to
do "belief " . O.K. But first
we, you, said that proof
gives a kind of guarante e of
truth while evidence only
gives us some reason to
believe sonethin g is true.
O. K. ~ow \,:-:st about belief.
(Pause) ~hat is the
rel ati onship between evidence
and belief. Can I believe
somethin g for which I have
no evidenc e?

Craig
Jim

- No .
- Yes. Evidence is
somethin g which will make
you believe somethin g.
Ron
- O.K . That's one point.
But look at my question .
Can I believe somethin g
for which I have no
evidenc e. Jim says
evidence makes you believe
somethin g. That's one
point. I als o want to
know if you can believe
without having evidence .
Craig - Evidence can help you
have a belief but it can't
make you believe . I can
L,el.ieve anything I want
to. I can believe with no
evidence at all. I can
believe that Jim drank
from the glass ...
Stacy - That's evidenc e.
Gail
- His fingerp rints are th e
evidenc e.
Craig - That's believin g when I
have evidence . But I couid
also believe ...
- That there are little
Ron
invisib le orange men that
live on top of your head ...
Craig - What?
LAUGHTER
Ron
- I ' m trying to say, to
help you with an exampl e
Craig - That doesn't help.
LAUGHTER
- What I meant was you might
Ron
want to say "I believe
that there are little
orange men living on top
of my head even though I
have no evidence for that
claim."
Craig - Then I'd be crazy.
Hendy - Unless you saw little
orange footprin ts .
- That would be evide nc e.
Gail
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TAPE RUNS OUT HERE: Convers ation
continue s while new tape is inserted .
Stacy - You could present all the
evidence in the world and if
I didn't want to believe it
I just wouldn' t believe it.
PAUSE
Shaun - You mean you could believe
I'm not here right now.
PAUSE
Ron
- Aren't there two question s
involved here. First, could
Stacey or anyone else simply
make-up their minds not to
believe . Second , could
S:acey or anybody simply not
believe .
Jim
- Sometim es there might be a
lot of evidence that, say,
your team lost the ball
game but you still might not
believe it. You might not
believe that your team lost.
Ron
- Is that what you mean or do
you mean that you don't
believe you should have lost.
..
...
',.
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PAUSE
Jim
Ron

Beth

Ron

PAUSE
Wendy

PAUSE
Ron
Gail
Ron
SERIES
Ron
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Ron

Ron
Beth
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- Ignore it?
- Yeah forget about it or
say it ' s not good enough
evidenc e. Like a mirage
you could be in a desert
and "see" a mirage and know
you ' re in the desert and so
not really believe what
you are seeing .
- Everybod y understa nd that?
That was pretty complic ated.
Do you understa nd that?
Shaun?

- You know there aren't real
mirages . So when you
think you see one, you don't
really believe it.
- Anybody ever see a mirage?
- In the movies on T.V.
- What about in person.
OF NO'S
- Say a guy came here and he
looked just like George
Washirig ton, and he knew

I

-~i

...... """··'

cheats? ... O.K. sometim es,
yeah, you don ' t believe that
you should have lost but ...
and other times like you're
thinking about the game and
you believe that you really
won.
- What happens to the evidence
here.
- \.Jhat do you mean?
- I take it you (1) your
team really did lose · and
(2) there are scoreca rds,
reports from friends, e tc . a
good deal of evidence to
support the claim t hat your
team lost. What happ <?ns to
that evidence ?
- You can some times just
ignore the evide nce.

Wendy
Ron
Holly

-

Ron

-

"vrts of st:..::~'- --,.-

Ge:orge 1\as hing : .:m , ::.i;,c .i.!
said he was George
Washing ton. Would you
believe him?
No.
Why?
Because George Washing ton
is dead.
So you reject one set of
evidence stateme nts ... I
mean, you have on the one
hand some evidence to
support a belief that this
guy is really George .
Washing ton. He looks just
like the picture , he says
he is etc. On the oth e r
hand, yo u have h0ard chat
(a) George Washing ton is
dead and (b) eve n if h e was
still alive, he would have
to be ove r ~50 years old .
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INAUDIBLE
Ron
- So belief does not
Beth
- They're both evidence. The
guarantee truth.
first and the second one. But
PAUSE
the second one, if you don't
Ron
- Does it seem to you
know is stranger. So you
that one thing keep s
don't accept, you forget about
leading to another?
the first.
SERIES OF GROANS
Ron
- O.K . That ' s good. But now I ' m
Ron
- I ' m getting tired too.
gett i ng mixed up. I feel like
We'll stop now. Bu t
Harry. What is the relations hip
just think . about this
between evidence and belief.
for the next class.
We sai d, I think, that
How does knowledge fit
evidence doesn't make you,
in with ail these other
doesn 't force you to believe.
words. Does knowledge
What does evidence do?
guarantee truth? Can
Holly - It sort of he l ps you to believe.
I know tha t it ' s
Like it says its 0.K. to
raining when it's not
believe something .
really raining. Also,
Ron
- Like a kind of support? Like
could I know that it's
the mo r e, the stronger the
rai ning (when its really
evidence, the greater the
raining) but not believe
chance that you ' 11 be r_igh t
that its raining.
in what you believe.
INAUDIBLE
Holly - Right.
ron
- See you next week.
Ron
- That seem right to everybody ?
vi:·"·
·1..
... 4. ••

,"l.vn

•
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l .:-u, ci :1 ,?u r. ry and

connect
some of the words that we've
used together.
GOES TO THE BOARD
Ron
- How about evidence. How does
evidence relate to truth?
Shaun - You can have evidence for
something that is true and
evidence for something that is
false.
Ron
- So evidence can't guarantee
truth .
Shaun - Right.
Ron
- But the stronger the evidence ,
the gr eater t he likelihoo d
of truth.
Shaun - Yeah , but still no guarantee .
Ron
- What about belief. Does
belief guarantee truth?
PAUSE
Ron
- Can I believe something that
is false'?
Debbi<;! - Yes.

